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It was, I recall, around 1971 when talking about Descartes that my school 
teacher put forward an argument that had a profound affect on my subsequent thinking. 
He argued that Descartes' famous statement, 'I think, therefore I am', was flawed. He, 
Descartes, had made in this statement the assumption, 'I think'. Following from this, 
without proving that he thinks Descartes cannot prove his existence and as his existence 
depends on his unproved ability to think, his philosophical premise is merely 
tautological. 
Shortly after this I read Bertrand Russell's, 'The History of Western 
Philosophy'. I could not help thinking - and subsequent re-readings have only confirmed 
my suspicions, which were only strengthened during my tutorials in the history of 
epistemology during my studies for my Bachelor of Arts degree - that each philosopher 
seemed to base his premises on a misunderstanding of a previous philosopher about 
whom he spoke, a misunderstanding caused by the inadequacy of language. I later began 
to realise that not only philosophy, but also scientific argument always begins with some 
premise which the author then tries to prove. The proof may sound most convincing but 
inevitably relies on the initial premise being correct. If the proof is right then so is the 
premise. If the premise is right then so may be the proof. Scientific advance relies on 
proving the premises of a previous theory to be inadequate. Newtonian physics were law 
until Einstein changed the parameters and today Einstein's theory of relativity has in 
turn been amended, although not, yet, completely discredited.[l] 
I have now been practising as a sculptor for twenty three years, (including five 
student years) and have found little space in making sculpture for this kind of scientific 
thinking. In making art, intuition and chance play a very great role and interestingly 
enough a number of scientists have now become interested in the way that artists 
think,[2] 
I mention these points in that they determine the structure of my text. I have 
become so unused to thinking in a strictly academic manner that I have decided to 
arrange my material as two parallel texts. Alongside and intermingled with the main 
theme are a series of biographical anecdotes and quotations from other writers. These 
are limited to matters relevant to the main argument or to my thinking in general and 
may, or may not, be elaborated on in the main text. I have chosen this methodology as I 
wish to allow room for intuition and accidents - for chance associations and insights into 
the main themes. These biographic writings are also a kind of apology for my lack of 
scholarship. I tend to clear my memory of large amounts of data on a regular basis and 
am often, thus, unable to distinguish whether an idea is original to me, or the result of 
something read many moons ago. These biographic notes are written in the present 
tense, for although they happened in the past they are memories tempered by time. Some 
notebook entries are also used and for these the exact date is given and not only the year. 
Having said this, I hope that a more serious intention will become clear in this method. 
All experience is essentially personal, but their are aspects of our experience which we 
may consider to be universal. Part of my quest is to unravel those aspects of our being 
and our art which may be considered to be personal, and those which have a common 
basis in us all. 
I am acutely aware that I have used much material here that would, I suspect, 
normally be disregarded by most academics as being not based in the accepted scientific, 
rational procedures that they favour. That is my prerogative as a sculptor, for I can find 
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interesting and useful information in the strangest of places. Much of what contributes 
to my world view would probably seem laughable to 'normal' intellectual thought. I see 
this as, ultimately, mentally liberating and, I hope, allows me to see things in a different 
light. If I can throw new light on an old subject then the endeavour of writing this text 
will prove worthwhile. I am sure, however, that it will infuriate some, if not many. 
There are moments in one's life when one feels totally overwhelmed. They may 
occur on hearing a piece of music, or when looking at a work of art. They are an 
emotional response to, what we tend to refer to as, 'beauty'. One such moment, or 
collection of moments, was the performance of Mahler's Third Symphony in the 
Cathedral of Pecs, some years ago. It was simply extraordinary and I have not heard the 
work performed so successfully by the world's leading orchestras. As it finished there 
was a silence, which seemed to last for about a minute before the long and thunderous 
applause began. One knew that one had been in the presence of great art. 
I have had similar experiences in front of the paintings of Mark Rothko which 
have their own room in London's Tate Gallery, in the Orangerie in Paris, where I saw 
my first Brancusi sculpture, the 'Bird in Space' from the Guggenheim Collection in 
Venice, and in front of a small drawing by Henry Moore of his own hands, in an 
eightieth birthday drawing retrospective, again, in London. 
The theme which underlies this look at the language of sculpture is an attempt to 
establish the origin of these moments, for they are, I believe, the ultimate experience that 
art can provide. 
Footnotes: 
[1] British astronomer Sir Fred Hoyle has made some amendments to this theory. 
[2] Benoit B. Mandelbrot 'The Fractal Geometry of Nature' Cambridge, Mass, 1980. 
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Part 1 Sculpture as language 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the 1970's William Tucker held a series of seminars at St. Martin's School of art 
in London entitled "What Sculpture is". Tucker argued that what differentiates a 
sculpture from any other object is its "visibility". A sculpture's primary function, before 
any other subsidiary function that it may have, is that it is made to be seen. I still find 
this a useful definition today.1 
Let us dig a little deeper by comparing a sculpture to say, a chair. A chair is, by its 
nature, made to be sat on, although it may also be used for other purposes - say to stand 
on to reach something on a high shelf, or indeed, in certain pubs in our big cities, as a 
weapon. It may indeed be beautiful to look at. It may be highly decorated, or it may have 
a kind of beauty in its simplicity. A sculpture may also be sat on, used as a temporary 
ladder or, indeed, as a temporary weapon, but this is not its prime function. It is made to 
be seen and, through this act of seeing, to convey messages to the beholder. It is the 
nature of these "messages" and how they are created and seen that is a central concern 
of this text. 
"Chair" is a word, a signifier. When we hear the word "chair" we, who 
understand English, know what the word means, although our understanding of it may 
vary a little. We may on hearing it, if we think a little, remember a favourite chair, or 
perhaps we have an idea of an 'ideal' chair. The word "sculpture" may affect us in a 
similar way when we hear it and bring to mind a particular example, or, indeed, trigger 
in our minds an image of some kind of an ideal sculpture. So what is the difficulty? Why 
a need to define what a sculpture is? Tucker argued that the term "sculpture" had been 
so debased in its modern usage as to have almost no meaning. When Anthony Caro 
flippantly said that "sculpture can be anything" he was taken rather too literally and 
videos of people throwing twigs in water became "sculpture" as did a photograph of 
someone walking in a straight line through the desert Some people argued, (and still do), 
that sculpture is what sculptors do. Now that is a tautology if ever there was one. Clearly 
a word which can mean anything loses all its value as a signifier. A "chair" which is a 
walk in a straight line through the desert is clearly absurd and just so a "sculpture" like 
this. 
Given this situation it is my intention to take another look in the following pages, as 
Tucker himself did, at what sculpture is. I wish to make an analysis of the sculptural 
language and to look at our ability to formulate and use this language. 
It is 1972.I am standing on Caldy beach. The sea washes a great deal of refuse from 
Liverpool Bay onto the shore. There are plastic bottles everywhere, used contraceptives and 
assorted pieces of driftwood. Sometimes there are dead sheep and once a cow, another time 
a seal. I often come here to think or draw. This time I suddenly start to make things. I make 
a series of drawings from seaweed and plastic, knowing that the tide will later wash them 
away. It is a revelation. I am intervening in nature and time. Intake a series of crosses 
from different materials. They say "I was here". I have marked a spot. The junction of the 
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arms of the cross is the middle of the world. Ifind a huge wooden beam, around four 
metres long, covered in tar and very heavy. I have the urge to stand it up. It is too heavy to 
lift so I start to dig a hole at one end and pack under the other end with sand and stones 
with the help of a lever. I eventually reach the point near to its equilibrium and with one 
big effort it falls into the hole. I straighten it up and pack it around with sand and stones. 
My first "sculpture"? I have joined the history ofproducing cultural artefacts; a history 
which stretches back at least 30,000 years. From this point on I stop painting and start 
making things. 
In his book "The language of Sculpture" Tucker tried to show the nature of the 
language that sculpture uses, through the study of a number of sculptors working at the 
end of the last, and the beginning of this, century.2 Re-reading Tucker today I feel a 
certain nostalgia and whilst my own ideas have developed considerably since my first 
reading as a student, I am still struck by how influential Tucker was in affecting the way 
I began to look at sculpture. Tucker wrote very much from the standpoint of a working 
sculptor and his book is full of astute insights. In talking of Rodin he states that; 
"if one compares ,for example, the celebrated clay sketch models of Canova, the feeling is 
utterly different: in Canova the surface is brittle, torn, ragged, gouged-out, but, however 
loose, it remains a surface, a skin. In Rodin one senses the identity of external event with 
internal force: clay is felt as substance, not over the surface, but through every cubic inch 
of volume. 
It is passages such as these that make Tucker's book well worth reading. 
But Tucker's analysis is limited in its scope. He concentrates his effort on an 
analysis of the awakening of the modern aesthetic and, in particular, the concept of the 
sculpture as object. Tucker begins his book with a quotation from Rilke, whose book on 
Rodin is one of the finest studies of a sculptor that I know, and this quotation is so 
pertinent that I take the liberty of repeating it here; 
"Sculpture was a separate thing, as was the easel picture, but it did not require a wall like 
the picture. It did not even need a roof It was an object that could exist for itself alone, and 
it was well to give it entirely the character of a complete thing about which one could walk, 
and which one could look at from all sides. And yet it had to distinguish itself somehow 
from other things, the ordinary things which everyone could touch. It had to be given its 
own certain place, in which no arbitrariness had placed it, and it must be intercalated in 
the silent continuance of space and its great laws. It had to be fitted into the space that 
surrounded it, as into a niche; its certainty, steadiness and loftiness did not spring from its 
significance but from its harmonious adjustment to the environment."4 
Whilst acknowledging Tucker's contribution to my thinking, I should like to look 
at this language that is sculpture from a very different angle. Perhaps my approach owes 
something to Paul Klee who tried to define a kind of 'language' for art in his 
"Pedagogical Sketchbook".5 As I should like to, Klee began with a number of 
fundamental elements in the language of art and made drawings to illustrate his topics. 
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His work is a mixture of logic, intuition, even play, and as Sibyl Moholy-Nagy states in 
her introduction; 
"A mind so in flux, so sensitive to intuitive insights, could never write an academic 
textbook All he could retain on paper were indications, hints, allusions, like the delicate 
color dots and line plays on his pictures." 6 
Now I should like to do something similar - although, as we shall see, my 
methodology is quite different - and that is to look at the basic elements which the 
language of sculpture, uses. Sculpture uses shape and form, line, direction, articulation, 
measure, scale, size, geometry, symmetry and many more elements in the language 
through which it communicates. Until the modern period one might say that a sculpture 
used all these elements in some combination, but, as we shall see, the tenets of modernism 
have been in part a kind of analysis of this language itself and in some modern sculpture 
one aspect of the language may be explored at the expense of others. We may understand 
this better if we look at these fundamental elements one by one. This may seem a rather 
laborious process and, indeed, seem unnecessary, as much of what I shall say here will 
seem to be so evident. It is, though, a necessary step, as it is on these basic building bricks 
that my later arguments shall be based. We must start with the real basic stuff of 
sculpture itself and to begin with we must make a distinction between the physical 
aspects of the language and those non-physical aspects from which meaning is 
constructed. 
7 
Chapter 2 The physical aspects 
Material 
"Many people cannot refrain from picking up stones of a slightly unusual color or shape 
and keeping them, without knowing why they do this. It is as if the stones held a living 
mystery that fascinates them. Men have collected stones since the beginning of time and 
have apparently assumed that certain ones were the containers of the life-force with all its 
mystery. 
For while the human being is as different as possible from a stone, yet man's 
innermost center is in a strange and special way akin to it (perhaps because the stone 
symbolizes mere existence at the farthest remove from the emotions, feelings, fantasies, and 
discursive thinking of ego-consciousness). In this case the stone symbolizes what is perhaps 
the simplest and deepest experience - the experience of something eternal that man can 
have in those moments when he feels immortal and unalterable." 7 
Sculpture is pervaded by its materiality. It is perhaps, at first sight, something of a 
paradox that sculpture, a language which one associates with the philosophical and 
spiritual should be a media that is so dependant on the material. Yet, it is this very 
paradox which is fundamental to the nature of sculpture. The language that a sculpture 
uses is communicated through its material. Thus it follows that in a piece of sculpture 
the nature of the material as unformed matter has a great influence on what is conveyed 
through it. 
Different materials have different physical qualities in their un-worked states and 
these to some extent limit what can be made from them. A simple example would be the 
stone lintel of an arch. Once this lintel becomes too long and its centre of gravity 
becomes too far away from its two supporting uprights, the lintel will sag in the middle 
and break under its own weight Such a lintel of steel may be much longer and would sag 
without breaking, or at the optimum length would eventually bow down and touch the 
ground at its centre. 
It follows from this that some materials are more appropriate than others for 
certain kinds of sculptural communication and that the physical properties of the given 
material in a sculpture determine to a considerable extent what may, or may not, be 
communicated through it. In other words the material is not only that through which all 
must be conveyed, but it, itself, imposes certain limitations on what can be made from it, 
due to its inherent character. The sculptor must have a profound understanding of the 
nature of his materials and their limitations, and he must work with these limitations in 
his quest to invest them with meaning. 
The materials used in sculpture have their own methodology of working. One must 
do things in a certain order, use the appropriate tools and obey certain rules. This is a 
logical process and one which cannot be ignored. Deviation from the logical working 
process which the material demands may result in damage to the tools, to the material 
and indeed to the sculptor. At the same time, whilst these processes are undoubtedly of a 
logical nature, the sculptor, or indeed the craftsman, obeys these rules and carries out 
these procedures without thought. They are second nature; logical processes which are 
employed without a great measure of conscious thought, having become part of the 
everyday practice of the sculptor through their employment over a long period of time. 
In some modern sculpture the pushing of the limitations of the material itself has 
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become the main concern of the sculpture, or, as in the work of Ulrich Riickriem, the 
normal working processes determined by the nature of the material, have themselves 
become the subject of the works. 
Traditionally the range of materials used in sculpture is fairly limited - stone, 
bronze, ceramic, wood, to name the main materials. As well as limitations imposed by 
the nature of the material itself, attitudes towards these materials have, at various times 
in the history of sculpture, affected what is made from them. In the case of stone and 
wood the sculptors of various cultures, at various times, have painted over the materials, 
thus denying their intrinsic character in favour of the sculpture's shape, form and their 
subsequent narrative. The Twentieth Century has favoured the idea of 'direct carving' 
in stone and wood in Europe - that is to say that the sculptor begins working with the 
material without precisely pre-determined plans - whereas in the previous centuries the 
final form would almost certainly have been pre-conceived in the form of a maquette or 
detailed drawings. 
One may even talk of 'philosophies' of particular materials. Attitudes towards a 
material at various times have become so intimate to the material, that the material has 
been seen as having in it a kind of extant world view. One may recall Michelangelo's 
famous notion that blocks of stone already contain sculptures and the task of the sculptor 
is merely to cut away the un-needed parts of the block. Animist beliefs would have us 
believe in the spirit of a stone and even Christianity teaches us that God is everywhere. 
(This is probably an echo of such animism.) Modern physics also teaches that even 
inanimate stone contains energy fields. So we do tend to imbue materials with 'magical' 
qualities, which they may, or may not, have. 
Modern thinking has added new materials to sculpture. The modern stance is such 
that any material may be used for making sculpture; that sculpture is rather an attitude 
towards form and objects, than something traditionally based in a particular material. 
Sculpture may, according to the modern position be made from plastic, found materials, 
crushed cars, even from other objects taken out of their normal context - for example 
furniture, which seems to have been popular in the last few years. (Some of Tony 
Cragg's works serve as an example). New materials have been popular recently, 
specifically because they have no history. The search for newness that is one of the tenets 
of modernism has, therefore, tended to favour materials with no 'art' connotations. This 
at the expense of value engendered by association with the historical use in sculpture of 
the traditional materials. 
These new materials would not be so problematic if the concerns expressed in such 
sculptures that are made of them were to be similar to the traditional concerns of 
sculpture. In sculptures such as 'Through' of 1965 and 'Genghis Khan' of 1963, Phillip 
King made some astonishing sculptures out of fibre-glass. Whilst the material was 
relatively new to sculpture, the 'language' that King used was thousands of years old 
and these works were entirely convincing, despite the rather dead surface caused by the 
nature of the material. In hindsight such works seem classical and of the highest order. 
At the time they seemed excitingly new, but even then, the tenets of the language within 
which they came in to being, spoke of their relation to the ancient language of sculpture. 
The materials were new but the concepts which they encoded were 'as old as the hills', 
as they say. This was 'new' sculpture at its best. In many other cases use of new 
materials has not been related to the tenets of the language of sculpture, but has tried to 
overthrow not only the traditional materials of sculpture, but also the language in which 
it is based and dependent upon to convey its meaning. In such cases the situation has 
arisen where some modern sculpture can only claim the appellation 'sculpture' through 
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the context of where it is seen. (See 'Environment'). In other words the material 
presence of the 'sculpture', does not denote it as such. * 
Whilst material is paramount in sculpture, it is possible to 'hide' the nature of the 
material. I have mentioned paint, as one obvious example, but their are other ways of 
negating the material and this too depends on one's philosophical stance towards the 
materials. Whilst in Riickriem's work one is so aware of the material as stone, other 
sculptors have worked with stone in a way in which the quality of the material is almost 
totally negated in the quest to create illusion. Here much 19th Century English and 
French marble sculpture springs to mind in which the material has been polished all 
over, and to such an extent that it has lost all sense of stoniness and rather resembles a 
kind of sugary soap. One of Michelangelo's greatest contributions to the language of 
sculpture was, to my mind, the way in which he mixed the polished and the roughly-
worked parts of the material. The outer extremes of a limb will be tight and polished, 
whilst the slack parts of the form will be left with chisel marks intact, thus creating a 
real sense of form, through an illusion of tense and relaxed material. In his best works 
he, thus, exploited the material to its full. 
Before I go on to look at how the sculptural language 'arranges' material, there is 
one further aspect of material that we must note. Materials in sculpture may be 
classified into three groups - those which are essentially subtractive, those which are 
essentially additive and those which are constructable. One may build with stone and 
wood and in this sense they are constructable materials. However, the working of 
individual blocks of them is a subtractive process, that is to say that one cuts or carves 
them - subtractively shapes them to their required form. Clay and plaster are additive 
materials. They have no inherent shape when one begins to work with them and the 
process of working them is essentially additive. (Here again, one must not rule out the 
possibility of someone casting or forming a block from them and then carving away the 
unwanted matter. This, although possible, is essentially alien to their nature as material.) 
Bronze sculpture although formed from molten metal is dependant on original forms 
and moulds and these original forms and their moulds are usually formed from clay, 
plaster, sand and wax in an additive way. Metals may be constructed with in their cold 
states. In fact construction, as a method of making sculpture, may employ any material. 
Construction in sculpture has gained particular prevalence in the Twentieth Century 
and this may be considered to be the major legacy of the modern movement to the 
language of sculpture. The often fragmentary nature of constructed sculpture would 
seem to be pertinent to the fragmentary nature of our contemporary society and, indeed, 
the contemporary psyche. These three procedural methods - the carved, the modelled 
and the constructed - are basic to sculpture and, with the exception of construction, are 
determined by the nature of the materials. 
I have suggested that materials may have their own philosophy. Tied to this is a 
notion of the ethics of materials and these ethics are surely time-bound. Ethical attitudes 
to materials certainly exist, but they tend to change in different ages. Our ethics today 
are basically those of 'truth to materials'. What this means is that we try to use the 
material in ways that it, itself, dictates. Generally speaking we do not try to use the 
material in a way which is alien to its nature. We respect the inherent qualities of the 
material and try to make sculptures in which the materiality of the material is presented 
as it is. The material is not made to look like something that it is not and the image that 
we make aspires to accept the nature of the material which carries it. Having said that, 
there are always exceptions to the rule and there are certain sculptors whose work is 
* This theme is developed more fully in Part 3, in 'Carl Andre and 'The Bricks'.' 
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motivated by a desire to make the materials appear to be other than they are. For 
example, I know a number of sculptors working in Carrara who try to make marble look 
like cloth. They go to extremes to make an illusion that the marble that they are using 
should not appear to be marble. They totally negate the essence of the material and make 
magical tricks of illusion, just as the conjuror does as he pulls the rabbit out of the empty 
hat. The problem with tricks is that once you see how they work, they have already lost 
their magic. The use of materials in this tricky way, with one or two notable exceptions, 
generally leads to a kind of meaningless kitsch. (I have, here, perhaps revealed my own 
prejudices with regard to materials). 
It may seem that I have over emphasised the importance of material, but ultimately 
there is nothing else. The material is the stuff of sculpture. It must carry the shapes and 
lines and forms. It must carry the meaning. The entire language of sculpture is 
dependant upon the rapport of the sculptor with his material. The degree of success of 
this rapport determines the meaning and value of the sculpture. 
I have tried to show that the material is that through which all must ultimately be 
stated. Now we must look at the way in which the material is manipulated in sculpture, 
and the way in which a sculpture's ability to encode meaning, is determined. 
Surface 
When we look at a sculpture we see only the surface of the material. Its forms, 
lines, contours, shapes are all conveyed on its surface. We may be able to see through the 
sculpture, through holes or spaces in its forms, but what we actually see is the surface of 
the inside of the hole. We do not, indeed cannot, see the inside of the material with the 
naked eye. Thus surface is paramount in communicating the sculpture's message. 
The surface determines the speed with which our eye roves around the sculpture. 
Rough, indented parts slow down our eye, catch our interest, whilst smooth, polished 
surfaces rush our gaze to another area of the work. Our eye subliminally caresses the 
work and arouses our sense of touch. 
The surface may reveal much about the physical qualities of the material itself. A 
rough hewn stone surface will give a much greater feel of the hard, rugged, crystalline 
nature of the material than a smooth highly polished stone surface, which rather 
emphasises the stone's colour and may, indeed, reflect light from the surroundings. A 
rusty surface of a steel sculpture will tell more of the steel's hardness and weight than an 
over-painted steel surface. (In this case the paint itself is the surface). The patination on 
a bronze sculpture serves to cover the marks left by the fettling tools - the chisel, rasp 
and polisher - which leave some parts of the work abrased and others in the original 
rough-bronze post-casting state. Its colour variations also catch the eye and slow down, 
or hasten its journey around the surface. Bronze may also have a completely polished 
surface so that it becomes like a mirror, distorting the reflection of the surrounding 
environment according to its form. 
When stone is polished its surface undergoes not only a physical, but also a 
chemical change in the immediate area under its new skin. Bronze and steel surfaces 
may also change chemically under certain treatments. 
Surface is important to our sense of touch. Tucker spoke in his seminars of 
'touching with the eyes'. What he meant was that when we actually touch the surface of 
a sculpture it is usually disappointing - its surface will probably be physically cold and 
hard. Our eye 'touches' the surface as it roams across it and creates an illusion of 
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touching - some parts may appear soft and warm, others rough and cold. Our eye 
actually works in a way that is a substitute for actual physical touching. Actual touching 
with the hand will usually contradict this illusion of surface. 
I have often heard sculptors referring to surfaces as 'skins'. The implication in this 
is that the surface is an outside, or a shell, which holds something within it. The surface 
must 'carry' the form within it. The surface must reveal the nature of the forms it 
contains. If not enough attention is given to it by the sculptor, the surface can destroy 
form, as in the case of the over-polished surface of much 19th Century marble sculpture, 
mentioned above. 
If the material is the matter through which all must be conveyed, the surface is 
everything that we actually, physically see. 
Line 
Line can have an important role in sculpture in creating direction. Our watching 
eye shoots along straight lines, but in sculpture line is so often really edge - a meeting of 
two planes - as we are in three dimensions. 
Line is important as outline. As we move around a sculpture our eye sees ever 
changing outlines, or contours of forms. This is the "drawing" in the sculpture. 
Edges meet, change direction and this affects the way our eye moves over the 
sculpture. Some recent sculpture has used line to such a degree that the sculpture is a 
collection of lines in space - it is all line.8 
I am gazing out of the window and looking at my neighbour's roof. The sun is above 
the roof The roof tiles are arranged so that the bottom of a row of tiles covers the top part 
of the row beneath. The sun casts a shadow at this junction. My eye reads this as a line, 
although this is merely a series of shadows of differing intensities. The contours of the 
shadows are irregular and yet I still read this as a straight line." 
Our eye and brain like lines - they see them where there are none. That is to say 
that our vision has a volition to classify what we see into an order of lines and shapes. 
This is a trick of the system, for real lines are much more rare than we realise.t What 
we usually think of as line is merely the meeting of visual fields - the classic example 
would be the horizon line, where the sky meets the sea. The horizon line is an illusion, 
but one which we really do perceive and experience. The 'outline' of a sculpture is also 
an illusion of line, dependent entirely on where we stand in relation to the sculpture. The 
slightest movement on our part will change the outline. What the 'outline' really is, is 
one immaterial, (but actually seen), contour-line running over the surface of the forms. 
In sculpture then true lines are usually edges, unless the sculptor has consciously made 
them a major element of the work, as in Barbara Hepworth's stringed sculptures. 
Otherwise lines, unless they are physically engraved on the surfaces, are illusions and 
will hinder our 'reading' of the work if we pay too much attention to them. 
f This is a theme I shall be developing later on. 
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Plane 
Planes are flat surfaces, although in sculpture they need not be perfectly so. An 
approximation to flatness is implied but may be directly manipulated for reasons 
outlined in 'Surface'. A plane may be a rather uninteresting area in a sculpture -
something that in many works might appear at the back, in a relatively 'unseen' area. It 
might also have a crucial role. Modern sculpture, like modern architecture has given the 
plane a new status and it has an essential role in much steel sculpture.9 New materials 
such as thin sheet steel have allowed the use of bent planes in sculpture.10 Here the 
plane is not a surface on the outside of a volume or form, but an element in its own right 
- a twisted, flat, volumeless area. Like line it has become to be used in its own right as the 
syntax of certain sculptures. 
Planes may take on the role of 'cuts'. Imagine an egg-like form and cut a part 
away from it. The result is a dismembered egg - a form with a plane that cuts it. In such 
cases the plane ends the form but implies the continuance of that form beyond the cut A 
flat plane will always abruptly 'end' a form in this way. 
Sculptures may be made of a series of interrelated planes. In such cases different 
planes seem to have an equal status, despite their difference in size. Imagine a brick. The 
six planes of its surface vary in size. There are three different sizes appearing twice 
each. Despite this difference in size the status of each plane within the configuration of 
the brick is the same. The planes all, equally, reject our eye from seeing form within 
them. The eye and brain never really know whether a brick is hollow or solid, although 
they 'believe' that the later is true. The lack of articulation of the planes is responsible 
for this effect A plane reveals nothing of what is beneath it and, unless it is a mirror, 
over it. 
Horizontal planes equate to the earth. 
Shape 
"Shape without form, shade without colour, 
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;"11 
If I had talked about "shape" as an element in sculpture a hundred years ago it 
probably would have seemed not only a strange word to use, but also an insulting one to 
the creator of the sculpture in question. Shape is something two-dimensional, for 
example a flat triangle or, indeed, an irregular shape, but flat. Sculpture is three 
dimensional and thus I would have used the words "volume", or better still "form". 
However, new materials and in particularly the use of steel in sculpture, have allowed 
for the development of shape as a basic element in the language of sculpture. Whereas 
carved and modelled sculpture was essentially form-based, the newer forms of 
modernism are often constructed and essentially flat. This then allows for a notion of 
shape as opposed to form, and plane as opposed to modelled surface. Shapes may be cut 
from steel plate which have such minimal thickness as to be, visually at least shapes 
without volume or form.12 These may not have the horror implied in the lines from 
Eliot, quoted above. Phillip King's Genghis Khan is an excellent example, for whilst the 
cone-like part of the sculpture, certainly, may be said to have volume, the two vertical 
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leaf-like parts are shapes - that is to say, that although they have minimal articulation 
and are not thus entirely flat, one reads them despite this, frontally at least, as shapes. 
Unlike forms, they do not develop as one changes ones position in regard to the 
sculpture. 
Gravity and Weight 
Sculpture is bounded by those physical laws which govern the behaviour of all 
matter. What Einstein established in relation to matter and energy is just as pertinent to 
a piece of sculpture as to any other object or material in the world. The same particle 
theory - or lack of it, for Einstein replaced the idea of particle physics with that of 
events related by interval - bounds sculpture, and the same laws of space, energy and 
gravity. 
These physical laws of nature govern sculpture as they do all objects in the world. 
Whilst the majority of these have little visual role in sculpture as a language, gravity - or 
rather a sense of gravity - does. Sculptures are bound to the earth by gravity, as are all 
objects, and the way in which a sculpture 'meets' the ground is of considerable 
importance to the meaning it conveys. We can perhaps understand this better by 
comparing Rodin's figure of 'Balzac' with his sculpture 'The kiss'. Whilst 'The Kiss' sits 
heavily on the ground and is rather a lumpen mass, 'Balzac' thrusts out of it at a 
precarious angle. It is an essentially phallic sculpture and it plays on our intuitive sense 
of gravity, its mass, leaning as it does away from the vertical, creating its sense of 
energetic force. Some modern sculpture, such as Phillip King's "Tracer" of 1977, appear 
to defy gravity through a visual illusion that the work is toppling over. 
Coupled to gravity is the notion of weight and implied in this, monumentally. 
Some sculptures look incredibly heavy, and often they are. There are those sculptures 
which play on this illusion of weight and their visual weight seems heavier than their 
actual physical weight. Again Rodin's Balzac is a case in point and Phillip King 
produced a series of works in the late 70's, of which Shiva's Rings of 1978 is a good 
example, in which the elements of the sculpture are articulated in such a way that they 
seem to be involved in a kind of wrestling match with each other. The visual weight of 
some of the elements in Shiva's Rings far outweigh their actual weight. They appear to 
be of immeasurable weight, as if the sculpture is making visible gravity itself. 
The opposite effect is also possible. Elements in sculpture may give the illusion of 
being weightless. Here some of the works of Anthony Caro spring to mind and in 
particular, Month of May of 1963, in which some of the steel elements seem to float 
weightlessly in space, as is true of the horizontal bars in Prairie of 1967. Of this work 
Michael Fried says that it; 
"goes further towards completely revoking the ordinary conditions of physicality than any 
other sculpture in Caro's oeuvre. In the grip of the piece one's conviction is that the 
horizontal poles and corrugated sheet are suspended, as if in the absence of gravity, at 
different levels above the ground Though once again this is done, not by hiding the 
physical means by which these elements are supported from below, and thereby seeming 
literally to suspend them in mid-air, but by acknowledging the means of support in such a 
way as to accomplish the abstract suspension not just of the elements in question but of 
gravity itself The result, as in other sculptures by Caro, is something deeper, more radical, 
more abstract than illusion."13 
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Scale 
All objects have size and their sizes are measurable. Scale is different. Scale, as I 
wish it to be understood here is a relationship of the size of an object to our size as 
human beings. A sculpture that is of a height higher then our size will appear 
monumental. It is something greater than us and provided its 'bones' are well jointed it 
will have an effect on us of power. A tiny sculpture that fits into our hand may also have 
this power - it too may have an impressive scale. In this case our eye behaves something 
like the change of lenses on a camera from normal to macro. Our sense of our body 
scales itself down to this tiny object and like some small ant our senses creep into its 
macrocosm. The in-between size is more difficult to react to. A sculpture the size of, say, 
a chair, (or indeed a chair itself), does not invite such a strong physical empathy within 
us as a very large or very small one. 
The reason for this is partly to do with 'monumentality' and partly to do with the 
object's - in this case the sculpture's - own internal scale, and this is the second type of 
scale which may also be called proportion. When looking at the internal scale or 
proportions of a sculpture larger than ourselves we empathetically increase our size to 
these giant-like relationships, whilst ever aware of our own real size. With a tiny 
sculpture we empathetically diminish our size to a size smaller than the sculpture, whilst 
again remaining aware of our real size. The middle-size sculpture is not impressive to 
our intuitive sense of the monumental, (and here I wish to imply the monumentality of 
the small sculpture too). It is pervaded by that reality common to most everyday objects 
and we dwell rather on its own internal scale. 
Now all objects have internal scale. We may, also, be impressed by the power of 
some giant machine and we might, too, find a kind of monumentality in a tiny pebble. So 
what differentiates scale in sculpture to that of, say, a giant bulldozer. The scale of the 
bulldozer is a result of its function as a mover of large amounts of earth or rock. The 
scale of the sculpture is also determined by its function and so it may appear that the 
difference is only in the nature of the function itself. Yet, I think not. Scale in sculpture 
has a vital role in communication and has subtle facets and nuances which do not help at 
all in looking at a bulldozer. In the bulldozer the internal scale of the machine is a direct 
result of its functioning as an earth mover, in the same way as is its large size. In a 
sculpture the internal scale is a signifier. It forms an integral part of the language of 
sculptural communication. It is intentional, but for intellectual, rather than physical 
ends. Whilst the bulldozer's internal scale is not determined on a visual basis, the 
internal scale of a sculpture is, and this scale is a part of its language and function. 
'•'"Monumentality is not a function of size. Not everything large in scale is 
monumental, nor is the small necessarily a miniature in effect. Monumentality is a rhythm 
embedded in the interrelationship of forms. Of course an authentically monumental piece 
of sculpture that is enlarged only gains in impact Enlarged, it becomes expressive. But we 
can see the same principle and melody at work in a small bronze sculpture. It is as if a 
small-scale model of a monumental sculpture genetically embodies all the elements of its 
counterpart, and vice versa. There are sculptors who work well only on a small scale, it is 
absolutely impossible to enlarge their works and transform them into monuments."14) 
If we look at Reg Butler's model for a Monument to an Unknown Political Prisoner 
of 1951-2 the work has a great sense of scale. It is small - it is, of course, a model for a 
large monument - and its internal scale implies this gigantic size, partly, it is true, 
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because of the small figures included to establish an exact size, but also because the 
'rock' on which the metal construction stands appears almost to represent the whole 
earth itself - some massive mountain to which the sculpture is clamped. This work has a 
sense of monumentality directed and implied by scaled relationships between base, 
sculpture and figure. This we relate, in turn, to our own size. 
The Venus of Willendorf also has a kind of monumentality. It would be absurd to 
blow it up into a larger size. Its integrity relies on the way in which it may literally, or in 
the imagination, fit into one's hand. Its internal relationships imbue it with a tremendous 
force, which we feel to be, literally, graspable. Its physicality is far greater than its size. 
It too, in another way, may be felt to be monumental. 
Structure & Geometry 
Structure may mean how a sculpture is physically joined together, as in a 
constructed steel sculpture. It is also the over-all organisation of the planes, lines, shapes 
and material. All sculptures of any worth have a structure underlying them, which may, 
or may not, be obviously visible. Michelangelo's pietas have the underlying structure of 
a triangle or a series of interlocking triangles, a device also favoured in the Madonnas 
painted by Leonardo da Vinci and, indeed, in much Renaissance painting and sculpture. 
Piero Delia Francesca actually produced a number of treatise on the subject of 
mathematical structure in art. In European sculpture since the classical Greek period 
this structure has often been based on the geometry of Euclid, as in Michelangelo's case. 
The Golden Section is another Greek measure that appears over and over again, 
although its uses may in many cases be subliminal, rather than intentional.1 It may even 
be argued that Euclidean geometry has become so much a part of our thinking that it 
conditions how we look and see. 
There are, however, many other structural systems used in sculpture which do not 
particularly use geometry in this Euclidean sense. Some sculptures may employ a kind of 
rigid symmetry, as in much Egyptian sculpture. Here any sense of internal geometrical 
relationships is replaced by a kind of overall stasis of symmetry. The Egyptian granite 
sculptures generally have a tremendous stillness, a heaviness and a serious almost over-
bearing physical presence, all of which results from the complete lack of animated 
articulation. The figures are frontal and geometrical only in the sense that they hardly 
break away from the rectangularity of the block from which they were carved. I can 
think of no other world-culture's sculpture whose tenets are so far removed from the 
tradition of European sculpture, this latter dependent, as it is, on geometric and 
rhythmical relationships as a mainstay of its expressive language. 
Traditionally European sculpture's sense of structure has been based on the actual 
structure of the human body. That is to say that the sculpture has had a structure whose 
origin ultimately lies within the anatomical structure of its model. In various periods of 
European sculpture differing notions of compositional structure have been favoured and 
these are usually in some way geometrically based. 
Some sculpture may be regarded as a series of "events" strung along a central 
spine - for example some of the work of David Smith and Anthony Caro - and such work 
is without geometry, although it has structure. Other of Caro's works seem to have no 
structure at all and in sculptures such as Blue Blaze of 1969 and Call of 1967 Phillip 
King has demolished all notion of structure and, indeed, the object. In these cases the 
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sculptures are made of different elements arranged disconnectedly in space. The viewer 
walks through and around a series of events that are related marginally; in the first case 
by colour, and by colour and, to some extent, similarity of forms between the elements, in 
the second case. This concept of sculpture without an object, and, thus, without true 
structure, proved to be an untenable position towards sculpture and one from which 
King soon stepped back. Kudielka commented thus; 
"The true implications of dispensing with the self-sufficiency of the object and 
opening up the structure of sculpture are too fundamental to be masked by a simple formal 
strategy. They challenge a concept of making which is inherent in our civilisation and 
therefore permeates the human beings we have become. Far from being merely a 
sculptural notion, the monolith expresses man's intention to assert himself over the earth 
and take possession of it;"16 
Articulation 
A sculpture that stands upright - that is to say that it is higher than it is broader -
confronts us. It is perhaps rather static. It is masculine in its penis-like quality. It may be 
threatening in its monumentality. It is a favourite form in sculptures which represent 
civic power. It stands. 
A lying sculpture is passive. It may have associations of death. It is generally calm. 
A sculpture which leans at an angle to the ground is super-active. It will probably 
appear unstable and rather dangerous. It will probably appear to threaten. 
These are some ideas of what I mean by articulation. It is an articulation of the 
surrounding space by the sculpture, which has a profound effect on the way we view it. 
Articulation may also be the articulation of forms and volumes, matter and space within 
the sculpture. It may be simple or complex. (See 'interval'). 
Form 
Form is a word much used when talking about sculpture and it requires 
considerable attention. A form is a realised mass, a mass that has been organised with 
attention to surface, contour, shape etc. It is a transformed mass of material. It has been 
formed from an inert lump of stuff. 
We can argue about forms being satisfactory or unsatisfactory, so that the act of 
forming in itself does not guarantee a realised form per se. Indeed, when we talk about 
form in sculpture we imply such a value judgement in the way in which we use the word. 
The success of forms must be judged as a group of masses interrelating and relating to 
the whole object. One successful form in a sculpture is not much use if it has not been 
interwoven as an integral part of the whole. 
I have already said that when we look at a sculpture all that we literally see is the 
surface. So with a form - we see only its surface. It has been formed from the outside by 
the hands of the sculptor, but if it is to be convincing, I believe, it must create the illusion 
that it has been formed from within - it must look as though there is an energy within, 
which is pushing to its surface, an energy which gives that shape to the form which our 
eyes see as they run over its surface. 
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So what is the nature of the value judgement we imply when we use the word form 
in relation to sculpture. The answer may be the subject of a whole book itself, for form, 
and various ideas of it, have occupied philosophers for thousands of years. One may 
recall that Plato spoke of each thing having an ideal form made by God. All beds have a 
common idea, but there is only one real bed to which our idea of bed owes existence and 
that is the ideal form of the bed. Clearly such thinking is not particularly useful in our 
understanding of the notion of form in sculpture. 
Parts of Aristotle's theory of forms are more useful. 
"We may start with a marble statue; here marble is the matter, while the shape conferred 
by the sculptor is the form. Or, to take Aristotle's examples, if a man makes a bronze 
sphere, bronze is the matter, and sphericity is the form; while in the case of a calm sea, 
water is the matter and smoothness is the form." 
"It would seem, then, that 'form' is what gives unity to a portion of matter, and that 
this unity is usually, if not always, teleologicaL "17 
These ideas of Aristotle's are the basis of what I think to be true about form. 
Nevertheless Aristotle's theory of forms went much further than this and it is here that I 
find difficulty in agreeing with him. Of course Aristotle was regarding form as a 
philosopher and his theory, as with Plato's, was intended to cover all form. When we 
refer to form in talking about sculpture we use the word in the sense of man-made form, 
or formed-matter. For sculpture the sea has no form. Otherwise the notion of form as 
realised matter may well be seen to have its origins in Aristotle. But form, as the word is 
used in talking about sculpture, is much more than this, as I have already suggested. 
The value judgement implied when we talk of a sculpture having form is a thorny 
question. Do we mean, merely, that the forms of the sculpture are realised and cohere 
together in a way that is individually pleasing to us, or is there some common ground for 
our evaluation of form. It is a question that I shall return to many times during the 
course of this text. So for the moment we must leave 'form' as a physical entity of 
worked matter; matter that is worked into a relationship to the other forms around it in 
the sculpture, and implicit in this, into a relationship with the whole. 
Interval 
Sculpture is worked mass in space. It always affects the space immediately around 
it and indeed may be itself affected by its environment. Within the sculpture there are a 
collection of forms, shapes, volumes, edges, etc. These are arranged in space by interval. 
Many sculptures also have spaces or holes between the elements and we then have an 
interplay of filled and empty space. This arrangement is again interval. Interval in 
sculpture is, then, the arrangement of matter in space and in time, and the relationship 
of this matter to the space within, and around, the sculpture. 
The interval between filled mass and space, between collections of shapes and lines, 
and between form and form, in sculpture, is analogous to the interval that is a basic part 




Forms, lines, indeed everything in a sculpture, might be measured scientifically 
when it is being made. Some sculptors prefer to use geometry as the be all and end all of 
their artistic effort. A ball, or pyramid may be formed by exact measurement, or it may 
be formed by eye. The eye has a degree of tolerance that mathematical measurement 
aspires to negate. We can make a ball, or pyramid (or indeed any shape or form) by the 
measurement of our eye. We may perfect its shape until our eye accepts it as a ball, or 
pyramid. Mathematical measurement, if then applied, will invariably show the shape to 
be mathematically incorrect. The eye can of course be trained in making such 
judgements and may become more and more refined. 'Eye' may be regarded as a degree 
of tolerance. 
'Eye' is also important in distortion. Sculptures which are exact measured replicas 
of a human being will look silly if placed high up on the facade of a cathedral. Their 
proportions will look wrong because no account has been taken of 'eye' and the way it 
sees and relates things to the body to which it belongs. (See Scale). 
Light 
Light reveals sculpture. The artificial light of museums may deny this aspect of a 
sculpture - light and shadow in a constantly changing play across the surfaces and 
forms. Light models surfaces. It may rebound off a polished surface, or be sucked into a 
rough one. The sculptor must be aware of it, but cannot plan for its visual effects, except 
in the case of a fixed public work. 
In England we usually have dark grey skies with a very clear, heavy kind of light, 
which defines form. In the Mediterranean countries light tends to dissolve form. 
Some modern sculpture uses artificial light as its main component.18 
Environment 
It is 1989.1, and a large group of sculptors from around the world have been invited 
to Burkina Faso to carve natural outcrops of granite. We visit the north of the country and 
see ancient line drawings scratched in the granite. Like these, our works will probably last 
for thousands of years. 
It is March 1996.1 have just returned from Finland and Sweden, where we have been 
making ice and snow sculptures. The ice we cut out from the sea with chain saws and built 
the work on the sea - part going up, part going down. They will probably melt by the second 
half of April, if not before. 
The environment that a sculpture is seen in is of paramount importance to our 
understanding of it. Traditionally salon sculpture was set on a pedestal to 'remove' it 
from the real world of other objects, to set it apart, and thus to enforce its visibility as 
sculpture. When Anthony Caro began to make works that stood on, or rather spread 
across, the floor, it was as if sculpture had joined the real world of ordinary objects. It 
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now stood in the same space as a chair. But, of course, it did not really. These sculptures 
were again set apart by where, and how, they were seen. Presented in galleries and 
museums these works were 'seen' in a certain way because of the context in which they 
were shown. The importance of this context will become apparent when we view the 
work of the sculptor Carl Andre, whose stacks of bricks and 'floors' of steel plates could 
not be distinguishable as sculpture if seen in a brick yard, or scrap yard, respectively. 
Constantin Brancusi was renowned for his carved bases and often it is difficult to 
decide what is sculpture and what is base. Indeed the two are so integral that they work 
as one thing. Here, of course, Brancusi was quite intentional. He wanted his works to be 
seen at a certain height and in a certain way, i.e. he wished to control as much as 
possible the environment in which his works would be seen as they travelled out of his 
studio to various museums and galleries around the world. He would have no control 
over the space or lighting, but as far as possible the works would be seen as he wished. 
The environment of the sculpture is of course of paramount importance in public 
sculpture. The relationship of the work to the extant buildings, public spaces etc. is an 
integral part of the planning of the sculpture. The sculptor will probably have taken into 
account the movement of the sun, the lighting during hours of darkness, the movement of 
the public in relation to the work and many other considerations. Like Brancusi, the 
public sculptor only has a certain amount of control. Buildings may be destroyed around 
the work, trees will grow. Urban development may alter the flow of traffic and 
pedestrian movement. The sculpture may stand the test of time and stay or it may be 
removed to another place, or even destroyed. There is no doubt that a successfully 
placed public sculpture may be ruined by development around it. Its relationship to its 
environment is crucial in our appreciation of it, but the control of the sculptor ends once 
it is emplaced. I often think that good public sculpture should not shout out for attention. 
It should be there and even if very large it should be of a quiet, calm nature. It will be 
passed by some people everyday and they may not take particular notice of it, except 
subliminally. It fits into its space in a natural kind of way. If, however, it is removed it 
will be missed. There will be a hole in the environment and it will be remembered 
lovingly, probably just by those people who never took much notice of it. That is what I 
mean by a sculpture's relationship to its environment. 
Some sculpture, in recent years, has taken the environment itself as a starting 
point. I am thinking here of 'Land Art'. The so-called land art sculptors tend to make 
their works in the landscape. The work usually has an integral relationship with the 
environment and often, but not necessarily, will use materials found on or near the site. 
The work taken out of context and put into a museum will have a totally different 
meaning, (vis-a-vis Richard Long's works inside and outside). Some of these works 
actually deal with the ecology of the site, others may just use aspects of the site, for 
example water running through the work. (See the catalogue of David Nash's work in 
Japan 1984). Some works, by their nature, purport to symbolism - Robert Smithson's 
'spiral Jetty', which reminds me so much, in spirit at least, of the Cerne Abbas Giant. 
These artists have taken the relation of the sculpture and its environment to an extreme 
position. There is a strong dose of romanticism in this approach. An intervention is made 
in the landscape which may or may not be of a lasting nature. 
I shall be returning to the question of environment again at a later stage and in 
another context. Here I wish merely to reaffirm that the environment in which a 
sculpture is seen is crucial to our appreciation of it, and here 'environment' not only 
means the physical environment - the lighting conditions, space etc. - but also the 
'intellectual' environment, whether the work is in a gallery/museum, public place, 
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artist's studio, the landscape or elsewhere. These environments must surely affect the 
way we view the work. 
Movement 
Movement in sculpture may be implied or actual. The bronze Charioteer of Delphi 
has implied movement, as do Degas' dancers and Rodin's 'Iris'. This 'movement' may be 
active or passive. Let us compare two Degas sculptures - the first is 'Dancer, arabesque 
on the right leg' of 1882-95 and the second the 'Little dancer' in the Tate Gallery, 
London. The latter shows a moment of rest during the active process of ballet dancing, 
whilst the former 'freezes' an active moment in time. In the former ballet step the 
dancer will indeed hold this position in rest for a fraction of time. It is a moment of 
extreme balance in which straining muscles give the illusion of restful calm. This illusion 
is captured in the sculpture too and one awaits the moment when this poise is broken 
and the dancer moves to another position. In the sculpture one wonders, too, at the 
delicate physical balance - as if the sculpture will fall at any moment The Tate's dancer 
alludes to a moment when she is in a position of unstrained rest, a pose perhaps taken by 
a dancer whilst a soloist actively leaps around her. One may be inclined to compare this 
to the captured moment of a photograph, but it is not the same. The sculptor may 
telescope a series of movements into one state, a state that never really actually occurs. (I 
remember gazing for hours at the Charioteer of Delphi. Something bugged me about its 
posture and after about three hours of looking I realised that the figure is not standing in 
'one position', but in a 'series of positions' at the same time.) 
George Rickey and Alexander Calder use real movement in their works. Heavy 
elements of steel are moved by the wind. 
There is another kind of movement pertinent to sculpture and that is the movement 
of the spectator around the work. This may also be controlled to some extent by the 
sculptor. In much traditional sculpture the work is frontal - that is to say that there is a 
directed frontal view and in moving around to the sides or back the viewer learns 
nothing new. The side and back views merely confirm the front view. Rosalind Krauss 
writes brilliantly on the subject and points out how in much modern work this has been 
replaced by a central spine around which 'activity' occurs. Moving around i t the 
sculpture slowly unfolds its nature in time.19 
Time 
Coupled to the idea of implied movement in sculpture is the notion of time. 
Sculpture which does not actually move may be regarded as a fixed moment in time. 
Even an ice sculpture which has built into it the notion of change and decay, will 
probably not change significantly during a short period of viewing, even though new 
snow may gradually be deposited on it, or though it may be actively melting. Some land 
art works also have a built in transience, but generally speaking sculpture has, 
traditionally at least been regarded as a defiance in the face of the changes caused by 
the passing of time. Egyptian and Greek sto^e sculptures have stood for thousands of 
years, defiant witnesses against erosion and damage. However, what we see is not the 
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same as that which we would have seen when the works were first made. Anyone visiting 
the Parthenon Museum in Athens will be aware that what we now consider to be 
gleaming white Greek marble sculptures, were once painted, and in a style that uses 
gaudy colours somewhat reminiscent of the carved wooden figures one used to see in fair 
grounds around England. 
Having said this, our confrontation with a sculpture is usually of a short nature 
and we tend to view its objectness - we look at is as a fixed object. It may contain clues as 
to how it came into being over a period of time and it may, as in the case of our ice 
sculpture, suggest to us how it will eventually be destroyed as time passes, But our 
meeting with the sculpture will probably, on a conceptual level at least, be an event 
whose duration is of a fixed time. We may visit the sculpture again and again over the 
years and generally speaking, if it is well looked after, it will not have physically changed 
a great deal. 
We, however may have changed. Many important events may have occurred in 
our lives which have changed our thinking. We may, in the light of these, view the 
sculpture in quite a different way. For looking at sculpture is a two way process. It is 
both that which is extant in the sculpture and that which we take to it, which combine to 
cause our response. As John Berger puts it in writing about painting; 
"Paintings are static. The uniqueness of the experience of looking at a painting repeatedly -
over a period of days or years - is that, in the midst offlux, the image remains changeless. 
Of course the significance of the image may change, as a result of either historical or 
personal developments, but what is depicted is unchanging: the same milk flowing from the 
same jug, the waves on the sea with exactly the same formation unbroken, the smile and 
the face which have not altered " 20 
I invite you to replace Berger's "Paintings" with the word "Sculptures". 
Having said this we must also consider that our viewing of a work of sculpture 
takes place over a period of time. This time is not of a fixed period as, say, when we view 
a film. The sculpture reveals its messages to us over a period of time. Our reaction to its 
physical intervals unfold over time. The relationship of a sculpture to time is, therefore, 
extremely complex. In moments of self-consciousness during our viewing of it we are 
aware of the time of our own act of viewing, and yet the sculpture may encode notions 
of infinite time. It may encode concepts of time which are both transient and everlasting. 
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Chapter 3 The creation of meaning 
I have tried, so far to describe the language of sculpture in its physical aspects -
those aspects which form sculpture's physical substratum. Discussion of many of them 
will be continued in the pages that follow. Before we continue and look at those aspects 
which are tied to its intellectual and spiritual aspects - to 'what' and 'how' it 
communicates, as opposed to 'with what' - we must accept that the physical elements 
are also fundamental to our appreciation of not only sculpture, but of all other objects 
too. 
Let us return to our 'chair'. The elements of sculpture's language as I have 
described them above are not unique to sculpture. They are qualities which our chair 
also has and indeed they are qualities that all objects have in some degree or the other. 
Our chair has material, surface, line, plane and shape. So does a tree. What I have 
described here is not a language which is unique to sculpture, but a language that is a 
product of our capacity to visually evaluate the world. So if our sculpture is made to be 
more visible than other objects, what linguistic elements does it have, if any, which are 
not common to those other objects? 
To put the problem another way we may consider these elements of sculpture's 
language which I have so far described as being the 'physical' or 'formal' aspects of 
sculpture. The sculptor, (and indeed the viewer), may learn much about this formal 
language by studying those formal conventions adopted by other sculptors in other 
periods and in other places. He will also, probably, adopt or adapt these conventions in a 
particular way, and this is the basis of individual or collective style. Much modern 
sculpture has paid particular attention to the formal aspects of sculptural language, but 
even in the case of the most purely Formalist works their construction of meaning is not 
a question of the merely physical. It is possible for the viewer to react to a Formalist 
sculpture as something which is simply harmonically pleasing, but even this reaction is 
of an extremely complicated nature and a reaction which is not purely of a physical 
nature. 
The relationships which a sculpture physically embodies invariably allude to 
something else. They are configured in such a way as to convey meaning on an 
intellectual and/or spiritual level. It is the complex way in which such meaning is 
constructed, which is my concern in this text. The physical properties of a piece of 
sculpture affect us in ways which are dependant on our own physical and mental make-
up. The endeavour of the sculptor may be described as that of finding the right physical 
equation of form, line, shape, material etc. to control the intellectual, emotional, or 
spiritual reaction of the viewer. As we shall see the matter is made even more 
complicated by the fact that such meaning is not constructed on the basis of a series of 
simple pre-determined recipes. Sculpture, at its profoundest level, does not merely 
illustrate an idea, or tell a story. Its evaluation involves mechanisms which we do not 
properly understand. We may, until the workings of the brain and mind are better 
understood, only offer suggestions as to how this mysterious process may work. 
I should like to begin my own thesis of meaning in sculpture by introducing some 
of those aspects of sculpture which do not belong only to its physical realm. I shall, later, 
endeavour to suggest the mechanisms which may be responsible for these non-physical 
reactions to sculpture. 
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Allusion 
I propose that the basis of way in which meaning is constructed in the language of 
sculpture is that of allusion. A chair does not allude to anything. It is an object 
determined by function, which may or may not involve a measure of aesthetic merit It 
may be beautiful, but before all else it is determined by its function as a repository for 
bottoms. The forms of a sculpture are, on the other hand, determined by what it is to 
which they allude. They are as they are, not only for consideration in themselves, 
however interesting, however harmonious, however aesthetically pleasing they may be, 
but also they are as they are because of their ability to allude to something else. In the 
case of much sculpture this may seem obvious as the physical matter of the sculpture 
alludes to a figure or figures seemingly involved in an event and this event in turn, 
alludes to some aspect of our own being and experience. 
The case of abstract sculpture is more difficult for here the sculpture would seem 
to represent a set of relationships which either are, or are not pleasing to our aesthetic 
sense. But I hope to show that even in the case of the purist Formalist sculpture the 
forms together make an image which alludes to an aesthetic sense which is based in 
aspects of our own being. In other words our reaction to a set of formal relationships is 
tempered by our accrued experience acquired over time in the course of our own 
existence. 
Having said this, there is one kind of reaction to sculpture in which any sense of 
allusion is suspended and this is that sublime reaction which we so rarely experience in 
front of a small number of exceptional works of art. I shall return to this experience in 
detail later on. 
Illusion 
Central to the meaning which the sculptural language constructs is the idea of 
illusion. It is a subject which I shall deal with more fully when we look at the workings of 
the human eye and brain. Here I should merely like to make some general points. 
Illusion is far more widespread in sculpture than we may care to realise. Illusion is 
an invitation to read something as it is not. In other words illusion is an instruction to 
our brain to read something not as it really is, but as it appears to be. Inherent in this 
concept is the notion that the appearance is usually radically other than the reality. 
Let us return to the first of Degas' dancers that I mentioned when writing about 
movement. The sculpture is static and yet gives the illusion of movement It represents a 
figure in balance and yet this too is illusion. If the bronze were not physically joined to 
the base-plate the sculpture would fall over. The bronze has been formed to represent 
limbs, muscles, skin and invites us to believe in the reality of these elements of the 
dancer's body. This 'suspended' belief is also illusion - the limbs, muscles and skin are a 
lump of bronze. The bronze looks solid, but is probably hollow. (This is certainly the 
case in larger works in bronze). There is an illusion that the taut extremes of the 
buttocks are the outer points of a solid from, which as I have said is probably hollow. 
Any expression that there may be on the face is also an illusion - it is not actual, but 
metaphoric. 
However much a sculptor tries to exorcise illusion from his work, (something 
which concerned me for a time, many years ago), however much he tries to make an 
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object which refers only to itself and nothing else, he will be unsuccessful. Perhaps an 
unpolished stone cube will not involve any illusion. Polish it and the illusion is that the 
nature of the surface is the same as the material within, which it is not. An unpolished 
stone cube is not sculpture because it does not employ illusion. Illusion is essential to the 
language of sculpture. It is the means through which dialogue is created with the viewer. 
It is through a series of complex illusions that the sculptor tries to focus the response of 
the viewer. 
'Narrative' and 'Embodiment'. 
Having said this, there are some sculptures which use illusion to a greater extent 
than others. They may be considered as 'narrative'. Such works not only use the 
illusions common to all sculpture, but they have the added allusion of telling a story. As 
an example let us look at Bernini's 'The Ecstasy of Saint Theresa' in Rome. The 
sculpture is telling a story. To Understand it, it is a pre-requisite that we know that the 
winged figure is an angel who is appearing to Saint Theresa. We may or may not know 
who Saint Theresa is, or was, but she appears (and this is again illusion) to be either 
having a vision - her eyes are closed - or perhaps taking part in a real event, when an 
angel is physically hovering beside her. Saint Theresa is placed on what appears to be a 
cloud and 'rays' of metal hang on both side of the figure group, purporting to be sun 
rays, or, perhaps, divine light The sculpture is an extremely complex set of illusions, 
which make up a story. We are invited to suspend our knowledge that this is not a real 
event and to believe in it as such. As such it is a tour de force of representational art. 
If we compare Bernini's piece to a Cycladic figure - lets say a female figurine of the 
Syros Group. 21 This sculpture represents a female figure. The illusion of femininity is 
created by two small swellings on the chest area and an inscribed triangle at the top of 
the legs. It too employs illusion with simplified, hardly defined forms standing in for 
arms and legs. Its neck is long and its head extremely pared-down, its only facial feature 
being an over-large nose. It is an illusion of a figure defined with a great geometric 
simplicity. It obviously alludes to a woman, but this is no specific woman. It tells no 
story, it simply is. It is 'there'. I must admit that I prefer it to the Bernini. 
I have given these two random examples to show a difference in attitude. It is in 
part a difference in the degree of illusion employed by the sculptor. The Bernini aspired 
to make the illusion that a specific event is occurring before our eyes. The Cycladic 
figure is quiet and unassuming and yet of immense power. Its illusion is confined to the 
concerns of making a simple image in the material. They are illusions determined by the 
nature of the material, not by some grandiose illustrative scheme. The Cycladic figure 
communicates in its modest way through every millimetre of its material. It embodies the 
concept not by illustrating it as Bernini did, but by the embodiment of the concept in an 
image which is a visual equation for a human state of being. The sculpture embodies 
'womanhood' by encoding in its image an equation to our deeper 'sense' of this state of 
being. Bernini, by comparison, uses every kind of illusion possible to try and make us 
believe in the real physical presence of his subject. I think that he fails. 
I should bring in another area which may be regarded as narrative. Alberti's 
treatise on painting from the Fifteenth Century had an enormous impact on Western 
European art until the end of the last century. He argued that the viewer sees, and reacts 
to, depicted emotions in paintings and encouraged artists to study the effects of emotion 
on gesture and facial expression. In other words, he was arguing that if one wishes to 
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make a sorrowful sculpture, then the sculptor must do this through the facial expression 
and the pose of the body. This attitude to the making of sculpture is also narrative in the 
sense in which I use the term here. This convention had a profound effect on sculpture 
during this long period. It is a stance which, I believe invariably leads to sentimentality. 
The emotion is illustrated and, with a few exceptions, does not pervade the material. 
Such sculptures do not exude emotion, but sentimentally illustrate it. This stance 
towards expressing emotion in painting and sculpture is unique to this period and 
geographical area. No other world sculpture, with perhaps the exception of certain 
Classical Greek works, has held with i t The rest of world sculpture, generally, employs 
'embodiment' and not 'narrative'. Put simply, a sculpture which makes an illusion of 
realistically representing a sad face will be of lesser value than a sculpture which alludes 
to our profound experience of sadness. 
Image 
Considered altogether the complex of physical elements and their inherent 
allusions and illusions create an image. We may view the sculpture as many parts, but in 
totality they are an image and this is what we see when we view the whole work. It is this 
image which, through its illusions and allusions causes a meaningful reaction to the 
formal parts of the work. The forms, lines, shapes, etc., are of a fragmentary nature; 
they are parts of the sculpture, but they have no meaning on their own. The relationship 
of these fragments in the final sculpture constitute a totality. The sculpture before us is a 
real thing, an object and also an image. It is an image of a concept or idea in the mind of 
the sculptor and also an image of an act in time. That is to say that it is an image of the 
process of its coming into being. The decisions that the sculptor has taken during its 
making are decisions of the visual world (the world of images) and not decisions based 
on linguistic thinking and moral or ethical motivation. This is what differentiates a 
sculpture from other man-made objects in the world. A chair is a chair and not an image 
of a chair. A sculpture, whilst it is undoubtedly a material thing of a certain 
configuration, is also an image of something else. It is an image of an intellectual, 
emotional, or spiritual reaction. The sculpture encodes a complexity of meanings. Its 
function is the communication of these encoded meanings. It is a physical visualisation of 
the non-physical. 
I have discussed briefly a sculpture by Bernini. The Bernini is a sculpture which is 
an image of a recognisable event that one may or may not have culturally learnt. That is 
to say that one may have learnt the history of the event - the appearance of the angel of 
God to St. Theresa - and thus be able to recognise the sculpture as an image of this event. 
A sculpture, then, might be understood to be an image of a complexity of different 
things. It is an image of the sculptor's thinking, an image of its own making and, by 
function, an image of a relationship to something in the world outside of sculpture. 
When people view sculpture they tend to think of it in terms of an image of the 
latter kind. The frequent question, 'what is it meant to be?' actually means 'what is it an 
image of?' but as far as the sculptor is concerned, a sculpture is meant to be what it is. 
The sculptor made it thus with intention. Viewers of sculpture are generally unable to 
accept the sculpture as an object which has no parallel in the world of other objects. 
They need to relate it to something else within their experience. They need it to be an 
image of something else, even though sculptors do not, necessarily, think in these terms. 
For the sculptor it is an image of the thought and physical processes that went into its 
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making. It is an image of the response which he wishes to trigger in the viewer. In fact, 
for the sculptor, it is an image of a part of himself and themselves. 
William Tucker, as I have already said, spoke of the sculpture differing from other 
objects by being more 'visible' than they are. I, as Tucker did, have suggested that what 
differentiates a sculpture from a chair is its function. This difference is based in 'image'. 
The chair is not an image of a chair, but an actual chair. The sculpture, as I have said is 
not only object, in that sense in which the chair is, but also image. This image encodes 
the process of its coming into being in time, and encodes the 'statement' of the sculptor. 
In addition it encodes our biological condition and the workings of the human mind. The 
associations it invokes in the mind and psyche of the observer are encoded in its form-
language and, thus, in its overall image. It shall be my task, in the pages that follow, to 
elucidate how the sculpture works as image. 
"Anyone who thinks that the illusion of space in painting is a simple, easily analysed 
matter, must be totally insensitive to the pictorial realities. It must surely be apparent to 
readers from everything I have just been saying about this picture that the sensations of 
spatial depth and recession are utterly mysterious in their operation and their causation 
and, strictly speaking, are beyond analysis. All I have been trying to do in front of this 
painting, is to record, as faithfully as I can, a set of overwhelmingly definite spatial 
sensations which, when one struggles to communicate them in words, seem rather 
paradoxical, even contradictory. So far from being able to say, as used to be said, anything 
as stupidly simplistic as that'all reds advance; all blues recede', one is driven to conclude 
that there are no generalisations, no general truths about the illusionistically spatial 
operation offlat colours organised side by side across a flat surface. The aesthetic 
experience, the spatial sensations, are utterly concrete: they bowl us over, they are totally 
present to one's visual senses, yet to explain them seems increasingly impossible. At best 
one can only hope, very inadequately, to describe them." 22 
My explanations of these fundamentals of sculpture may seem slightly simplistic 
and the way I have chosen to cover them in a kind of glossary of different characteristics 
might be misleading, for in a sculpture these different aspects of the language are 
interwoven in a highly complex way. As an example, what I have called 'gravity' is a 
concern in the making of the sculpture - obviously the sculpture must not fall over - but 
gravity when used in a visual sense is closely tied to illusion. A sculpture may not defy 
gravity literally - i.e. it must not fall over - but it may give the illusion of doing so. 
Similarly a flat surface might not be strictly flat, but the eye reads it as such and this is 
in turn an illusion. Here what I have separately described as 'surface', 'eye' and 
'illusion' are aspects that are woven together, through the 'material', as part of the 
complexity that is the 'image'. 
A problem must be noted here. It is that which Heron alluded to in the above 
quotation, that of using words to describe a non-verbal language. My choice of headings 
in the passages above are probably contentious and others might have chosen different 
keywords. My descriptions may also be lacking. It is a problem of the spoken language 
that words are so imprecise (and that is maybe partly why I normally choose to use a 
language which is not dependant on them; namely sculpture). I have, above, tried to 
describe in words some aspects of this non-verbal language. It is primarily a language 
that is based on sight and our experience of things in the world and I am only too aware 
of the paradox of trying to explain in words that which is not of words. 
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"There is mathematics, there are computers and there are pictures, but the bulk of 
our communicated thinking is done with language. I do not believe that language is 
essential for thinking, though it may be for extended thinking. But in society the 
communication of thinking is through language. Culturally language has come to 
dominate our thinking - and this is a grave defect. Language is a communicating system, 
and not a thinking system. Thinking and communication are quite different, and we run 
into serious trouble when we confuse the two. I believe it was Wittgenstein who said that the 
function of philosophers has always been to protect the truth against language." 23 
It is perhaps a mistake to even think of sculpture as a language, for languages 
require words. These words are related to each other in syntax and on the basis of the 
related words the language may communicate something. Perhaps the notion of 
sculpture as a language arose only because of sculpture's obsession with itself, 
particularly in the last half of the Twentieth Sculpture. As sculpture has become more 
and more concerned with its own tenets, as opposed to the world outside of itself, it 
would seem natural that this self-examination should be formulated into some notion of a 
coherent and independent language. 
If we are to make an argument for sculpture being a language, then the parallel 
between the spoken and the visual may be made thus: The 'words' of sculpture might be 
its lines, shapes, and planes in their individual unrelated states. The 'syntax' of sculpture 
would be the way in which these relate to each other, making 'form sentences'. The 
resultant image may be equated with the message of language - perhaps a book, a 
newspaper article, or a spoken point of view. But, the most difficult thing to grasp is that 
sculpture communicates without spoken language. It has no words in the normal sense 
that a language does. It works in some way as a word language does, but it is a language 
that is entirely visual - a language of the eye and the brain, a language dependant on our 
physical experience of being in the world and not on any rational word-based analysis of 
this experience. I shall be discussing this more fully later on. 
We must, at this point, also look at a second problem. We need to differentiate 
between the visual language of sculpture as it is used when viewing and talking and 
writing about it, and that which the sculptor employs himself during the production of 
the work. The above terms are the terms we use when talking or writing about sculpture 
and whilst these concerns are undoubtedly essential to the making of sculpture, it would 
be a mistake to think that a sculptor consciously considers these things in the course of 
making a work. He may consciously dwell on some of these aspects whilst having a 
problem in realising the work, but generally speaking his language is one without words 
and without a great degree of logical thought The sculptor certainly uses this language 
but does so on an intuitive level, an intuitive level that may be tempered with practice 
and experience. Here Gertrude Stein makes some pertinent comments in an essay on 
masterpieces; 
"The thing one gradually comes to find out is that one has no identity that is when one is in 
the act of doing anything. Identity is recognition, you know who you are because you and 
others remember anything about you yourself but essentially you are not when you are 
doing anything.". 
"At any moment when you are you you are you without the memory of yourself 
because if you remember yourself while you are you vou are not for purposes of creating 
you."24 
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For the moment I do not wish to dwell on this problem - the difference between the 
sculptural language used by the sculptor in making, and that language used by the 
observers in viewing the work - as I hope that the nature of this paradoxical situation 
will become clearer later on. 
There is a third problem, which I have already mentioned. The terminology used 
here may also be used in considering and evaluating other objects in the world. What 
differentiates a sculpture from a chair is its image and, coupled with this, its function 
and, to some extent, the context in which the sculpture is seen which invites us to 'see' it 
in a certain way - in a way that we would not normally view other objects. Sculpture is 
unlike other objects in that it has a built-in invitation to view it in a certain way. The 
very way in which the bones and muscles of the sculpture are put together is 
determinant of how we may view it. The sculpture's structure not only carries a 
message, but also instructs us how to read that message. This is a result of the way our 
brain functions, as I shall attempt to show later.? 
We have now reached a point where we have a kind of basic language. It is a 
language which has a role in the making of sculpture, but which is particularly to do 
with the way we may talk about it and, to some extent, about other objects too. We need 
to look at how this language is used in practice by makers of sculpture and by viewers of 
sculpture, but firstly I should like try to establish the origin of the language itself. 
; See 'The Brain' and 'Looking at Sculpture". 
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Part two The Biological Aspect 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
'How can a work of art outlive its origins?' To put it bluntly, if the ideological, 
political, social and economic mediations of a work are so important, how is it that I can 
walk into the Victoria and Albert Museum, look at a piece of sculpture from an ancient 
Indian civilisation of which I know next to nothing, and still enjoy it." 2S 
It is 1980. Iam working in my studio in Bath Academy of Art, where I have been 
appointed as Fellow in Sculpture. There is a knock at the door and in comes Peter Fuller. 
Peter is a critic who is much in the news, having written a number of scathing criticisms in 
the art press about, amongst others, my friends. I am working on a series of sculptures 
combining stone and steel. An unfinished piece called "Head 1" is one of the main 
contentions. It consists of two stones stacked on each other and a third which hangs from a 
steel armature fixed in the other two stones. It is perhaps reminiscent of Julio Gonzales' 
work which I have studied extensively in Paris. The materials are different, but like 
Gonzales' heads it is abstract and yet is reminiscent of the head - how deeply we feel the 
urge to relate sculpture to our own bodies! I am surprised at Fuller's encyclopaedic 
knowledge of not only art, but a wide range of other subjects. He argues convincingly and 
yet I disagree with almost everything he says. We talk for hours. 
A couple of months later, there is a knock at the door and this time Fuller enters 
without waiting, strides straight to "Head I", now finished, and says "Yes, I am sorry, you 
were right". I am surprised that he can be convinced by someone else's arguments - he 
always seems so sure, almost to the point of arrogance, in his writings and lectures. After 
this we meet on a number of occasions. He had told me on his first visit that I should visit 
sculptor Glyn U illiams. I never have, although I did speak to him on the phone last 
summer (1995) and promised to look him up next time I am in London. Every time we meet 
Peter asks if I have "seen Glyn yet." 
There follow a number of books, perhaps the most interesting of which was "Art & 
Psychoanalysis". In this book Fuller's declared aim is to find a materialist basis for our 
aesthetic facility and to do this through psychoanalysis. (Fuller was a Marxist and, thus, a 
materialist). I had two major arguments with this book, which are relevant to my thinking, 
still. Firstly was the question of interpolation and extrapolation. He studied Michelangelo's 
"Moses'" at great length, with particular reference to Freud s writings on the sculpture, but 
I felt all the way through this text that both Fuller and Freud lacked understanding of the 
'thinking'processes through which Michelangelo actually went whilst working, or rather, 
simply chose to ignore them as unimportant. This piece of writing is a classic example of 
the vast distance between the thinking of the sculptor and the, quite other, interpretation 
which viewers of the work may bring to it. Fuller generally wrote as though his, Fuller's, 
interpolation was what actually concerned the artist about whom he was writing, which, 
clearly, would be absurd. It is a matter that I also discussed personally with him - that of 
the standpoint of the sculptor. He dismissed this with one of his typically cutting remarks; 
'I am not interested in the rubbish artists write about themselves'. I hope to show that this 
remark was quite correct - that what an artists writes or says about his work is of little value 
in our endeavour to come to an understanding of it Now this is a minor point, but one 
essential to my current text, as I shall attempt to explain the vast difference between the 
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procedure of the sculptor at work, and the way in which the viewer reads the messages 
encoded in the image by the sculptor. 
My second misgiving was more serious. I criticised him for using psychoanalysis to 
try and argue for a materialist basis for aesthetics, but without proving that psychoanalysis 
itself had a materialist basis. My feeling is that psychoanalysis is a practice based on 
observation of behaviour, from which observation a hypothesis is constructed, and is not 
therefore, materialist in the strictest sense. To prove the materialist basis of psychoanalysis 
or, indeed aesthetics, one must look at biology itself i.e. the actual physical workings of the 
body. 
I am delighted when Fuller's next book started with a chapter called "Art & 
Biology", as if he had himself come to see this discrepancy. However, whilst he 
acknowledged his mistake and suggested that the solution to his problem must lie in 
biology, he did not go into these biological processes themselves 26 
It is 1971. My school art-teacher, Eric Atkins, thrusts a book into my hands and 
suggests that I should read it. It is by Reuben Wheeler and is called "Man, Nature & 
Art". 27 It is a modest volume which contains chapters on "Dancing", "Myth, ritual & 
symbolism", "Biology and art" and "Unity, sex and love", amongst others. It is a book that 
I feel reinforces everything Ifeel about art It becomes a constant companion to me and I 
subsequently re-read it many times, especially in those difficult moments when work is 
going badly. It is perhaps because of this book that I am to find so much of what Peter 
Fuller is to write, to be so obvious as to hardly need stating. 
Peter Fuller, in short, argued that there are certain "biological constants" which 
determine our aesthetic responses. That we are able to find aesthetic value in a Mayan 
sculpture from South America, or a Dogon sculpture from Africa, without having any 
knowledge of the society and culture which engendered them is a result of constant 
biological conditions which unite our different cultures. In simple terms, we are all born, 
procreate and die; we all eat, drink, defecate and have sex and these common 
denominators are the basis of a common language of aesthetic response and judgement 
I should point out that Fuller was saying nothing new here. As an example Wilson 
Duff had, in 1975, made similar comments in a catalogue essay for an exhibition of North 
American Indian sculpture; 
"Let me go back to the beginning by admitting again bluntly that we do not have any way 
of "knowing" what the stone sculptures really "meant" to their makers and users. We have 
not observed them in use, or known anybody who has. Nor do the present generation of 
Indian people, their more rightful inheritors, have any better way of knowing their deeper 
meanings. The best we can do is make surmises, based upon what we know from 
archaeology, ethnography, and mythology, upon parallels with other objects of better 
known use and meaning, and upon our own perceptions of the images themselves. What we 
must acknowledge most of all is that our world of reality is very different from the world of 
reality in which they were created, and that the only certain area of overlap is that which 
results from a sharing of the concerns of the human condition. One such universal concern 
is sexuality; others are death, the perpetuation of life and self, and the basic shapes of order 
in human thought. But these, we must also notice, are matters about which man has often 
preserved his thoughts in stone." 28 
31 
The other part of Fuller's thesis, which will be relevant to us later on, was that, 
because of the decline of the force of Christianity in our society, we suffer from the lack 
of a "shared symbolic order" and, as a result, artists are faced with the difficulty of 
having no language which is meaningful to society as a whole. He proposes that the way 
forward lies in the development of the "tradition of higher landscape" and sees that a 
creative response to landscape might incorporate those spiritual values that he finds 
lacking in de-spiritualised modern art, the expression of which values would, he argues, 
seem essential to the well being of our society.29 
When I first read about Fuller's "biological constants" I was excited by the idea, 
although I should say that Wheeler had already argued along similar lines. I now have 
certain misgivings. 
Firstly, we must make a clear distinction between that which is truly biologically 
determined and that which is conditioned by our environment or our social beliefs. The 
biological part of sex - the joining of the male spermatozoa and the female ovule - is a 
biological constant, with slight variations for twins, triplets, etc. The rest of sex is not, 
occurring as it does today, not only as a result of a natural animal instinct, but as a 
highly sophisticated act, whose rules, taboos, and practice are determined by our 
sociological environment, which will differ widely according to where we live. 
Death too is a biological moment when certain bodily functions switch off, although 
the considerable number of people who have been clinically dead and come back to life, 
all recall that after the moment of "death" their whole life's history was relived in a 
short space of time, which would suggest that the memory replays everything before 
being switched off (if indeed it is) and this poses the awkward question of what death is 
and when does it actually occur. If some of the brain's functions continue after what has 
till now been considered to constitute clinical death, then the question obviously arises of 
what death is. Sculptor Ernst Neizvestny is one of those who has 'come back to life' after 
being declared as clinically dead. 
"One morning I woke up completely free from pain. I was at peace and content. But I 
could not open my eyes, could not say a word, not move a limb. I could, however, hear what 
was going on around me. I heard that there were doctors standing by my bed. They were 
saying that I was dead and gave the Latin name for my condition. Iliad grown up in a 
doctor's house, so I knew the terminology. I wanted to let them know that I was alive, but 
could do nothing. I was completely unafraid, calm, and happy... I knew only peace and was 
free from pain. 
The stretcher bearers came to take my body to the mortuary in the cellars, down a 
great many stairs. I was particularly heavy because of all the plaster. They could not be 
bothered to carry me, so they heaved me over the banisters and went on their way. The 
plaster cracked open as I hit the ground at the bottom of the stairs, and this presumably 
touched off something in my mutilated back. I began to scream with pain, I know not for 
how long. 
In the meantime my old nursemaid had come into the ward and found my bed empty. 
She found out that I had died and had been taken to the mortuary. So she went down there 
to take her last farewell of me. And on her way down she found me lying screaming. I was 
carried up again, back to life and pain. But the bureaucrats had already managed to send 
news of my death to my family."30 
Death, like sex is surrounded by ritual and taboo which varies between races, 
religions and, indeed, social groups. Our experience of death is tempered by these 
culturally learnt attitudes towards it, and this would appear to be true for our 
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experience of our own death too. Given this, the actual common biological experiences 
would appear to be very minimal and the variations in socially conditioned attitudes 
towards these events would seem to outweigh any common biological factors. 
There is another problem with the biological constant of death. I shall explain it 
through an illustration. As an example I shall use the first 25 verses of the second 
chapter of the Bhagavad-gita, although I may have equally used the Holy Bible or 
numerous other ancient texts which we, perhaps mistakenly, refer to as mythology. 31A 
large battle is about to take place involving gods, half-gods and men. Arjuna does not 
want to fight for fear that the gods will be destroyed and the race will become impurified 
as the women will then couple with others. He is also appalled at the thought of killing 
his friends and teachers. Krishna states in verse 20 that; 
„A lelek nem ismer sem sziiletest, sem halalt; ha mar letezett, tobbe meg nem 
szunhet; nem-sziiletett, orokkevalo, mindig-letezd, halhatatlan es osi, s ha a testet meg is 
olik, d meg nem olhetd." ("The spirit never knows birth, neither death; if it has once 
been, it can never end; not born, always existing, invincible and ancient, and should the 
body be killed, it is inextinguishable.")§ 
Now Peter Fuller would have hated this whilst he was alive, but may now have a 
different opinion, should he be orbiting above us somewhere. As a strict materialist he 
left no room for such speculation.33 The belief in this, or another set of religious values, 
must have a profound affect on the type of sculpture produced by the believer and it is 
in these cases, particularly, that the constancy of Fuller's "biological constants" are 
contaminated with the social conditioning which is an affect of the belief. The Christian 
beliefs of Michelangelo may have had a far greater importance in determining the 
nature of his fresco of "The Last Judgement", than any biological constants. A Hopi 
Indian looking at the fresco may be moved by it and, as Fuller would have it, his reaction 
may be enabled by biological constants, but it may equally be caused by a similarity in 
the belief of the Hopi Indians concerning death and afterlife. If this concept of an 
everlasting life is true, then we are not born and do not die and these things cannot, then, 
be regarded as biological constants, although the physical act of squeezing through the 
lips of the vagina of the mother may be. 
I have a further misgiving. Being born, procreating, dying are experiences also 
common to dogs (or other animals) and yet the human would seem to be unique in 
making objects solely for aesthetic consideration. (Richard Hamilton did have a show of 
pictures of dog faeces, hung at dog-eye level, but this did not bring any notable canine 
response. Phillip King, in a lecture about his work at Trent Polytechnic in the seventies, 
recounted how it poured with rain at the official opening of a large public sculpture of 
his, (I think in Holland). He and the officials stayed in the limousines provided and the 
only visitor to the sculpture was a dog who cocked his hind leg and christened the work -
"the only art critic present" as King put it. Nevertheless, this may well have been 
coincidental and not an example of canine art criticism. (Of course it may even have 
been a two-legged art critic in disguise.) 
Having said all this I do not wish to overthrow Fuller's thesis entirely. I do think 
that the language of art and our capacity for aesthetic appreciation and evaluation, have 
their roots in biology, but these roots lie in the mechanism of the body itself - in the DNA 
patterns, in the functions of the brain, in the way we see and sense and in the rhythms of 
the energy impulses in our synapses and the blood circulating in our bodies. These real 
§ My translation. 
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biological constants are tempered with culturally learnt experience and together they 
formulate our capacity for aesthetic evaluation. Our biological systems determine our 
capacity to formulate language. The systems themselves are causal of how we are able 
to do this - the given biological systems can only work in certain limited ways. What we 
then do with these systems is dependant on our culturally acquired experience and I 
should now like to look in some detail at this problem and try to unravel these two quite 
separate strands from each other. To do this we must turn to genetics. 
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Chapter 2 Genetics 
"Man's physical being contains within itself all the basic rhythms that go to the 
creation of dancing and music. The repetition of accent which marks the bars of music, is 
echoed in the tap of the dancer's feet and is like the beating of the heart. The melody which 
flows over the regular beat of musical time is expressed by the dancer's body and arms. 
This may be likened to the rhythms of breathing, and the patterns traced upon the ground 
by the travelling of the dancer's feet coincide with the sweep of musical phrases and are 
comparable to the flow of the circulation of the blood." 34 
If we wish to establish a biological basis for our ability to react to and appreciate 
sculpture, it is necessary to establish a common ground between each of us and between 
us and our predecessors. It is quite obvious that the nature of our optic system must 
affect the way we see sculpture, but to place any weighty importance on the mechanisms 
of such a system itself we need to be sure that your and my optic system behave in the 
same way. It would furthermore be helpful in explaining my ability to appreciate a 
Dogon, or ancient Egyptian sculpture, if the physical workings of my eye and brain may 
be shown to be the same as the sculptor who produced these works. In this case my 
ability to get pleasure from such works may be based on our common biological systems. 
If we are to prove this it is necessary to study how these systems are inherited by each 
generation, over considerably long periods of time. 
It was in 1865 that Johann Gregor Mendel's first law of genetics opened up the 
modern study of the way in which biological information is passed between parent and 
off-spring. (Lamarck's relevant contribution preceded this and will be dealt with below.) 
We had to wait almost a hundred years for the next big leap, which was the cracking of 
the genetic code by Watson and Crick in 1953. Watson and Crick worked out the 
complex structure of the deoxyribonucleic acid, (DNA), the genetic material of the cell. 
Eccles claims that; 
"The segregation of this essential evolutionary material into the cell nuclei was achieved 
very early in the evolution of the unicellular eukaryotes that arose about 1.8 billion years 
ago." 35 
(I shall discuss these evolutionary aspects in detail, later, as this is of central interest to 
my argument) I should now like to give a brief outline of the genetic system, as we 
understand it today. 
The nucleus of the cell contains the DNA. Its form is that of a double helix, which is 
very long and densely coiled. Each of these strands is made of sugar and phosphate 
moieties, which are arranged alternatively. To each sugar a molecule is attached. This is 
either an adenine, guanine, thymine, or cytosine molecule. The two helices are linked 
together at regular intervals by hydrogen bonds, the adenine of one linking to the 
thymine of the other, the guanine linking to the cytosine, and so on. This patterning is 
the genetic information of the ceil, and it is this which is passed on during reproduction. 
Essential to this process is protein and the enzyme, Ribonucleic acid, (RNA). It is the 
RNA which accepts the DNA information and passes it on to the new DNA, or to protein. 
The RNA is the postman. Smith points out that certain viruses can simulate the function 
of the RNA, thus passing on defective genetic information. 36 
In human reproduction the male cell joins with the female egg. Each of the two 
genomes contains DNA. If everyone's DNA code were identical, then the two DNA 
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systems in unity would produce an exact replica of both parents, provided that there is 
no 'outside' interference. (As the information of the DNA is passed to the new DNA 
through the RNA, the RNA, or viruses simulating the RNA's function, could affect this 
transfer). The matter is complicated by genes. The strands of the DNA carry genes and it 
is these which contain the precise information necessary for the building of amino acid 
sequences. Simply our bodies require a large range of different types of proteins and it is 
the configuration of genes in relation to each other which makes their production 
possible. 
Eccles accepts the existence of around 30,000 human genes and around 3.5 billion 
genetic configurations in our cells. 37 The DNA is sub-divided into chromosomes and in 
the human genome 23 of these exist, each having its own character (or gene 
configuration) and each responsible for a different job. During reproduction these 
chromosomes join with the 23 chromosomes of the partner's genome, thus making the 
normal human compliment of 46 chromosomes. The groupings of genes, or 'alleles', is 
different in each individual, with the exception of identical twins, although Dawkins' 
opinion differs from that of Eccles. (See below)38. The 23 chromosomes of the male 
genome contain all the genetic information of that male (and by implication, of his 
parents, grandparents etc.) and the 23 chromosomes of the female genome, all that of the 
female (and her ancestors). Here we must imagine a kind of "gene wars" in which 
certain of the male gene configurations will be more strong than the female's and vice 
versa. In simple terms, if the family of the male side has had black hair for generations 
and the family of the woman's side sometimes black, sometimes brown and sometimes 
blond, then the offspring will almost certainly have black hair as the combined fact of 
the male genome's 'family history' will be stronger than the female genome's mixture of 
hair colour alleles. However, the offspring's genome will in turn carry traces in its DNA 
of the mother's (and her family tree's) varied hair colour. 
The possibility exists of gene mutation - accidental, or direct. (I am thinking here of 
recent gene manipulation experiments). For example, instead of the adenine, the cytosine 
may join the thymine. Eccles suggests here that such accidents are normally 
unimportant as their detrimental nature to the survival of the animal, will lead to their 
disappearance through natural selection. One might argue that modern medicine and 
the social practice of keeping alive patients with genetically based deformities and 
diseases, who in turn will often reproduce and pass these on, can only lead to the 
deterioration of the genetic stock - to a kind of genetic degradation. Whilst his argument 
may be true of animals, and indeed humans at an earlier stage of their development, our 
current social and medical practices and ethics would seem to be working against the 
notion of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. 
Eccles then writes of beneficial mutation; 
"Only on rare occasions is a mutation beneficial for survival and reproduction. Such a 
mutation will be transmitted to successive generations and will result in enhanced survival 
of the biological group sharing this mutation. So after many generations by natural 
selection this favourable mutation may come to be incorporated in all members of that 
species, which consequently reflect a slight change in genotype." 39 
Richard Dawkins deals with the question of how the genetic material is activated 
during embryonic development. 40 Each cell of our body contains the genetic information 
to make a whole human. Yet, different cells in our body have different functions. During 
embryonic development that part of the genetic information necessary for the creation 
of the various cells is activated variously. 
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"Mi dönti el, milyen gének lépnek működésbe egy adott sejt esetében? A sejtben már 
jelenlevő kémiai anyagok.") 
However, Dawkins also states that, 
„Hogy adott sejtben mely kémiai reackiók zajlanak,azt az határozza meg, mely 
enzimmolekulák vannak nagyobb számban. Minden enzimmolekula felépitéseert, perdöntő 
alakját is beleértve, egy meghatározott gén a felelős." 41 
According to this, genes cause the production of the enzyme molecules present in the cell, 
which in turn activate the genes which determine the cell's characteristics - a classic 
chicken and egg situation, as Dawkins himself recognises. Dawkins gets round the 
problem by comparing the function to the loading programme of a computer - a 
programme which instructs the computer how to read the loaded programme. Dawkins 
states that something similar exists in our genetic system: 
„Hogyan differencialódnak (a szakszóval élve) ehelyett májsejtekké, vesesejtekké, 
izomsejtekké stb., miközben mindegyikben más és más gének lépnek működésbe és más 
enzimek aktiválódnak? Kérem szépen, a programbehúzás segítségével, mégpedig a 
következőképpen. Habár egy petesejt gomb alakú, kémiai összetételét tekintve különbség 
van a pólusai - a teteje és az alja és sok esetben az eleje és a hátulja (ezért a jobb és bal 
oldal) - között Ezeken a pólusokon a vegyületek más-más koncentráció jelentősen 
megnövekszik például, ha hátúiról előrefelé haladunk a petesejtben, másoké meg akkor, ha 
fentről lefelé. Ezek a korai koncentráció-különbségek meglehetősen egyszerűek, mindez 
azonban elég ahhoz, hogy beindítsa a programbehuzás első szakaszát 
Amikor a megtermékenyített petesejt, mondjuk, harminckét sejtté osztódik - tehát öt 
osztódás után -, e harminckét sejt némelyikében a petesejt csúcsában lévő vegyi anyagok 
jutnak túlsúlyba, míg másokban a petesejt aljára jellemző anyagok. Kiegyensúlyozatlanság 
mutatkozhat a sejtek között az elülső és hátulsó koncentrációgradiensek viszonylatában is. 
E különbségek elégségesek ahhoz, hogy a gének különböző kombinációját léptessék 
működésbe az egyes sejtekben. Ezért a kezdeti embrió különböző részeit alkotó sejtekben 
eltérő enzim-kombinációk lesznek jelen. Ez pedig gondoskodik további génkombinációk 
beindításáról a különböző sejtekben. Az utódsejtek tehát különböznek az embrión belül, 
nem maradnak azonosak klón-ősükkei " 42 
I can only give Dawkins credit and assume that this is an assumption based on the 
results of scientific study and not merely plausible speculation to get round a rather 
thorny problem. He unfortunately offers no evidence to back his arguments, in what can 
only be described as a highly didactic book. I shall have to believe that he is right 
The importance of our genetic make-up to my arguments will become more 
apparent later. At present suffice to say that our genetic constitution determines the 
nature of our brain and optic functions and the degree of constancy between my and 
your various biological systems. It is in these that the essence of the language of 
sculpture lies. Before developing this theme further I should like to pause and to take a 
look at the question of evolution. 
Chapter 3 Evolution 
Whilst our understanding of our genetic make-up may be studied through 
scientific experimental procedures, the study of evolutionary genetics would seem to be 
much more a question of speculation and imaginative guesses backed by some rather 
unconvincing experiments and observation. Its importance to my arguments is to do 
with the idea of constancy as put forward by Fuller. If our genetic structure is in a state 
of flux, then so too must be our brain and optic functions. 
I should like to begin by looking at two historical figures, and their theories which 
constitute the foundation of our understanding of evolution. 
Jean-Baptiste de Monet Lamarck, (1744-1829) preceded Darwin in his interest in 
the idea of hereditary evolution. What Lamarck proposed was that the functions of the 
body, through their habitual use, became more and more efficient and that this increased 
effectiveness was passed on from generation to generation. In other words, the body, and 
its functions, is able to adapt to its environment. Smith43 gives the example of humans 
living at high altitudes who produce more red blood cells than their counterparts who 
live at low level. That people do adapt to their environment is undoubted, but the 
question for us, here, is whether these adaptations may be transferred, as Lamarck 
believed, from one generation to the next through our genetic system. 
"I have just been to our village pub to buy the Sunday newspaper and was captivated 
by the final of the Australian Open tennis final in which Becker defeated Chang. Of course 
the match was enthralling, but what particularly interested me was what was happening on 
the screen before me. These tennis players were making decisions with their optic system of 
the minutest exactitude. These decisions were based on practice, on years of experience. 
Their training had made them capable of making decisions in which the eye and the 
movements of the body are in accord to such an extent that one can only describe it as 
super-human, or genius, within its field. The eye has become so highly trained - and the 
resulting bodily movements so oiled - that responses to the movements of the ball, as 
directed by the other player, invoke replies that, to us non-tennis playing mortals, are 
extraordinary. Such optic training is also regularly used by sculptors, although here it is 
not the movement of a ball that is in question, but the amalgamation of line, shape, form, 
interval, etc., about which I wrote earlier." 
What Lamarck argued was that the practised use of the systems of the body had a 
genetic affect and that this may be passed on to subsequent generations. It is on this basis 
that genetically based sperm banks have been founded in America so that the possibility 
will exist in the future to buy gene stock 'off the peg' and produce exceptional tennis 
players or politicians. 
From my understanding of current evolutionary theory Lamarck would seem to be 
discredited, but it does seem to me that he provides at least a plausible explanation for 
the way in which genetic change may be influenced, or even caused by environmental 
factors. Furthermore, a very unscientific hunch tells me that he may be much more right 
than we think at present. 
Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) theory of evolution was deeply based in the idea of 
the survival of the fittest, or natural selection. He argued that the most well adapted 
organisms would reproduce more effectively and thus, those characteristics of 'well 
adaptedness' would be propagated, meaning that the well adapted strains would become 
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ever stronger, whilst the weaker, or less well adapted strains would become ever weaker. 
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The argument may be illustrated by an example that Maynard Smith gives of 
industrial melanism in the moth Biston Betularia, although Smith uses this example in 
quite a different context. This moth is normally of a speckled grey colour and in 1850 an 
almost completely black example was found. This blackness is a camouflage, making the 
moth harder to be seen by its predators as it rests on sooty trees. Within a hundred years 
of this first sighting of the black variety 95% of this species in industrial areas showed 
this black variation.45 According to Darwinian theory this would appear to be an 
example of the evolutionary process. The moth adapts to hostile changes in its 
environment and is better able to survive than its counterparts whose speckled grey 
colour make it easy prey. This is what Darwin meant by the survival of the fittest 
Such change as the moth underwent slowly leads towards the better functioning 
and the greater suitability of its bodily systems in relation to its environment This would 
then, at least logically, be a continuing process slowly developing over a long period of 
time which in the case of humans has, according to Darwinist evolutionists, taken several 
million years. It also presupposes that we are still developing genetically, or that we have 
reached some kind of perfect state of gene development in which our gene combinations 
have reached a maximal suitability to the environment 
Smith also acknowledges the contribution of August Weismann (1834-1914) to 
current evolutionary thinking. Weismann argued that the fertilised egg divides in two 
different ways, one of which forms the soma (i.e. the reproduced body) and the other 
which forms, the 'germ line' (i.e. that part which will again, later, reproduce). 
Weismann's germ line is immortal and, he says, unaffected by changes to the soma. This 
is obviously the antipathy to Lamarck's stance. Smith comments thus; 
"the energy and material needed for the production of gametes are provided by the rest of 
the body, so there are opportunities for the soma to influence the germ line, In fact, 
Weismann's insight was to realize that what is relevant is the passage, not of material and 
energy, but of information." 46 
These different theories, or rather a combination of them, still form the basis of 
evolutionary genetic theory today and we shall be returning to them later. 
For my thesis there are certain questions about the genetic process which are 
particularly important and I should like to look at these in turn. 
Firstly there is the question of the nature of evolution, if indeed evolution actually 
occurs. If my genetic make-up is identical, or very close, to that of an Egyptian sculptor 
4,000 years ago, it may prove to be the basis of my ability to empathise with his work, 
although I have a quite different cultural and historical background. In other words, the 
nature of our biological functions, inherited through our genetic system, might be the 
same. If this is the case the possibility exists of our common biological system being 
causal of the way in which we can respond to the world and these common factors may 
outweigh in importance any culturally-conditioned characteristics, mediated, as they 
must be, by place and time. 
Eccles tries to show how the brain has developed from a mammalian to a human 
brain and does this through an examination of pre-homo sapiens primates. His 
argument is based on Darwinian evolutionary theory but as with Smith, with some 
amendments. He argues that all the existing pongids, proto humans and the now extinct 
great apes, all derived from one original source, around 30 million years ago.47 
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If we accept Darwin's theory, then the "favourable mutation" should eventually 
spread to all members of the species and it would be difficult to accept Eccles' argument 
about the difference between pongids and homo; 
"The three species of pongids -chimpanzees, gorilla, and orang-utan - have 48 
chromosomes. In Homo two pairs of chromosomes have united by centric fusion to form 
chromosome 2, hence homo has 46 chromosomes." 
Man, it would seem, is the result of genetic development, a development which escaped 
the pongids. By the implication of the Darwinist evolutionary theory the pongids are, or 
should be constantly evolving, just as we are and yet they have not evolved this 
seemingly advantageous centric fusion. As they cannot interbreed with us, they must 
have developed in isolation from us and this would seem to deny the idea of a common 
ancestor, or they too would have undergone this advantageous fusion. 
The answer to this problem would seem to lie in the hypothesis that relatively 
isolated groups may evolve at a very rapid rate and that these then return to their 
ancestral territory and co-exist with, but do not mate with the old, lesser evolved species 
and Eccles claims there to be examples of this in the fossil record, where supposedly 
newly evolved species are found to have existed alongside the original species from 
which they evolved. Eccles states that, 
"A species consists of a population rather than of unconnected individuals. The population 
of a species is reproductively isolated from all other species because of the fertility 
criterion. Other rather similar species may inhabit the same territory, but despite this 
sympatric coexistence there is no interbreeding." 48 
Australopithicus africanus would seem to have been as different from homo habilis 
as is, say, a gorilla from an orang-utan - two species which we know cannot interbreed. 
According to Eccles' argument all these pre-homo types must have, at some point in 
time, been of one species, (and thus able to breed), and yet on the other hand he wishes 
us to believe that they were capable of evolving very quickly in isolation and not 
breeding subsequently with the older ancestors. Now to me this raises the question of the 
difference between a species and an evolved sub-species. Where is the point that a sub-
species cannot, or will not, mate with its ancestors? Secondly, why has one isolated 
group developed beneficially into a sub-species, whilst the original group has not? What 
has caused this beneficial genetic change in one group, whilst the other stagnates? What 
is the 'motor mechanism' of genetic evolution? 
Before I go into these questions in more detail I should like to mention one more 
difficulty I have with the evolutionary theory as put forward by Eccles. That is the total 
lack of intermediate stages in the fossil record. It is as if there is a fully developed 
species, or sub-species Australopithecines and then another, homo habilis, homo erectus 
and so on. He, himself recognises this problem, 
"Some of the key happenings in hominid evolution seem to occur without leaving a fossil 
trace. For example, in hominid evolution the immensely important transition from arboreal 
to a terrestrial existence..... We need a more complete fossil record " 49 
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"The fossil evidence is inadequate for illuminating the stages of transformation from an 
assumed hominoid that eventually evolved into an erect striding bipedal 
Australopithecine."50 
The fact is that there is absolutely no fossil evidence that these proto humans developed 
one out of the other. Indeed, the fossil record rather suggests that we are merely looking 
at a set of different species and to my mind it requires rather too large an imaginative 
leap to use this fossil record as proof of genetic evolution in a Darwinian sense. It would 
seem to me that some kind of sudden genetic manipulation is a much more plausible 
explanation and I shall deal with some theories of the possible cause of this a little later. 
For the moment there would seem to be a consensus amongst Darwinian evolutionists 
that, (as Eccles also points out), genetic evolution would appear to occur, in the case of 
humans at least, in spurts, as the apparent chromosome fusion in the human would seem 
to illustrate. The idea of constant gradual change would appear to be a misnomer, but I 
cannot help asking whether the desire to link the pongoids, pongids and man into an 
evolutionary process has not been causal of this way of thinking. If it is true then this 
begs the question of what causes these spurts of development. 
If evolution, on the other hand, is supposed to be a gradual adaptation and 
perfection based on environmental factors, it is hard to see why we have not changed 
genetically for thousands of years. Our environment has certainly undergone radical 
changes as man has gradually 'conquered' our natural habitat and left his mark 
everywhere. (See W. G. Hoskins 'The Making of the English Landscape'3l). Many 
writers on evolution would seem to subscribe to both theories, slow and sudden 
evolutionary development, as it better fits one or other of their arguments. Dawkins 
approaches the problem thus; 
„Az evolucio sarkalatos sajdtossdga a fokozatossaga. Ez inkabb elvi kerdes, mint teny. Nem 
tudhatjuk, egy-egy fejezete hirtelen fordulattal koszontott-e be. Megszakitdsok is 
elofordulhattak a gyors iitemu torzsfejlddesben vagy akdr vdratlan makromutdciok -
jelentosebb, az utodokat a sziiloktol elkiildnito vdltozasok. Kellett lenniiik hirtelen 
kihaldsoknak is - talan nagy termeszeti katasztrofak valthattak ki ezeket, pelddul egy 
Foldunkbe iitkozo iistokos amelyek hagyta vakuumot rovid uton betoltottek a sebesen 
fejlodo „beugro szineszek", igy a dinoszauruszokat helyettesito emlosok. Az evolucio nagy 
valoszinuseggel nem mindig fokozatos. Am fokozatosnak kell feltetelezniink, ha a 
segitsegevel ktvanjuk magmagyardzni olyan bonyolult, szemlatomdst rendezett szerkezetek 
kialakulasat, amilyenek a szemek. Mert ha ez esetben nem fokozatos a torzsfejlddes, akkor 
semmit sem tudunk vele megmagyarazni."52 
However much I read I have, as yet, found no reasonable explanation by the 
Darwinian evolutionists as to what caused these spurts of genetic development. Perhaps 
it was, as Dawkins suggests it may have been, the sudden change in the environment 
caused by the impact of some large meteorite. But this is mere speculation. Whilst it 
seems perfectly plausible, it cannot be proved or even demonstrated. It has no more 
value than any other of the many other current 'creation theories' of man. It is the lack 
of explanation to this key question which has lead me to doubt the integrity of the 
evolutionist theory. Such guesses as Dawkins', (and he is by no means alone in 
forwarding this hypothetical explanation), are simply a means of plugging an 
embarrassing hole in evolutionary theory. Yet, it would seem to me that these holes are 
so large that they deny the credibility of the evolutionary theory itself. 
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I should now like to look a little more closely at the theory, as put forward by 
Darwin, himself. Whilst I find it difficult to agree with him, per se, he does seem to come 
near to offering a solution to the problem. 
In his 'Origin of Species' Darwin gave to the world, when it first appeared in 1859, 
a very well thought out theory. He had been urged to publish it before it was 'ready', 
and he refers in it, many times, to another more complete study which was to have 
followed. He had evolved the theory over a long period and was well versed with the 
works of others who were thinking along the same lines, as can be seen in the 'Historical 
Sketch', which he appended to later editions. He foresaw the subsequent criticism which 
was likely to ensue and is at great pains to present, and explain away, counter arguments 
to his theory. He therefore deals with both the problems of the inadequate fossil record, 
and with the question of evolution being both gradual and in spurts. 
Before we consider these questions more carefully, I should like to make one 
general note. Modern genetic theory has adopted Darwin's theory as the totality which 
it clearly is. Darwin, of course, knew nothing of genetics and attributed the adaptation of 
species as the passing on of'blood' from generation to generation through the sexual act. 
Without understanding the mechanism of the genetic process, he presupposed it in a 
remarkable way. There is no doubt that his theory was revolutionary, not only in the 
field of science, but in how it radically altered our world view. Darwin's theory still, 
today, profoundly affects our thinking in so many ways. One of these is our attitude 
towards time. J. W. Burrow, in his introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of'The 
Origin' points out how different conceptions of historical time were, at the beginning of 
the Nineteenth Century; 
"Most men at the beginning of the nineteenth century thought the world had been created 
only some six thousand years before, though perhaps few would have cared to be so specific 
as the famous pronouncement of a seventeenth-century vice-chancellor of Cambridge 
University according to whom 'man was created by the Trinity on October 23 4004 B.C. at 
nine o'clock in the morning.' Even so, it has been pointed out that when the poet 
apostrophized Petra as 'rose red city half as old as time' he meant it" 53 
Now let us look at what Darwin has to say about the problems I outlined above. He 
deals with the problem of an inadequate fossil record at great length, and it is, perhaps, 
unnecessary to go into all the details here. Basically, he argues, the required geological 
conditions for the creation of fossils were not extant at all times, in all places. We find 
fossils only in certain locations in the earth's crust, but these will obviously represent 
only those species who existed at that time, in that place, and those species which existed 
in other regions are obviously not represented. This seems perfectly logical. 
He categorically denies the idea that evolution occurred in sudden bursts: 
"Natural selection can act only by the preservation and accumulation of infinitesimally 
small inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved being; and as modern 
geology has almost banished such views as the excavation of a great valley by a single 
diluvial wave, so will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the belief of the 
continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification in their 
structure." 54 
Darwin is most thorough and convincing in his descriptions of how species evolve in a 
gradual, slow, way. The idea of sudden evolution of certain species is, he suggests, a 
misconception, again based on the inadequate fossil record: 
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"In members of the same class the average amount of change, during long and equal 
periods of time, may, perhaps, be nearly the same; but as the accumulation of long-
enduring fossiliferous formations depends on great masses of sediment having been 
deposited on areas whilst subsiding, our formations have been almost necessarily 
accumulated at wide and irregularly intermittent intervals; consequently the amount of 
organic change exhibited by the fossils embedded in consecutive formations is not equal 
Each formation, on this view, does not mark a new and complete act of creation, but only 
an occasional scene, taken almost at hazard', in a slowly changing drama." 55 
It is on the question of the motor force behind the evolutionary process that 
Darwin is most pertinent. He actually describes two motor forces, the first of which is 
man himself. He suggests that man has perhaps domesticated animals since the Egyptian 
period, thus, for four, or five, thousand years. 56 During this time he has both 
intentionally, and subconsciously, been responsible for breeding new strains. He argues 
that man has also affected domesticated plants, in the same way: 
"We cannot suppose that all breeds were suddenly produced as perfect and as useful as we 
now see them; indeed, in several cases, we know that this has not been their history. The 
key is man's power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds 
them up in certain directions useful to him. In this sense he may be said to make for 
himself useful breeds." 57 
He points out that methodical science of breeding stock has only a short history, but goes 
on to give earlier examples from history of such practises. Man's power, he says, is 
limited to choosing extant variations from nature and developing these: 
"Man can hardly select, or only with difficulty, any deviation of structure excepting such as 
is externally visible; and indeed he rarely cares for what is internal. He can never act by 
selection, excepting on variations which are first given to him in some slight degree by 
nature."5S 
Suffice to say that man has undoubtedly had an affect on nature in the historical period 
and may have been responsible for evolving certain species at a much faster rate than 
nature does. Modern genetic engineering, dangerously, allows for those major structural 
developments which in Darwin's age were inconceivable. 
The second motor force is 'Nature' itself. Even for Darwin nature is God given, 
and it is important to remember that in the Nineteenth Century, 'Nature' was thought of 
as a holistic entity governed by unseeable forces and, ultimately, by God. Darwin's work 
was to change this conception. 
What he argues is that all living beings are engaged in a struggle for life. They 
must struggle to survive against adverse climatic conditions, against the scarcity of food 
and against other individuals of the same species. As a result existence is dependent on 
the idea of the 'survival of the fittest'. The stronger members of any species will survive 
and in order for a species to continue its struggle, it must be adaptable to its 
surroundings. This law causes the selection of the best adapted specimens, whilst the 
weaker strains and species will, eventually, die out. In other words Nature has its own 
built-in evolutionary mechanism. 
There are minor confusions in Darwin's arguments, w here he occasionally seems 
to contradict himself over small details and he sometimes uses the examples of domestic 
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animals to illustrate points which should be really illustrated by examples from Nature, 
but we can let these pass. There are also absences, the gravest of which must be that of 
disease as a force in the checking of over-population, and, indeed, as a cause of mutation. 
In fact he nowhere mentions disease. 
Now let us cover these questions again, in the light of our improved understanding 
of evolution, thanks to genetics. We have seen that Eccles, and many other writers, does 
seem to think that evolution occurred at certain times in quite radical steps. He also still 
finds the, now much improved, fossil record to be inadequate. Darwin's argument of 
why the fossil record is inadequate is logically convincing, but this, by no means, means 
that it is correct 
I am, sometimes, inclined to think that Darwin might be right about the theory of 
natural selection causing a very slow development of species, but that there have been 
sudden changes too. Some of these may have been caused by dramatic climatic changes, 
such as Oawkins' hypothetical meteorite, but there may be many other causes. 
There are a large number of sites around the world where vitrified rock 
formations may be found, often, coupled with high radiation levels. The Tap G'Noth hill 
and Knock Farrel in Scotland, the Rio Gila in Arizona, and the Gobi Desert in China are 
examples of such sites, all of which attest to nuclear explosions in ancient times. Perhaps 
the war in heaven of all those ancient texts was no myth. Such nuclear explosions, which 
seem to have occurred world wide would also have an enormous genetic effect. 59 
A considerable variety of other theories have been put forward as to how man 
'evolved' or came into being, and this is perhaps not so surprising given that we are, 
here, really asking the big question, 'where do we come from?' I should like to 
summarise some of them, rather briefly. 
There are a vast number of creation 'myths" in wltich these genetic changes would 
appear to have been caused by gods. These may be regarded as divine interventions in 
the genetic development of man in which the Gods couple sexually with human women. 
Here the Greek Gods are a case in point, as is the creation myth of the Mauysi people of 
the Volga River, to give just two examples.60 In what is, traditionally at least, a 
Christian society, we tend to dismiss this non-biblical literature as mythology and to 
read the Bible as a mixture of the materialist and the symbolic and gloss over some 
rather embarrassing questions. 
It was in 1973 that my attention was brought to another kind of thinking about 
these ancient texts, when I read T.C. Lethbridge's 'The Legend of the Sons of God'. 61 
Lethbridge suggested that the Bible might also be read literally. He quoted the first two 
verses of Genesis chapter 6; 
"And it came to pass, when men began to multiply on the 
face of the earth, and daughters were bom unto them, 
that the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they 
were fair; and they took them wives of all which they chose." 
Lethbridge then asks the question of who these sons of God were, a question that no 
theologian had, apparently, managed to answer for him. He makes the assumption that 
these sons of God were literal and really did mate with the earth women, who bore them 
offspring. It would seem that Genesis is no different in this aspect from the vast majority 
of creation myths from around the world. Indeed, offhand, I am unable to think of any 
which does not involve the Gods mating with earth women. This then may be a plausible 
explanation of 'evolution' - that some other race from another planet visited earth and 
reproduced with earth women. 
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In 1979 Erich von Daniken went further in his 'Prophet der Vergangenheit' and 
suggested that human 'evolution' was the result of direct genetic manipulation by a 
superior intelligence from space.62 Since this time a number of other writers have dealt 
with the issue. Dr. Johannes Fiebag has gone so far as to suggest that pre-human 
evolution was a result of a superior race using earth as a kind of experimental research 
station.6j Martina Steinhardt suggests that there may be evidence of such genetic 
manipulation in that series of diseases in which our bodies would appear to have an 
allergic reaction to their own organs. Her argument is based on the fact that the 
implantation of foreign genes into a body causes rejection and she suggests that the 
group of diseases she lists may be the result of our bodies still reacting negatively 
towards these long-ago implanted foreign genes.64 
Re-reading some of this literature after a space of over twenty years and reading 
some of the newer material I still find it full of speculation, it is interesting material, but, 
as with the evolutionary theory described above, seems to lack concrete proof. What is 
interesting is that a great number of scientists from various fields would now seem to 
subscribe to at least some parts of it. It would seem that there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that there was interference from outside at various stages of human history, but 
it is, as yet, insufficient to categorically surmise that our 'evolution' was enabled by 
another civilisation. 
The British astronomer Fred Hoyle has suggested that our planet is bombarded by 
viruses from space and that these viruses may be the cause of dramatic genetic 
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changes. " This is a theory which seems to be most plausible. He argues that organic 
material exists everywhere throughout the milky way and that this matter is biological 
in origin. There exist on our planet a vast number of micro-organisms which have no 
possible reason to be here, if everything has evolved in reaction to the environment, as 
Darwin argued. It is, perhaps not for me to go into ail the arguments, but when Hoyle 
says that: "Viruses have all the properties needed for them to serve as the vehicle of 
evolution.", I suspect that he may well have found the missing 'motor mechanism" of 
'evolution'.67 
There is too, of course, a large, but perhaps decreasing, body of opinion which 
would have man created whole and complete by one of the various Gods of the differing 
religions; that there is a holy spirit, or force, an almighty, which has created or caused 
us to come into being. These are the traditional Christians, Jews, etc. For these 
Fundamentalists our origin is a matter of belief and not of rational thinking. I cannot 
help thinking that religion requires belief of a kind similar to that exhibited by the 
members of the Ancient Astronaut Society. Christians read the Bible as a collection of 
fables and tales. They are at one and the same time both real and spiritual. It is both 
history and spiritual guidance combined. For the spacemen theorists the Bible is also a 
major source, along with many other essentially religious texts. They read these texts in 
a literal w ay - the many references to people flying around in the heavens and the 
appearance of angels are for them real events aided by the flying machines of high 
technology. The theory is almost like religion without the spiritual bit - a kind of 
deconstructed religion. 
Peter Fuller writes brilliantly about the deconstruction of Christ in 'The Christs of 
Faith and the Jesus of History'.68 What shocked me when I first read this essay, was not 
that Fuller should write it, but the doubt about the existence of Christ amongst the 
church's theologians themselves. If they can envisage a church in which the lynch pin of 
the faith is doubted, then there is little wonder that the force of the Church has been 
slowly undermined. 
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Fuller and his theologians and the members of the Ancient Astronaut Society have 
in their different ways applied rational logic to the Bible. Theirs is a totally materialist 
stance which leaves no room for the spiritual. It is a way of viewing the world which has 
become ever more prevalent in the 20th Century - rational materialism at the expense of 
all else. I shall be returning to this theme again shortly. 
Yet another group of thinkers are able to equate the notion of an almighty with 
Darwinian evolution and Eccles is a good example, being both an evolutionist and a 
Christian. He seems able to equate an evolved human as a materialist-based entity who 
has a spiritual, non-materialist, capacity that is God-given. 
An even more wicked thought has occurred to me several times during my reading 
for the preparation of this text. It has no scientific basis and yet would seem quite 
plausible. A brain that has been shown to be capable of self-healing, of levitation and of 
denying the sensual experience and physical consequences of extremes of pain and heat, 
might also have a volition towards its own evolution. 
Whilst I have expressed my doubts about the correctness of the evolutionary 
theory the American biochemist Michael Bele is about to publish his new book in 
England, which argues, rather more convincingly than I, that Darwin was incorrect. His 
thesis is based on the biochemical structure of molecules, which he claims are 
irreducibly complex and could not possibly have been evolved through a series of 
modifications over time. As individual parts the structural elements of the molecules 
would simply have no function and have use value only as operational elements in an 
overall function. So convinced is he of his findings discrediting the Darwinian theory 
that he has challenged Richard Dawkins to a televised intellectual duel. Dawkins has 
declined, claiming not to know enough about biochemistry. 69 
I leave it to you to decide w hich version of "evolution"" you prefer, it may seem 
that I have dwelt unduly long on a subject that seems far from the language of sculpture, 
but, as we shall see, my exploration of the biological factors involved in aesthetics 
requires a stable base for its foundation. I suggest that this lies in our genetic structure 
and that this structure is, at least in the period in which sculpture has been made, 
essentially stable. 
The Darwinian evolutionists say that, "Biological evolution has apparently ceased 
in the last 40,000years." 70 Fiebag puts the number of 'interventions1 from space at a 
maximum number often and this would seem to be in accord with those major stages of 
evolution as put forward by the Darwinists. For my purposes it would seem that our 
genetic make-up has undergone no radical transformations within the historical period 
and that my hypothetical Egyptian sculptor's genetic make up and those bodily systems 
dependant on it, were the same as mine. We can therefore talk of a genetic constancy. 
This now leaves me with the complicated task of showing how much our genetically 
determined common biological systems are causal of how we are able to view the world. 
Before discussing this, how ever, I must deal with one or two other matters. 
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Chapter 4 Our genetic inheritance 
"If as neuropsychologists we study the behaviour of simple organisms, even honey-bees, we 
can plausibly account even for the most complex behaviour by the concept of inherited 
instinct with a superimposed learning. The instinctive performance of an animal is based 
on the ontogenetic building of its nervous system and related structures by means of genetic 
instructions. And learning can be the increased effectiveness of synapses following 
usage. "ll 
The other questions I should like to raise in connection with genetics and evolution 
are to do with the specific nature of the material that is genetically transferred from 
parents to offspring. If culturally learnt values might be genetically encoded and 
inheritable, my appreciation of the Egyptian sculpture may be due to my having a prior 
knowledge of it within my genetic coding. As we shall see this is a misconception. 
I have already mentioned Lamarck. Now if, as Lamarck suggested, the functioning 
of our bodily capacities are improved by practise in use and this improved performance 
is then passed on genetically, then these improvements must come about as a result of 
more effective response to the environment. I shall begin by looking at whether the 
environment itself, (and here I mean the environment in a physical sense), can, therefore, 
affect our genetic coding? 
According to Eccles a small isolated group of a given species will have limited 
breeding possibilities and dominant genes will be passed on at a faster rate. (One 
assumes that these are advantageous genes, for here the same must be true for 
retrogressive genes.) Crucial to the idea of evolution in small isolated groups is the 
notion that the environment itself can affect the genetic code of a species. Lamarck said 
that this is possible whilst Weismann, said that it is not. Of course we know that animals 
and humans adapt to their environment, but is this adaptation at a genetic level and the 
adaptations, therefore, inheritable? 
There is another problem here, one which I have already mentioned above. If 
evolution is supposed to occur in isolated groups then this implies the notion of a steady 
continuous genetic change, something which both Eccles and Dawkins say variably did 
and did not happen. It appears that they want it both ways - that evolution is both a 
gradual process and one of sudden bursts. Leaving this aside, let us continue. 
Of real interest here is Dawkins' discussion of the role of enzymes in the 
developing embryo. The notion of the genetic material being affected by its chemical 
environment within the cell is surely an example of the environment affecting the genetic 
material. But we must distinguish here between the environment enabling certain 
inherent genetic processes, as in the case of Dawkins' embryonic cells and the 
environment actually changing the genetic structure. Whilst Dawkins' 'loading 
programme' instructs the genetic material, it enables but does not alter its nature. There 
is, however, the possibility within this complex process of structural changes occurring 
in the genes, as in the case of oxygen deficiency and disease: 
„Az embrionalis fejlddes rendkiviil bonyolult fizikai es kemiai folyamat A bar mely 
pontjan lezajlo aprocska valtozas jelentos tovabbi kovetkezmenyeket von maga utan. Ez 
nem meglepd, ha vissza emlekszunk, milyen kimerito programbehuzas elozi meg e 
folyamatot. Az egyedfejlddes kuldmbsegei zommel kornyezeti kuldmbsegeknek 
tulajdonithatok, amilyen az oxigenhiany vagy a talidomid hatasa az embridra. Mas 
kuldmbsegek a genetikai eltereseknek tudhatok be - itt nem csupan az elszigetelt genekre, 
hanem a genek osszjdtekara es a kornyezettel valo kolcsdnhatasara gondolunk.. Az olyan 
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összetett, kaleidoszkópikus, szövevényes és kölcsönös programbehúzással vezényelt 
folyamat, amilyen az embrionális fejlődés, egyszerre átütő erejű és érzékeny. Átütő erejű, 
mert néha lehengerlően hátrányos környezeti hatások ellenére is életre segíti a csecsemőt. 
Másfelől érzékeny is a környezeti hatásokra, hiszen nincs két teljesen egyforma egyed, még 
az egypetéjű ikrek sem." 72 
It is time to look at Smith's moths more closely. The argument is that the moths 
adapted beneficially to their new environment - that they were too easy prey for their 
predators against the black sooty trees of industrial England and thus, a group of them 
at least, turned black and this new colour was passed on genetically. Now those who 
have lived in the industrial parts of England will know that the fight of the ecology lobby 
has had considerable effect in recent times and one no longer finds black sooty trees. 
Our black moths would once again be easy prey for their predators as their blackness is 
no longer a camouflage, but a distinct disadvantage, in a cleaner environment. We would 
therefore expect this black strain of the moth to revert to its original colour. Here lies 
the difficulty. If the black strain disappears there is no way of telling whether it has 
changed genetically back to its original colour, or is simply dying out because its 
predators are hunting it more effectively. Darwin and his strict followers would have it 
that in the latter case the genetic change has proved environmentally disadvantageous 
and this black strain will therefore die out, due to the notion of the survival of the fittest. 
In the first case the motor force that caused the original adaptation should also be 
capable of reversing it and if it does it would seem that no evolution has occurred in the 
strictest sense in the genetic configuration of the moth; that it is merely adapted and re-
adapted to its changing environment. If change has occurred in the genetic structure and 
is not reversible then the black moths will simply be huuted out off existence by their 
predators. 
Now Smith argues that this change was caused by a dominant gene. It therefore 
follows that the capacity for such a change was inherent in the original moth; that the 
original moth contained a gene for blackness and was thus able to adapt to its changed 
environment. This means that Smith's moths underwent changes caused by 
environmental factors. However the gene for blackness was extant in the moth and the 
environment merely activated a new genetic configuration perhaps in a similar way in 
which the enzymes in Dawkins' embryonic cells activated certain gene combinations 
required by the specifics of function within the workings of the body. This blackness was 
then seemingly passed on genetically in a specific group of the moths. Their actual gene 
bank did not change in its content, merely different combinations were activated, caused 
by environmental changes and that these modifications were inherited quickly by new 
generations. The two strains of the moth have the same genetic constitution, but their 
genes have become differently configured and if we believe Eccles, they must at some 
point stop inter-breeding. 
I cannot help pondering the question that what must be thought of as real 
evolution might be something else - an irreversible change in the gene structure itself. 
The apparent fusion of two chromosomes within human seems to be of a far more drastic 
nature than the activation of extant genes for a certain colour within the moth. In the 
moths' case the environment affected the gene combinations, whilst in the case of the 
human, the argument goes, radical chromosomal fusion took place. What in the 
environment may have caused such a radical, seemingly advantageous, mutation? Eccles 
observation that such beneficial mutations seem to be rare, does not really answer the 
question. So we must pose the earlier question again - is evolution something which must 
be understood as causing major changes in the chromosome compliment, or a series of 
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minor variations in the combinations of the genes with each other, or is it indeed a 
combination of both. 
It would seem then that two possibilities exist. That the environment can affect our 
genetic combinations on the basis of extant genes, or that we have evolved through a 
series of genetic mutations. If the first case is true this would mean that the original 
proto-homo must have had all the necessary genes for our subsequent development; that 
we must also have a genetic trace history of that development and that so must any other 
species that truly derived from this same original, which would mean that the pongids, if 
they are derived from the same original source as we are, must also contain all the 
genetic information necessary to, potentially at least, become human and that by 
implication pongids can be made into humans through the rearrangement of their 
genetic combinations, and vice versa. Dawkins would appear to subscribe to this theory; 
„Meglehetdsen bonyolultgenetikai mechanizmus feleldspelddul a rovarok szelvenyezett 
testfelepiteseert. Kisertetiesen hasonlatos genetikai hatasmechanizmust talaltak az 
emlosokben is. Molekularis szempontbol minden allot igen kdzeli rokona egymasnak, mi 
tobb, a novenyeknek is. A bakteriumokig kell visszamenniink, hogy tdvoli unokatestverekrol 
beszelhessunk, es a genetikai kod maga meg ez esetben is megegyezik a mienkevei " 73 
We are back to the question of the motor force of evolution, which evolutionists say 
is the environment itself, which causes beneficial adaptations to itself, in one way or 
another. We know that diseases and viruses can cause structural change in the genetic 
system which affect its normal workings. This begs the question of whether or not there 
are such things as advantageous, i.e. "beneficial viruses", or is there, indeed, something 
else of which we are unaware which is the driving force behind evolution? What 
actually caused the genetic mutation which Eccles claims would seem to have occurred 
when two of the chromosomes of the pongids fused to make the human compliment of 
46? It is the answer to this crucial question which seems to be missing from the 
evolutionists theory. One may speculate freely - perhaps our genetic system contains its 
own built in volition towards evolution. But such speculation takes me further and 
further away from my real concern here. 
If the environment affects the evolutionary process, as the evolutionists would have 
it, it begs the question of what specific information is inheritable. A species has, 
supposedly, adapted progressively in reaction to its environment at a genetic level and 
these adaptations are passed on. An individual within the species will also learn through 
experience and my next question is whether learnt experience, i.e. culturally learnt 
information, can be passed on genetically? If so, this might again explain my ability to 
appreciate the work of my hypothetical Egyptian sculptor. 
"The modern Darwinian theory of evolution is defective in that it does not even recognise 
the extraordinary problem that is presented by living organisms acquiring mental 
experiences of a non-material kind that are in another world from the world of matter-
energy, which was formerly globally comprehensive."74 
Lamarck, as I have already said, suggested the idea that the processes of the body 
improve through practice and that this continually improving performance is passed on 
to successive generations. The difficulty is to distinguish between that which is 
genetically inherited and that which is learnt. Smith puts the problem thus: 
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"Much the most important modification arises from cultural inheritance, because the traits 
that are acquired during a lifetime and then transmitted are often adaptive in nature: an 
animal that knows which berries are edible is more likely to survive. Given sufficient 
capacity for learning and cultural communication, a population can adapt to its 
environment by non-genetic means. The mechanisms of history and of evolution are so 
different that it is best to distinguish between them. However, they may interact." 75 
For my purposes this is one of the crucial questions; whether such learnt experience 
actually affects our genetic coding and is passed on through our genes, or that this learnt 
experience is passed on in the same way as language. Here again Eccles helps. 
"It is important to recognise that the speech areas of the human brain are already formed 
before birth, being ontogenetically developed ready for the learning of language. This is a 
genetically coded process, and, amazingly, the speech areas so grown are competent for the 
learning of any human language. It has been established without doubt that children of 
different races are equipotent for all human languages. Chomsky... has utilised this fact in 
formulating his ideas on the general principles of a universal grammar. I would suggest 
that the deep structure of grammar can be homologized with the micro-organiztion of the 
linguistic areas of the brain. In that sense it can be understood that a child is born with a 
'knowledge' of the deep structure of language because this is encoded in the microstructure 
of the linguistic areas of the cerebral cortex that genetic instructions have already caused to 
be built before birth." 6 
It would seem then that both Smith and Eccles make a distinction between that 
which is genetically given, (in Eccles' case a capacity to formulate language), and that 
which is later learnt, and one may be inclined to leave the matter here. Again, it is not so 
simple as it begs the question whether the development from the grunting and sign-
language of proto-humans to the sophisticated speech patterns of the human was in itself 
developed through the learnt experience of practice, or through genetic change. We are 
back to the point that the proto -humans and similarly the living pongids, must all have 
had the same inherent genetic capacity. Experiments with teaching pongids to speak 
have proved unsuccessful in any real sense.77 Here, this fact would seem to back his 
argument. Pongids may have the latent genetic capacity to use sophisticated language, 
but will be unable to do so until they undergo a genetic restructuring similar to that 
which occurred in the speech areas of the human, in the past. One should note here that 
the inability of pongids to learn human language is not a measure of lack of intelligence 
in them, but rather in the experimenters who subject them to such degrading 
experiments - and here I mean degrading for the human race as well as the pongids. 
On the question of the relationship between the genetically inherited and the 
learnt, I am inclined to agree with Smith and Eccles. Margenau introduced the idea of 
instinct in the quotation at the head of this chapter. We inherit a genetically coded given 
system, which system, itself, allows certain instinctive behavioural patterns. These must 
be distinguished completely from that which we learn culturally. What is learnt 
culturally does not affect genetic structure. We have the genetic structure which creates 
the necessary systems for the learning of language, for seeing, for sensual response to our 
environment, etc., etc., but we must then utilise these capacities and from practice in 
utility, improve and learn. There is no evidence that this culturally learnt experience 
may be passed on to future generations genetically. What will be passed on genetically 
are the systems themselves and their inherent capacities. 
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There is a final question which arises from this brief look at genetics and evolution 
and it is the most complicated. It is the question of whether the nature of the genetic 
system itself, with its structural limitations, is causal of the way in which we view and 
act in the world? 
Our present genetic structure creates certain physical and mental facilities in each 
human being. These may be taken to be relatively constant, except in cases where disease 
had caused some genetic malfunction. We all, of course, have shades of difference in hair 
colour, eye colour, in the size and shapes of our bodies and limbs and so on and so forth. 
A considerable number of men are colour blind. These differences are the individuality 
caused by slight variations in each of our genetic patterns. Some unfortunate people may 
be born totally blind or deaf, whilst others may have serious limb deformations. These 
are the result of genetic defects - of the wrong information being passed on, or of 
harmful genetic patterns arising during the fusion of the genomes during reproduction. 
One cannot deny the differences between us and contrary to what I shall be 
arguing hereafter, one may never be completely sure that what I am seeing is the same 
as the next man is seeing. I should, however, now like to argue that there is a great deal 
in us that is common. We have 46 chromosomes in common. Whilst some of us may have 
a dominant gene for red hair colour and some not, my and your bladder, providing that 
we are both healthy, will certainly work in the same way, although they are probably of 
a different size. You, as a child, may have become more practised than I in the art of 
retention, or, maybe, the opposite is true. We might make a simile with our noses or, 
indeed, compare two motor cars. Your nose may be shorter or longer than mine. Its skin 
covering may be different, as may its shape. But in function there is a unity. Both noses 
have the same job to do and their modes of operation are the same, even though they 
may differ in effectiveness. A Rolls Royce Silver Shadow looks quite different from a 
Ford Escort and yet they, too, are united in function - that of transporting people from 
one place to another. Here not only their visual appearance is different, so too is their 
mechanical structure. The Rolls has a bigger more powerful engine, but the principal of 
the respective internal combustion engines is the same. They basically work in the same 
way. 
A simple example will help to illustrate how the similarities between us as members 
of a species, outweigh the differences. Providing that we are born healthy we will all 
share a common optical system. The system is based on the same principles for all 
humans. There may be slight differences, again, as some of us may be short, or long 
sighted, the distance of one eye to the other may vary slightly or my optic nerve may be 
longer, or shorter, than yours. These are minor variations, which do not detract from the 
basic structure of the system itself. The easiest way to realise the nature of this basic 
structure is to compare the way in which the human eyes see, to those of other animals. 
Some mammals, such as the larger whales, whose eyes are placed on the side of their 
heads, do not see in the binocular way that we do. Each eye works separately, the left 
eye seeing that which is to the left and the right eye, that which is to the right. I saw, 
sometime ago, a wonderful film on the subject on T.V. (Unfortunately, I missed both the 
beginning and end and cannot, therefore, be more exact). With a series of specially 
prepared camera lenses the film recreated the 'vision' of various animals as they moved 
through their native environment. The bird of prey had a very wide field of vision 
coupled with, at a certain point on its retina, a kind of telescopic area which magnified 
small areas of the wider field many times. This enabled it to pinpoint a small mouse on 
the ground, from a great height, before making its deathly dive. From this illustration we 
can see that there are certain binding features of our optical system which actually 
determine the way in which we may physically view the world around us. Our naked eye 
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does not have the capacity of the eagle's and the eagle is unable to see in the way that we 
do. 
What is true for the human eye is true of all our bodily and mental functions, with 
of course some differences between the sexes. They are systems which are common to all 
of us. (Here we must consider blindness as a system malfunction.) What is more, the 
inherent nature of these systems determine how they may be used. However much we 
may wish it to, our eye will never see in the same way as the eagle's, unless aided by 
trick photography, or through simulation with an optical instrument, such as a telescope. 
Our optic system itself, with its wonderful qualities and, indeed its limitations, 
directly affects the way in which we view the world and, by implication, sculpture. In 
the same way the physical and chemical structure of our brain ultimately determines the 
way we use it, for example, the way we formulate ideas and think. These functions and, 
by implication, the language of sculpture, are deeply affected by the nature of these 
systems themselves. Whilst I have expressed my doubts concerning the Darwinian 
theory of how we came by them the nature of the systems are, undoubtedly, ultimately 
determined by our genetic make-up. 
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Chapter 5 The Brain 
"The identity thesis which I wish to clarify and to defend asserts that the states of 
direct experience which conscious human beings 'live through', and those which we 
confidently ascribe to some of the higher animals, are identical with certain (presumably 
configurational) aspects of the neural processes in those organisms...processes in the 
central nervous system, perhaps in the cerebral cortex..." 78 
The human brain is an extremely complicated biological system and one that is 
rather easily damaged. 79It is one of its wonders that it has built into it a capacity for self 
analysis. Having said that, it is also very difficult to study scientifically. Medical ethics 
rule out extensive experimentation on the brain and much of our knowledge of it is 
gleaned from studying and trying to heal defects. For this reason there are large areas of 
the brain whose functions are little understood. 
It would seem that our brain has many functions which we tend to refer to as 
paranormal. Meditation would appear to transform the normal functions of the body 
and enable such phenomena as levitation, flying, immunity to pain and extremes of 
temperature and self healing. The brain would seem to be capable of what we have come 
to know of as Extra Sensory Perception, of kinesis, (the moving of objects by thought) 
and of producing photographic images by thought. I do not wish to study these 
phenomena here, but to concentrate on those aspects of the brain about which there 
seems to be a consensus of scientific opinion, and here only to those areas directly 
connected to my study of the language of sculpture. 
I should like firstly, with the help of Eccles, to briefly examine the structure of the 
human brain and the way in which this affects how and what we see. I shall later look at 
how this determines our ability to understand the language of sculpture. 
Eccles makes a distinction between the functions of the left and right sides of the 
brain, which is crucial to my discussion of the way we create and perceive sculpture and 
indeed, in how we view the world. The brain can be viewed as existing of two halves, 
which in themselves may be subdivided according to the function they determine. These 
two hemispheres are of course connected and information would appear to pass between 
them chemically. The control centres of our various bodily functions are situated in 
different areas of the two lobes of the brain. The two lobes are not mirror images of each 
other, their functions being quite different, as we shall see. 
"We can say that the right hemisphere is a highly developed brain except that it cannot 
express itself in language, so it is not able to disclose any experience of consciousness that 
we recognise..... Because of its deficiencies in these respects (i.e. the inability to verbalise), 
the minor hemisphere (the right) deserves its title, but in many important properties it is 
pre-eminent, particularly in respect to its spatial abilities with a strongly developed pictorial 
and pattern sense. For example, the minor hemisphere programming the left hand is 
greatly superior in all kinds of geometric and perspective drawings."80 
This is the crucial distinction on which I shall be concentrating at length in the pages 
that follow. The left side of our brain would appear to control language and rational 
thought, whilst the right side has no language, but is the seat of most of the potentials we 
use in the language of sculpture. What is also of vital importance is the implication in 
this statement that the left brain would appear to deal with our conscious procedures, 
whilst the right brain is the realm of the subconscious. Jerre Levy makes a more detailed 
distinction; 
"The right hemisphere synthesises over space. The left hemisphere analyzes over time. The 
right hemisphere notes visual similarities to the exclusion of conceptual similarities. The 
left hemisphere does the opposite. The right hemisphere perceives form, the left 
hemisphere, detail. The right hemisphere codes sensory input in terms of images, the left 
hemisphere in terms of linguistic descriptions. The right hemisphere lacks a phonological 
analyzer; the left hemisphere lacks a gestalt synthesizer." 81 
It would seem then that our ability to perceive form and to perceive gestalt images is 
seated in the right side of the brain. Our left side is capable of making linguistic 
descriptions and analysis of what the right side has, subliminally, perceived. 
In a diagram based on Levy, Eccles locates, as well as certain other capacities, the 
following functions into the right hemisphere: pictorial and pattern sense, visual 
similarities, synthesis over time, holistic images, the geometric and spatial, and the 
musical. 
If Eccles and Levy are correct, this would suggest that the right hemisphere of our 
brain has a crucial role in the appreciation of the language of art. It would appear to be 
here that our capacity for pre-conscious perception is rooted - that we are able to 
receive stimuli here and to react to a sculpture as a holistic image, as a gestalt. Sculpture, 
as a visual language is of the right brain, unlike other languages which are of the left. 
Sculpture is not governed by the rational, for the right side of the brain is incapable of 
rational analysis. Sculpture as image is pre-Iinguistic and pre-rational. It is whole. The 
role of the left side of the brain in the sculptural language allows us to later evaluate our 
experience of the sculpture in a rational way, based on linguistic analysis. 
Before I look at the significance of this I should like to return to one of the 
problems that arose when looking at genetics and evolution - the question of that which 
is genetically given and that which is learnt. 
Eccles is quite specific about this and distinguishes between that which is 
genetically given and that which is learnt, by reference to Popper. He reiterates the idea 
of the three worlds, developed by Popper in their joint work of 1977 82 Popper shows 
how we receive and analyse information. To illustrate the process he splits the brain's 
functions into three categories, which Eccles describes thus: 
"It is necessary at the outset to introduce the three-world philosophy of Popper, which 
encompasses all existence and all experiences. World 1 is the world of physical objects and 
states including even human brains. World 2 is the whole world of subjective experiences or 
states of consciousness. World 3 is the world of knowledge in the objective sense. It is the 
whole man-made world of culture including language." 83 
Eccles then makes this important distinction; 
"At birth the human baby has a human brain, but its World 2 experiences are quite 
rudimentary, and World 3 is unknown to it It, and even a human embryo, must be 
regarded as human beings, but not as human persons. The emergence and development of 
self-consciousness by continued interaction with World 3, the world of culture, is an utterly 
mysterious process. It can be likened to a double structure that ascends and grows by 
effective cross-linkage."84 
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He later expands on this relationship between the given and learnt, 
"...biological evolution has created the human genotypes that build human brains with 
propensities for learning of languages, for altruistic behaviour, and all other cultural 
activities, which would include the value systems moulding and governing society... cultural 
evolution is dependant on the hominid cultural achievements and is not at all genetically 
coded, which would be Lamarckism. It is entirely transmitted by instructions and learning. 
There are no genes for language, only for the linguistic areas that make it possible to learn 
any human language." 85 
Here Eccles reaffirms that which I have already suggested, that there is a given 
brain structure inherited and passed on by our genetic coding. This has the capacity to 
learn, think, feel, remember, dream, imagine etc., just as we have a capacity to see, hear, 
taste, etc. There is a given genetic structure which capacitates these activities, but the 
exercising of their use is learnt through experience. 
To better understand how this brain structure orders the way in which we view 
the world, I should like to look in turn at each of the three Worlds of Popper. We must 
understand that Popper was trying to establish a system of classification by which we 
may categorise experience of the world and everything in it. 
The first World is that of physical objects and states. It contains all that which is 
given. It is our inheritance. He subdivides this into three classes. Firstly there is the 
'Inorganic'. This contains all the matter and energy of the cosmos and may be viewed as 
being governed by the laws of physics. The second sub-category is the 'Biological'. To 
this class belongs the structure of all living beings, i.e. the organic, and includes our 
brain. The third sub-category is rather more difficult. He calls it 'Artefacts' and it 
contains the material substrates of human creativity, of tools, of machines, of books, of 
works of art and of music. That is to say that the physical existence of a book, a musical 
score, or a sculpture belongs here, but not our reaction to them, or the act of reading the 
book. It is their status as objects or things which belongs in World 1. 
When we are conceived, develop in the womb and are born, we inherit World 1; 
genetically in the case of our bodies, and environmentally in the case of the rest. World 1 
is our physical self and the physical world into which we are born. 
World 2 is the world of States of Consciousness and within it that of subjective 
knowledge. It contains our experience of perception, thinking, emotions, dispositional 
intentions, memories, dreams and creative imagination. It is the world through which we 
collate experience of World 1 and World 3. It contains all of our subjective experience, 
including the conscious, sub-conscious and our self-consciousness. At birth we have little 
World 2 experience. It is confined to our experience of being in the womb; experience 
which would appear to be vital to the theories of psychologists. 
World 3 is the world of knowledge, but knowledge that is objective. It is not 
knowledge gained through experience, which belongs to World 2, but knowledge in the 
sense of cultural heritage. It is what Popper calls 'Knowledge in an Objective State'. It is 
a knowledge founded in the material substrates of philosophy, theology, science, history, 
literary, art and technology. 
It is perhaps difficult to grasp the distinction between the three worlds and may be 
better understood through an example. Let us take the example of a book. Its physical 
existence - the book itself, unread - belongs to World 1. The knowledge, or information, 
it contains belongs to World 3. When we read it the experience we have of the book 
belongs to World 2. When we are born, as with World 1, we also inherit World 3, but we 
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are totally ignorant of its existence. World 3 exists in fact, but has no meaning to us until 
we learn its secrets. 
To properly understand World 3 we must emphasise that this cultural heritage 
must be viewed as being based in material substrates. But what are the material 
substrates of, say, history? The history as portrayed in books is essentially subjective 
and might therefore be considered to belong to World 2. But this is not the point of 
Popper's World 3. Popper's World 3 must be viewed as a kind of repository or store in 
which we find all the extant knowledge of those who came before us. The book as a 
physical thing belongs in World 1, but its contents belong in the repository of universal 
knowledge from which we may, or may not, take as we please. To re-cap. Popper's 
classification itself, belongs to World 3. The paper on which it is written belongs to 
World 1 and my discussion of it and your reading of this belong to World 2. 
Popper's classification is a very useful way of viewing our experience the world, 
and of viewing the way in which our brain works, although, as with all logical systems, 
its rules, if adhered to, may actually stricture the way in which we view. It makes 
particularly clear that distinction between that which is inherited, that which is learnt 
through experience, and that which is available knowledge which, should one desire, 
may also be learnt. 
I should now like to return to sculpture. Based on the above the sculpture, as 
object, belongs in World 1. Any historical knowledge of it and its coming into being 
belongs to World 3. Previous criticism and evaluation of it also belong to World 3. Our 
looking at and experiencing the sculpture is essentially World 2 experience. (I shall be 
arguing later, when I look more closely at the brain, that this may not be a strictly 
correct understanding of Popper.) Afterwards we may consult World 3 for more 
information about the sculpture. When we view it and put it in a context of other art, 
our knowledge of this other art also once belonged to World 3, but is now of World 2 as 
it is knowledge that we have learnt and which has therefore become subjective. Our 
conscious perception of the work, and all thoughts that it may arouse belong to World 2. 
We will recall that the right side of the brain is responsible for what Sperry calls, 
'non-verbal ideation86 It would appear that the right side of the brain contains all the 
necessary functions to enable a response to sculpture that is not only visual but also of a 
gestalt nature. That is to say we are able to recognise the sculpture as a whole in which 
all its parts are related to each other and constitute a whole. This is the 'image'. Such an 
image can undoubtedly cause a profound emotional reaction, which might also be 
considered to be of a spiritual nature. This is prior to any attention to the details of the 
sculpture, which would appear to happen on the left side of the brain; prior to any 
rational evaluation; prior to any comparison to other sculpture, or relation to the 
knowledge of Popper's World 3 which, requiring language, is also a function of the left 
hemisphere. 
I shall be arguing later on that the language of sculpture, and in particular the way 
in which sculptors create sculpture, is largely dependant on the functions of the right 
hemisphere of the brain. I also suspect that one of the problems with the modern way of 
thinking is that it relies far too much on the functions of the left side of the brain - that 
we have become so used to the rational, and to language-based evaluation that we have 
almost forgotten the importance of those functions, described above, of what Eccles 
terms the 'minor hemisphere'. 
Before we leave the subject of the brain I should like to bring in one more theme, 
which has already come up in passing. It is that to which the quotation at the beginning 
of this chapter refers. It is the idea that the configurational aspects of our brain and 
various organs actually determine the sort of experience that we are able to have. I have 
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already suggested that the way our eye functions actually limits how we see, a theme I 
shall be expanding on in the next chapter. I should now like to pose the question of 
whether the configuration of our brain actually limits what we can do with it. 
I suggest that the answer to this question is in the positive. We all have a notion of 
what we call logical or rational thinking. It is perhaps most easily illustrated by a simple 
mathematical example. If we have a pair of apples and add to them a second pair, we 
then have two groups of two apples - four apples in all. If we take the four apples and 
split them into two equal groups we then have two pairs of apples again. This is a logical 
argument, with no room in it for doubt. ** The first sentence of this paragraph is not 
logical as it is an expression of opinion. It may be an opinion arrived at after a great deal 
of logical thought of a rather more complex kind than is involved in the example that I 
have just given here, but it is still an opinion and therefore not strictly logical. The 
process of logical thinking is rather like climbing a rickety ladder. One takes the first 
step and checks that it is sound before moving onto the next and so on and so until one 
either reaches the top, or one falls down should the logic be faulty. I should say here that 
I do suggest that those climbing rickety ladders are more logical than my simile and 
check each step before treading on it, something which one cannot do with thoughts. 
At this point my logical thinking tells me that this method of rational thinking is 
almost certainly learnt. As children we do not really think or react to the world in this 
logical way. I am sure we can all remember moments in our childhood when the 
rationale of something or other 'dawned1 on us. This 'dawning' was the recognition of 
certain logical thinking patterns. And yet. The fact that rational reasoning probably has 
to be learnt, in no way explains its origin. Where does this capacity for rational 
reasoning come from if not from our biological system itself? Surely we do not think that 
someone discovered it and taught it to everybody else, unless of course we wish to see it 
as God given, or as a 'gift' from some ancient astronaut. It would seem to me that the 
only origin for our ability for rational thought is that the pattern of this kind of thinking 
is analogous with the pattern of the brain which allows it. 
It might be easier to prove my argument if we were capable of thinking only in a 
rational way, but our brain and its capacities, and the variety of these mental capacities, 
would seem to be enormous. One might even be tempted to argue that the brain contains 
the material necessary for its own evolution - that 'evolution' is not based genetically, 
but that the brain has its own volition to evolve, an argument which would be well 
within the bounds of Lamarck's theory, but as I said earlier there is little scientific 
evidence for this. 
Margenau has argued that the our brain, neural systems and sense organs have 
constituents which are governed by probabilistic quantum laws.87 What would appear 
to happen when we think is that the thinking actually causes neural activity. Thought, 
according to Margenau and Eccles actually utilises the brains energy to stimulate 
neurons. I have no idea how this may be proved, but it really would seem to be a case of 
'mind over matter', and this thesis must be considered to be revolutionary in the study 
of the interaction between brain and mind. 
"We all think and act as if we have at least some control and responsibility for our actions, 
especially out linguistic expressions, but reductionist critics have insisted that this must be 
an illusion since it is contrary to the conservation laws ofphysics. We are now free to reject 
these criticisms."88 
** It is, in fact, tautological. 
If the theory is correct it suggests the existence of a mind which is somehow apart from 
the biological system - a mind which can give orders to it. At the same time this mind is a 
function of that system and whilst the relationship between mind and brain may be 
biologically more of a two way thing than was previously realised, the mind cannot 
operate without the system itself. It is dependant on it and must, therefore, also be 
limited by its nature. The system, as with any system, can only give rise to certain 
patterns and these are the patterns in which we must think, sense, and experience the 
world. 
I should now like to expand on these themes by examining the optic system and to 
show how this too limits the way in which we see the world. 
58 
Chapter 6 The optic system 
"/ have always claimed that painting's prime function is to dictate to us what the 
world looks like. Each artistic generation recreates what it believes to be the natural 
appearances of the world, sometimes radically, sometimes only slightly, but none the less 
decisively. A given version is mandatory at a given time. What we imagine to be the 
'objective' look of everything and anything is largely complex, a weave of textures, forms 
and colours which we have learned, more or less unconsciously, from painting, and have 
superimposed upon external reality. The actual 'objective' appearance of things (of 
anything and everything) is something that does not exist - or rather, it exists as data that is 
literally infinite in its complexity and subtlety, in the variety and multiplicity of its 
configurations. What assuredly floods in upon the retina, from the outside world, is an 
amorphous cloud of visual stimuli into which the human eye learns to inject a favoured 
order of some sort or other. Historically, it is painting that supplies that order. It is painting 
that persuades the eyes of a generation to see swarms of ragged dots of disparate colour 
overlying the entire scene, indoors or out, where none exists. It is painting that persuades 
another generation, elsewhere, that every solid object inhabiting the visual scene, in which 
we move, must have a black outline round it. It is painting, yet again, that licensed certain 
generations to believe that the entire landscape consisted of various browns. It is painting 
that cajoled the eyes of yet another age to see all solid objects, whether near or far, in terms 
of nothing more formally definite than a continuum of coloured mists. Yet all these 
configurations nevertheless have been abstracted out of the infinity of possibilities which 
compromise the visual scene." 89 
"The visuo-constructive areas of the cerebral cortex are not as clearly defined as the 
speech areas which were mapped first by the study of lesions and then later by electrical 
stimulation as described by Penfield and Roberts (1959). However, the study of lesions that 
gave disorders of movement (apraxia) and more recently of commissurotomy patients has 
disclosed that the visuo-constructive areas are largely in the right hemisphere and 
particularly in the inferior parietal area, probably the main location is in Brodmann areas 
39 and 40 which are automatically mirror-images of part of the Wernicke speech area of 
the left hemisphere. These synthetic visuo-constructive areas can be considered as 
developing in evolution pari passu with the analytical speech areas on the other side." 90 
0 I have suggested that the structure of our optical system determines, in part, the 
way that we view the world and I should now like to expand on this. Inevitably a rather 
large dose of technical language is involved. 
I have already pointed out that our vision is stereoscopic. 
"....the visual pathways are arranged with a partial decussation in the optic chiasma so that 
the right visual fields of the two eyes project via a synaptic relay in the lateral geniculate 
body to the primary cortex of the left occipital lobe, and vice versa for the left visual 
field."91 
Put simply the information received by both eyes to their left, is passed to the right side 
of the brain, and vice versa for information from the right. This stereoscopic vision has 
to be learnt. Young children do not see in a three dimensional way and their eyes must 
be trained to see form and space as we understand it. Naturally this learning capacity is 
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built into the system itself, i.e. it is genetically conditioned, although the learning itself, 
is not. 
For any discussion of sculpture as a visual language the way in which the eye 
perceives shape, line etc., is a fundamental concern. It would seem that we are equipped 
with groups of neurons which are specifically programmed to accept certain kinds of 
information: 
"In the visual cortex, neurons with similar orientation sensitivity tend to be arranged in 
columns that run ortogonally from the cortical surface. Thus it can be envisaged that, in 
the large area of the human primary visual cortex, the population of about 40 million 
neurons is arranged as a mosaic of columns, each with some thousands of neurons that 
have the same orientation sensitivity." 92 
"In the upper part of laminae IV...... are the simple cells that are strictly monocular and that 
simply respond to lines or edges.... At the next stage of image reconstruction are neurons at 
other levels in area 17 and in the secondary and tertiary visual areas (Brodmann areas 18 
and 19). Here there are neurons that are especially sensitive to the length and thickness of 
bright and dark lines as well as to their orientation and even to two lines meeting at an 
angle. These so-called complex and hypercomplex neurons...constitute a further stage of 
feature recognition." 93 
"In the area TE of the temporal lobe there are remarkable feature detection neurons..... 
For example, there are neurons uniquely specified for squares, for rectangles, for triangles, 
for stars. More exotic are the small number of neurons that respond specially to hands or 
faces, or parts thereof." 94 
These findings are in part based on the study of the macaque monkey, (macaca 
mulatta) and there is a danger here in regarding them as being exactly equatable with 
the human system. Eccles points out the ethical difficulties posed by researching on 
human specimens and thus the conjectural nature of our understanding of the human 
optical system, although study of patients with lesions has helped to contribute to this 
knowledge. One does wonder, here, to what use a macaque monkey may put a capacity 
to recognise squares, rectangles and triangles in its natural environment, where it is 
hardly likely to meet with them. 
A rather more interesting thought comes to mind. If our human optical system is 
programmed in such a way as to see these quite particular shapes, as in the case of the 
macaque, may not this system itself be the basic cause of our particular way of viewing 
the world. It would seem quite plausible that our eye is only capable of seeing certain 
patterns. Euclidean geometry might, then, possibly be a system which reflects the actual 
workings of our optic system itself. 
To understand this better we must look more closely at what happens when our 
eyes, and indeed our central nervous system receive information. Gyorgy Adam explains 
the difference in status between the information as it is received to that which it becomes 
as it is processed.95 Firstly incoming information passes to the thalamus which acts as a 
kind of switching centre, passing information to the various parts of the brain. 
„A talamusz (thalamus = eloszoba; GALENOSZ) mindem olyan erzoimpulzus 
atkapcsolasi helye, mely az agytorzs vagy kisagy felol a nagyfeltekek fele halad," 
The thalamus has an important role to play in our sense perception; 
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„A perifériás érzőpályákon kívül a talamusz az agyi hemisfériumokfelől is kap 
afférentációt, ezenfelül az extrapirimidális rendszer egyes ganglionjaival is kapcsolatban 
áll. E sokrétű kapcsolatok példázzák a talamusz nagy fontosságú, központi szervező 
funkcióját az érzőműködések, a magasabb idegtevékenység ún. érzelmi komponensei, 
valamint a vegetatív aktivitás terén." 
The thalamus must be thought of as a mechanism, or a series of functions. It is not, 
however, an organ; 
„A talamusz tehát semmiképpen sem tekinthető homogén struktúrának: többféle 
sejtcsoportot tartalmozó, bonyolult páros magrendszert alkot."96 
For our purposes the pulvinar section of the thalamus is important, for here exists the 
switching mechanism for sound, in the corpus geniculatum médiaié, and for sight, in the 
corpus geniculatum laterale. The precise function of the thalamus within the sensory 
system is unknown, although, Ádám relates, some researchers have suggested that it 
plays a role in our subjective, emotional responses and that our notion of the 'pleasant' 
and 'unpleasant' is seated here.97 Most of the information received by the retina passes 
to the corpus geniculatum laterale, but a small part is also passed to the collicus superior 
of the central brain 98 This, latter, information is then passed to those neurons of the 
spinal cord which are concerned with movement and allow the neck to adjust its position 
to enable the eye to see something from a better position, whilst the information passed 
to the thalamus is then sent further to different parts of the brain for processing in 
various ways. 
It would seem that the cells of the cortex are capable of learning to recognise 
certain patterns in the incoming information; 
„Kiderült, hogy az emlősállatok agykérgének oszlopszerű funkcionális felépítése oly módon 
rendeződött, hogy egy-egy ilyen kolumnában helyet foglaló neuronok mindegyike valamély, 
a számára optimális, „legjobb", legmegfelelőbb külső ingerre váloszol maximális 
csúcspotenciál-sorozattal. Másként fogalmazva: az agykéreg egyes idegsejtjei képesek 
ingermintázat-felismerésre. Mint a továbbiakban látni fogjuk, a látó-, a halló-, illetve a 
szomatoszenzoros- kéreg egyes sejtjei képesek egyes egyszerű és bonyolultabb fény-, hang-, 
illetve machanikai mintázatokra szelektív módon a rájuk jellemző elektromos kisülési 
amplitúdóval és frekvenciával váloszolni. Bizonyított tehát, hogy az inger mintázata 
(angolul: pattern), vagyis alakzata, időbeli lefolyása, mozgási iránya, komponenseinek 
sorrendje stb. együttesen képes agyi neoronokat ingerületbe hozni és ingerületben tartani. 
Az agysejtek valószínűleg a korai ontogenezisben „választják ki" a számukra azután egész 
életük folyamán optimálisnak mutatkozó ingermintázat" 99 
He then goes on to describe the way in which arriving sensual information is processed. 
„A külső ingerek hatására az agyi centrumokban létrejövő érzékelési folyamatot 
elsősorban 1) szervezett (pattern) jellege jellemzi. Az agyi struktúrák a külvilág 
ingerkomplexumából mindig kiválasztják az egybetartozó, bizonyos szerveződést mutató 
stimulusokat az oda nem tartozó zavaró vagy véletlenszerű ingerektől. Innen adódik az 
érzékelési funkció 2) szelektív, kiválasztó jellege. A szlektivitás valószínűleg az agyi 
neuronok differenciáló, valamint széli gátlási folyamatával függ össze. Az érzékelő 
apparátust továbbá 3) a transpozició képessége jellemzi. Az agy erzékelése mindig 
61 
viszonylagos jellegű. Sohasem abszolút megkülönböztetést végzünk két ingerintenzitás 
között, mindig csak viszonylagosai. Ezt a pszichikus dimenziót könnyen átvisszük, 
transponáljuk más ingerintenzitás-sorokra is. A traszponálás képessége teszi lehetővé az 
azonos szerveződésű, egyébként részleteikben eltérd ingerkomplexumok azonitását, 
összehasonlítását (pl. különböző kézírású azonos betűket, különböző hangszeren és 
hangszerelésben megszólaló azonos dallamokat stb.). 4) Az érzékelési folyamat 
komponenseinek nagy része nem vele szüleit, hanem tanult jellegű. A szervezett, szelektív 
módon kiválasztott ingerkomplexumokat érzékletté a múltban szerzett individuális 
tapasztalatok kovácsolják egybe."100 
So what Ádám is saying is that the individual cells of the system recognise sensual 
patterns in the various incoming stimuli on a selective basis based on recognition 
comparison and that the major part of this faculty is learnt through practice. He later 
describes the way in which the laminae of the optic nerve work; 
„Jellemző a függőleges, rétegek közötti, oszlopszerűen rendeződött rostkapcsolat. Valószínű, 
hogy a körülírt függőleges sejtoszlopok felelnek meg egy-egy retinális receptormezőnek. 
Elektrofiziológiai elemzéssel sikerült a Mountcastle-féle kolumnaris szerveződést itt is 
igazolni: HUBEL és WIESEL kimutatta, hogy egy-egy látókérgi oszlop összes neuronja egy 
időben reagál és produkál akciós potenciálokat Az oszlopok többsége vízszintes, ferde vagy 
függőleges egyenes vonalra reagál, sejtjeit „egyszerű" (szimplex) neuronak newezük. 
Ezeken felül találtak olyan „komplex" -nek nevezett sejteket is, melyek nemcsak vonalszerű 
ingerekre produkáltak kisüléseket, hanem bonyolultabb ábrarészletekre, mozgó idomokra 
is."101 
The question arises whether this ability to see straight lines, vertical, horizontal, or 
inclined as they may be, is also learnt or whether this is a given, latent capacity of the 
system. He goes on to describe how the eye can distinguish between 200 colour tints, 500 
different degrees of lightness and darkness within those colours and 20 degrees of colour 
saturation, in other words two million (500 x 200 x 20) colour variations. Given this fact 
one is inclined to err on the side of caution and back the thesis that our capacity to 
distinguish shades of colour and our capacity to distinguish shape and form is developed 
over time, through experience and practice. Having said this, the system which enables 
this 'learning', the basic matter of whose learning through practice increases its 
efficiency, can only operate within those capacities laid down by the nature of the system 
itself. Euclidean geometry, or Renaissance perspective may be learnt and we may tend to 
view the world 'through its eyes', but the capacity to enable us to see in this way was 
inherent in the system. It must be a way of seeing compatible with our optic system, or 
our optic system would have rejected it - indeed been incapable of accepting it. 
If we accept this it follows that we may learn to see the world in various ways and 
if Ádám is correct then this is physically true and not only intellectually. His standpoint 
would seem, at first sight, to be antithetical to that of Feigl who argued that some of the 
states through which we live are identical to certain aspects of our neuronal processes. 
(See 'The Brain'). I should like to argue that even if the way in which the neurons 
function is learnt, this does not rule out the possibility of Feigl being correct. For it 
would seem that the functioning of our neurons is to all intents and purposes the same 
for each of us and, whilst they may have 'learnt' how to function, the processes which 
they configure may well be causal of some of the types of experience which we live 
through. To back up this statement we must look at those experiences which we 
commonly refer to as 'optical illusions'. 
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The optic system with which we are endowed has, then, as Adam explained above, 
its own volition towards order. It sees in a limited way, determined by its nature. It will, 
and regularly does, see straight lines, where there are no lines, for example the 
recognition of rectangular bricks in a wall which has been pointed in such a way as to 
splurge over the edges of the bricks and destroy any vestiges of symmetry. What our eye 
would seem to be doing is to be sifting information and categorising it into geometric 
classes of shape - line, rectangle, circle, etc., etc.. But what we actually see is an illusion 
of rectangularity and not actual. Glance at a shelf of books and we will 'see' or rather 
perceive a collection of rectangular books. Our eye generalises them as such. If we look 
again we will be unable to find an actual rectangle, unless we view the spines of the 
books 'square on', but rather a series of parallelograms, caused by the illusion of 
perspective. If we look again we will realise that we can not actually see more than one 
or two actual parallelograms, for most are cut off by other books covering them and the 
ones that we think we can see are of irregular shape due to the position of the top and 
the bottom of the book being in different planes in relation to our eyes, and thus not 
forming true parallelograms. If we look even harder we will realise that there are no 
actual lines visible, but only the meetings of different light and colour fields, forming as 
they do an approximation to line. Our eye therefore creates a complexity of illusions, 
which, as artists, and as viewers of art, we must tear down. The eye works something 
like a screen of semi-opaque glass which allows one to see the main outlines, but not the 
details. To see what is really before us we must look much harder - look beyond the way 
our eye normally sees in everyday use. This is a pre-condition if we really wish to 
observe the world at a meaningful level. It is essential if we wish to look at art, for even 
in art the truth is not to be found in the 'intentional' illusions that the sculptor has used, 
but behind these illusions. Sculpture creates meaning by means of this relationship 
between those illusions which it contains, and the reality which is behind them. 
Tibor Kukorelli explains how our biological system operates in this selective 
manner; 
„Az uj inger hatasdra fellepd altalanos figyelmi vagy orientdcios viselkedes alatt as 
agykereg valamennyi terilletrol beta-aktivitas vezetheto el, a hippocampus pedig 
folyamatos, teta-ritmust mutat. A tajekozodast tehat a retikuldris aktivalo rendszer 
serkentese valtja ki. A nem signifikdns ingerek ismetlddese soran a kergi deszinkronizalo 
hatas fokozatosan csokken, es a hippokampdlis teta-aktivitas is eltunik. A habituacios 
folyamat oka a retikuldris aktivalo rendszer gatldsa, amelyet az antagonista strukturak, 
vagyis a nyultveld es a talamusz szinkronizalo mezoi, az area praeoptica es a hippocampus 
fazisos aktivdcioja hoz letre. E teriiletek ingerlese ugyanis gyorsitja, roncsolasuk pedig 
keslelteti a tajekozodas viselkedesi es elektografias jeleinek az eltunteset A signifikdns, 
motivalo ingerek tartosabb, az ismetlodes soran sem habitualodd hatasdt valoszinuleg a 
limbikus rendszerbol a formatio reticularisra iranyulo serkentes biztositjcu E szelektiv 
figyelem soran a relevans informaciot szallito erzorendszerfokozottan mukodik, a tobbire 
pedig gdtlds ervenyesiil."102 
I shall look, in more detail, at the way in which the sensual 'inhibitors' operate, in 
the next chapter. For now it is worth noting that, interestingly enough, recent scientific 
research has been concerning itself with establishing those mechanisms which are 
responsible for us seeing certain visual patterns, whilst artists have long known that we 
tend to see in stereotypes, and part of their quest, certainly since the Impressionist 
painters, has been to look beyond these regular perceptual patterns and to literally 
represent new neural patterns of seeing. 
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In his book "Eye & Brain", R.L. Gregory researches into the way that the physical 
mechanism of our optic system affects the way that we see, amongst everything else, 
art.103 Gregory explains a great number of optical effects which are commonly 
perceived by most of us. These effects are closely connected to illusion. These are 
illusions caused by the nature of the optic system itself and are in no way exclusive to the 
language of art. 
Some artists have used similar ideas to those of Gregory and other writers as the 
basic premise of their work - Viktor Vasarely and Bridget Riley are prime examples and 
of course there are many other so-called Op-artists. I find this kind of work generally 
dissatisfying. One sees the optical illusion and then it is over - there is nothing more, 
rather like being amazed by a conjuring trick until one discovers how it works. It then 
has no more magic. Frankly Riley's works, or the large ones at least, make me feel 
physically sea-sick, whilst Vasarely's bring on my migraine. That is, perhaps, a personal 
prejudice, but I do find those works which to a large extent deal with optical tricks to be 
lacking. They expose the tricks that the eye plays when ordering visual information. 
They lack any reference to other aspects of life and existence. They also lack reference to 
the fundamental nature of the eye and of seeing, which lie beyond the tricks the eye may, 
on occasion, play. They are ultimately boring and have little to do with painting as an 
aesthetic language. 
I began this chapter with a quote from Patrick Heron. It is taken from an essay on 
Cezanne and is one of an occasional series of remarkably astute studies by Heron in the 
art magazine Modern Painters. Others include Matisse and the late work of Picasso. 
Most of what Heron says in this quotation has the ring of truth about it. It would seem 
that the eye certainly needs to impose an order on the mass of stimuli it receives and 
Heron's notion that we tend to do this through the eyes of paintings is a wonderful idea, 
and I suspect for him that this is true. I do wonder however if we, collectively, see the 
world in this way. 
I once had a mature student on a summer school I was running in Germany, who 
was a dentist by profession. He came to me as he wanted to learn to carve granite and he 
set about the task with great gusto. At the end of the two weeks he was with me he had 
three stones which were not very elaborately worked, but which had a rather strong 
basic form. We laughed as I told him that they all looked like teeth, which, indeed, they 
did. This incident came to mind as I read Heron's words and I could not help wondering 
if my Swedish dentist did not see the world as teeth, or being made of forms relating to 
them. 
I, too, have enjoyed the experience in France of seeing landscapes 'through the 
eyes' of Cezanne and Monet, but I do not always - in fact, rarely - view the world in this 
way. What is true, is that, because of Cezanne's paintings I am certainly able to view the 
world in another way, if I so wish. The reason for this is that Cezanne was able to break 
down those veils of the optic system which normally stop us from really looking at 
something. He was able to go beyond the superficial looking at things and to capture in 
paint what he found there. 
I suspect that how one sees the world is affected by more than painting. Our 
knowledge of geometry, our experience of moving through forms in the world, our fears 
and remembrance of past fear, and even philosophy, may all cause us to look at the 
world in certain ways at certain times. What Heron's statement points to in an 
admirable way is that we do have a pictorial sense of the world and this may well be 
deeply influenced by the pictorial artefacts of man, namely painting, and more recently, 
perhaps, film. I do not think that we can see the world through the eyes of a sculptor in 
the same way as we may do with a painter, as the sculpture is not pictorial but actual. 
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Heron's thesis is important as it recognises the contribution of culturally learnt 
ways of seeing. The theory of Renaissance perspective has become so prevalent in our 
visual culture that we often mistakenly regard it as naturalism, or truth. Cubism is 
invariably viewed as being a way of seeing and depicting which deviates from the true, 
naturalist Renaissance view. But Renaissance perspective is just as much a convention of 
seeing and depiction, as is Cubism. 
This was forcefully brought home to me whilst in Africa. I have had a long love 
affair with African sculpture. Its geometry is other than that to which we adhere. So is 
its structure, interval, form, etc., etc. I had always believed this to be based on highly 
stylised convention, which I suppose it is, but whilst in Africa I saw how much closer to 
naturalism it really is. The people really do look like their sculpture. Many of the 
exaggerated forms of head and neck are actually extant in those people who practise 
skull and bone deformation through binding from childhood. Much African sculpture is 
every bit as 'naturalistic' as Renaissance art, perhaps more so, and yet its physical 
conventions are quite other. 
So Heron's thesis, undoubtedly, contains a great deal of truth. The way in which 
we depict things reveals much of how we see the world, but it also leads us to view the 
world through these conventions of depiction. The sculptor must try to forget these 
conventions as he works and to begin from a standpoint of visual innocence, each time 
that he makes a sculpture. 
Gregory also recognises the role of learnt experience in our perception; 
"The seeing of objects involves many sources of information beyond those meeting 
the eye when we look at an object. It generally involves knowledge of the object derived 
from previous experience, and this experience is not limited to vision but may include the 
other senses; touch, taste, smell, hearing and perhaps also temperature and pain. Objects 
are far more than patterns of stimulation: objects have pasts and futures; when we know its 
past or can guess its future, an object transcends experience and becomes an embodiment 
of knowledge and expectation without which life beyond the simplest is not possible."104 
So Gregory is, also arguing that we have a familiar way of seeing which is based on our 
accrued knowledge of previous visual experience and our projected expectations arising 
from this. Now, when we look at a sculpture we are in a difficult position, for each 
sculpture is an essentially unique form and our experience of seeing should therefore not 
help us. This is probably the reason why an inexperienced sculpture viewer will 
invariably try to make some association between the sculpture and some known thing 
from his own visual world. The response that, 'it looks like a cat/horse' is much more 
usual than recognition that the sculpture is a unique form which may, indeed, have some 
superficial resemblance to a cat or a horse. 
The more experienced viewer will tend to perceive the sculpture in some art-
historical, stylistic, or formal context. He will perhaps recognise similarities in it with 
Gothic, or other, sculpture. He too will tend to inhibit his realisation of the sculpture as a 
unique form, through seeing it through 'Gothic', or other, eyes. 
In truth both the inexperienced and the experienced viewer are quick to make 
associations with their personal known experiences. I am sure that a vestige of our 
instinct of fear is at play here, for we instinctively fear the unknown. In face of the 
unknown we are naturally cautious, a caution that is determined by our drive for 
physical and mental self-preservation. If, each time we see a sculpture, we concentrate 
on its uniqueness, we are inevitably on unfamiliar territory. Our accrued experience is 
of no help and we must accept the inherent insecurity of exploring the unknown. 
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Gregory also introduces the idea of a perceptual hypothesis; 
"But it seems clear that perception involves going beyond the immediately given evidence 
of the senses: this evidence is assessed on many grounds and generally we make the best 
bet, and see things more or less correctly. But the senses do not give us a picture of the 
world directly; rather they provide evidence for the checking of hypotheses about what lies 
before us. Indeed, we may say that the perception of an object is an hypothesis, suggested 
and tested by the sensory data."105 
Here Gregory hits the mark For as we look and look at a sculpture we do, indeed, begin 
to build up a hypothesis of meaning. This happens on both a conscious and subconscious 
level. We look over time and modify our hypothesis of meaning which we begin to 
construct based on the lines, shapes and forms of the sculpture, and on the meanings 
encoded in the sculpture's image. The hypothesis may be purely visual and subconscious, 
or may involve rational comparison to known information of Popper's World 3. In this 
latter case the knowledge modifies the way in which we look at and perceive the 
sculpture. The hypothesis may also be based in a mixture of both the purely visual, and 
the rational together. The sculptor's job is to encode the sculpture's image in such a way 
that your hypothesis is synonymous with his. 
I should now like to dig a little deeper into the question of what happens when we 
view a piece of sculpture. Imagine for a moment that you are in the theatre watching a 
performance of, say, Hamlet. Now we know that the actors are real people but that they 
are pretending to be somebody else. They interrelate with the other actors and with the 
set of the stage. The props invite us to believe that Hamlet is standing in a castle in 
Denmark, although we know that the actor is standing on a stage in front of us. Our 
enjoyment of the play, and our understanding of it, are dependant on our ability to 
suspend our self consciousness of where we are, and of our act of looking, and to enter 
into the fantasy world of the play. The success of the play depends on its ability to 
convince, or in other words, its ability to captivate us and hold our imagination in its 
world, rather than in the real world of the room in which we are sitting. 
Now try and imagine that you are looking at a piece of sculpture, say, 
Michelangelo's David. Your enjoyment of the work will depend on its ability to 
convince. It, like the production of Hamlet, may suspend your awareness of yourself 
looking at the work, as you enter into its fantasy world. It invites you, just as the play 
did, to suspend your existence in the real world and to enter into its secrets and its 
success is, in part, dependant on its ability to do this. 
The sculptor has used all the tricks of the trade to try and convince you and to try 
and control what you are seeing and, more importantly, perceiving. You will almost 
certainly - unless you are intentionally analysing the syntax of the work - be unaware of 
the illusions involved. Generally there are two kinds of illusion involved; the purely 
optical, and the conceptual. The first kind of illusions are those which I mentioned in the 
chapter on the physical aspects of sculpture's language. The eye has a volition to order 
and will read flatness, or smoothness, where there is none. The second kind is more 
complicated. We perceptually accept that David's is holding a sling in one hand which 
he will later use to fire the shot, which is cupped in his other hand, at Goliath. In actual 
fact this is a physical impossibility, for the right hand is a continuous piece of stone with 
the leg against which it rests, and the 'cloth' sling a continuous piece of stone with both 
David's left hand and his shoulder and back. So we are suspending our belief in what 
our eye is visually telling us. We are not seeing what is actually there physically, but 
responding to the image of the sculpture. 
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What has happened here then is that the visual information coming from the 
sculpture leads us to make a conceptual hypothesis based on our experience of our 
normal reading of a real figure in the real world. It is a complex hypothesis involving 
our actual visual experience, our knowledge of the world accrued through our own 
existence in it, and Michelangelo's manipulation of what, and how, we are viewing his 
creation. For Michelangelo, or rather his sculpture, is, to a great extent, in control here. 
You may not have noticed how small David's head is in relation to his body, when 
compared to a real figure in the real world. By diminishing the size of the head 
Michelangelo stresses the illusion of an energetic physical strength within the body. 
Thus, and in many other ways, he is tricking you and controlling your mental response 
to the visual events before you. In simple terms you are being conned into believing in a 
lie. You are seeing the sculpture's image and not the visual facts that are before you. So 
as I said above, Michelangelo's task, as with any sculptor, is to try and find an analogy in 
his materials whereby you will make, and be convinced by, the same hypothesis which he 
has, intentionally, encoded. 
As Descartes wrote in his 'Dioptrics' of 1637: 
" I need not, in conclusion, say anything special about the way we see the size and shape of 
objects; it is completely determined by the way we see the distance and position of their 
parts. Thus, their size is judged according to our knowledge or opinion as to their distance, 
in conjunction with the size of the images that they impress on the back of the eye. It is not 
the absolute size of the images that counts. Clearly they are a hundred times bigger (in 
area) when the objects are very close to us than when they are ten times farther away; but 
they do not make us see the objects a hundred times bigger; on the contrary, they seem 
almost the same size, at any rate so long as we are not deceived by (too great) a 
distance."106 
Before we leave the eye, I must mention one other notion of Gregory's which is 
very important to my subject. He shows that Zulu people live in what is essentially a 
'round-culture'.107 Their mud huts are round, they do not plough their fields in straight 
lines, and they have few possessions with corners and straight edges. As a result, tests 
have shown, they have little or no response to those geometric patterns which confuse 
our European brains and cause optical illusions. In other words it would seem that a 
great deal of our perception, as opposed to our actual mechanically determined visual 
reaction, is culturally determined. In other words, whilst the incoming visual 
information is probably the same for myself and a Zulu, not only the conceptual, but, 
possibly, also the perceptual hypothesis which we construct as a result of it, would seem 
to be quite different. So I have to accept that my Zulu friend might have difficulty in 
seeing Michelangelo's David as I do. 
This simple fact would almost seem to destroy the whole theory that I am 
proposing, but I believe that it does not. We will recall that Eccles' monkeys had the 
necessary mechanisms to see geometric figures. If we human's have the same, or similar, 
mechanisms, then my Zulu colleague also has this latent capacity, even though he may 
not, normally, use it. Now to our European eye the forms of much African sculpture 
seem rather alien and yet we can, undoubtedly, take great pleasure in looking at them 
and they may even have a profound affect upon us. We may therefore conclude that our 
Zulu may be able to enjoy Michelangelo, just as I may enjoy his artefacts on a level 
which is pre-conceptual and perhaps also pre-perceptual and which may be profound. I 
hope that this apparent paradox will become clear, in a short while. 
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Chapter 7. The empathetic capacity 
"perception is a matter of making the best bet on the available evidence."108 
I should now like to examine, briefly, how we are able to train our senses. As an 
example let us take a symphony - say Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Given that some will 
say that this is just an awful noise, we must accept that, in western culture at least, this is 
a popular piece of music. Now I should like you to imagine that you are listening to a 
recording of it. You may be able to distinguish which instruments are being played at 
any given moment, or, if you have more extensive musical training, to distinguish on 
which string the violinist is playing, perhaps even to visualise which notes the violinist is 
playing at any given moment, or indeed be able to "see" the whole score. Now all these 
abilities are based on the level of our experience of music and probably on some formal 
training. Those whose job, or perhaps merely their passion, is involved with music, will 
obviously have a much wider and, perhaps, more refined appreciation of what is being 
played than the casual listener who 'knows nothing about music, but knows what he 
likes'. On the other hand the casual listener may get more pleasure from this music and, 
indeed, may, conceivably, outstrip the professional musician in the refinement of his 
appreciation. 
This capacity for refining the uses of our senses is common to all the senses. A 
professional wine-taster will appreciate nuances in the bouquet of a wine which will 
escape the nose of the sometime 'buy a bottle of cheap Spanish Sauternes for the party' 
drinker. Naturally, so it is with our appreciation of sculpture and those involved with 
making, or professionally looking at sculpture, either as critics, dealers or historians, 
may well have a more refined visual sense than the layman, although this is by no means 
sure. Just as a quality controller in a factory producing glassware will be able to make 
refined judgements as to the quality of each of the thousands of bottles passing before his 
eyes on a conveyor belt each day, judgements which an untrained eye would not see, so 
the professional sculptor can judge sculpture in a way probably not possible to the 
untrained eye. The important point here is that this is not guaranteed. The untrained eye 
can potentially make judgements and its brain, evaluations, at the highest level. Before I 
look at this capacity I should like to look at the biological theory of how we learn. 
Adam suggests that the brain functions learn to recognise functional modes that 
they have been previously required to use and are able to use these again, as required; 
„A magasabb idegi funkciok koziil az emberipszichikum es az allati alkalmazkodas 
folyamataban legjelentdsebb, es ezert legreszletesebben tanulmdnyozott folyamatok olyan 
agyi jelensegekkel kapcsolatosak, melyek kovetkezteben tobbe-kevesbe maradando 
modosulasok jonnek letre a magasabb kozpontokban. Az dllandoan valtozo kulvilag 
ingerei nyomdn letrejovo individualis es maradando agyi funkciomodifikacidk lehetove 
teszik a szervezet szamara, hogy az emleknyomok formajaban multbeli informaciokat 
taroljon, es hogy e rogzitett tapasztalatokat sziikseg eseten visszaidezze, es felhasznalja. Az 
egyeni elet soran megnyilvdnulo ezen plasztikus jelensegeket tanulasi folyamatkent tartjuk 
szdmon."109 
Adam says that there is not, at present, a definitive classification with which to 
categorise the physiological aspects of learning. He does, however, offer some 
explanation of this capacity. Firstly he distinguishes associative learning and within this 
category, classical, and operative, learning. He begins with the genetically given animal 
reflexes, which he claims are permanent and passed on from generation to generation. 
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An example of such a reflex is the bio-chemical reaction which occurs when a stimulus of 
pain is felt by the skin. He argues that such reflexes, alone, are not sufficient for our 
survival in a changing environment and, for this reason, we have the additional capacity 
to learn certain reflex patterns. He gives the example of carnivorous animals, whose 
taste-buds, at birth, are able to chemically respond to the taste of meat. The carnivore 
can, later, learn to associate the taste of meat with the sight and smell of meat. But this, 
latter, ability is a learnt one, and not genetically given. Basically the animal has learnt to 
associate the taste of meat with certain visual or smell patterns and these learnt stimuli 
will cause a salival reflex. 
Such learning is essential to the survival of the animal and may, therefore, be 
described as obligatory learning. The capacity in the animal to acquire this obligatory 
learning is, Adam states, genetically conditioned, although, as I have said, the actual 
acquirement of it, is not. The animal also has the capacity for facultative learning and an 
example of this would be the capacity of a dog to associate the sound of his owner 
banging on a plate, with food. In this case the dog has two incoming stimuli - that of the 
sound and that of salivation arousal. Through repetition the dog associates the two 
things. Physiologically, the thalamus and cortex have learnt the necessary associative 
pattern and will repeat this pattern again and again, each time that the two stimuli are 
received together. We, undoubtedly, learn to see in this way and our reaction to the 
language of sculpture is greatly determined by such learnt associative physiological 
switchings. 
Adam goes on to describe our blocking mechanisms, of which there are many 
types. If we return to the example of the dog's owner banging on a plate at feeding time, 
we can understand how these work. If the sound of the banging should be too great it 
will overstep the upper limit of the analysing neurons of the dog and a defensive 
blocking will occur. The dog, in this case, will not begin to salivate, as the learnt 
associative switching process has been interrupted in order to defend the dog's aural 
system. Another example would be the reaction of the eye to a very bright light, which, 
automatically, causes a reflex of turning away from the source, or shutting our eyes, 
which is why family photographs taken with a flash often show certain members with 
their eyes closed. This capacity is also genetically given. 
There is another kind of inhibitor which allows differentiation and this is central to 
the analytical capacity of the brain. If the dog hears not only the banging plate but also a 
bell he can learn to distinguish between the two signals. At first he will salivate on 
hearing either sound, but if, later, the sound of the plate, only, results in food and the bell 
not, he will learn to differentiate between the two and the bell will not lead to salivation. 
The second kind of associative learning may be described as instrumental or 
operative. The classic example is that of an animal which learns to press a button in 
order to obtain food. Here the animal receives no actual stimulus from the environment; 
rather the animal is conditioned. He learns that he may obtain food through a physical 
act and that this will happen however many times he presses the button. 
Most researchers regard these two types of associative learning as the basis for 
human learning and memory. Adam suggests that a more complex learning structure 
may be configured for the human, in which the basis is associative, and the peak 
cognitive, learning, that is to say, the ability to learn in an anticipatory way, based on 
already acquired knowledge. 
For my purposes I should like to make some distinctions at this point. We have seen 
how our biological systems learn to recognise certain operative patterns and to react to 
these, repeatedly, in the same way. We also have a capacity to inhibit these 'standard' 
reactions. These inhibitors are at the basic level self-protecting to the organism, but at a 
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higher level represent the notion of differentiation, and implied within this, choice. I 
have described how the eye tends to see through a set of learnt conventions, but we can 
inhibit the activation of our habitual ways of seeing. The importance of this will, I hope, 
become apparent when we look at the difference between the way the viewer views 
sculpture, and the sculptor makes sculpture. 
I should like, now, to introduce two more aspects of our biological make up - that 
of motivation, or drive, and that of emotion. Kukorelli proposes a pyramidal structure, 
based on biological urges, for our psychological motivation. This structure has six levels. 
At the base are those essentials necessary for a safe existence, without danger. The next 
level is that of the need for solidarity and love. Thirdly is a desire for recognition and 
esteem. Fourthly, the desire to gain knowledge and consciousness. Next comes the 
necessity of aesthetics - order, symmetry and the longing for beauty. Finally comes the 
need for self realisation.110 
Kukorelli makes a distinction between drive and instinct. When an animal attacks 
and kills, or when it copulates, its actions are determined by instinct. These instincts are 
genetically inherited and biologically determined. There is no consciousness or 
intellectual involvement, as there is in the case of motivation; 
„Az oszton es a drive azonban megsem egyetlenfogalom ket szinonim elnevezese, Mig 
az oszton, eredeti elkepzeles szerint az agyba genetikusan rogzitett rigid determinalo faktor, 
addig a hajtoero az eletmukodesek soran keletkezd motivdld hatds. Ezen elvi kiilonbseg 
magyardzza a motivdcids rendszer eldnyet az dsztdnrendszerrel szemben. A drive-teoria 
ugyanis lehetove teszi a) a hajtoerdk kiserletes vizgdlatat, alaptipusainak elkiiloniteset es 
centralis appardtusdnak feltardsat, valamint b) a motivdcids folyamatok plaszticitasdnak, 
vagyis masodlagos hajtoerdk genezisenek magyarazatdt." 111 
We should remember here that Freud' theory of behaviour was based, as Kukorelli 
points out, on two basic instincts, that of life, in the sense of sexuality, and of death, 
which is, according to Freud, the basis of our aggression. Personally I prefer the 
motivation theory put forward above. Before we look at this more closely I should like to 
look in a little more detail at the motivation theory. 
Some motivating factors may be considered to be homeostatic and these include the 
need for water and salt, the need for chemical balance in the body, the need for an 
energy store, the need for a constant body temperature, the effective use of the nervous 
system and the integrity of the body tissue. All of these factors are to do with the healthy 
maintenance of the body and are causal of various actions, namely, drinking, the eating 
of salt, etc., etc.. There is another group of motivating factors in human behaviour which 
may be regarded as extra-homeostatic. Some of these are fear, sexual desire, mothering, 
anger, etc. The homeostatic factors are those responsible for keeping the body in an 
optimal state, whilst the latter factors are sources of motivation which may be 
considered as environmentally related. 
These, and many more functions, are governed by the hypothalamus, seated 
around the lower brain-chamber, beneath the thalamus. Adam states that there is a 
difficulty in exactly describing the complexity of functions governed by the 
hypothalamus as theories change from year to year as the result of new research. 
Basically it is concerned with the self preservation of the animal, with motivation and 
• 112 emotional reaction. 
Kukorelli states that each of our actions is accompanied by an appropriate 
subjective experience. The resulting feelings are the basis of our emotional response. It 
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follows from this that the emotions are closely related to motivation. In the case of 
aggression, the emotion may actually be the motivation. Feeding and sex are not merely 
drive-based behavioural acts, but also can give immense pleasure. It is actually quite 
difficult to distinguish the two things and the differentiation normally occurs on the 
basis of the connection between stimulus and response. The main difference is that 
motivation, or drive, leads to a series of actions which have aim, whilst emotion is a 
subjective response to, not only the original experience, but also to the physical bodily 
reactions caused by it. 
As well as the actual source of emotion affecting us, we may also inflect our 
memory of previous emotional response. Thus the whole question of emotional response 
is extremely complicated and has been categorised in numerous ways. Kukorelli uses 
Woodworth's classification into six groups of emotional response - 1) love, joy, and 
optimism, 2) surprise, 3) fear and suffering, 4) anger, 5) loathing and 6) detestation. The 
physiological basis of these different emotions is unknown, although a distinction can be 
justified between that which is pleasant and unpleasant. He also points out that emotions 
tend to affect the whole body. Emotions can be read in facial expression, normally 
increase the rate of the heart beat, cause an increase in blood pressure, cause changes in 
the blood flow, cause the flow of adrenaline, etc., etc. What is particularly interesting is 
that it would seem that these physiological reactions to emotion are common to all 
emotions and not specific; 
„Ennek ellenere az izomtonus, a keringes, a legzes stb. muszeres (poligrdfids) megfigyelese 
megsem eredmenyezte a szomatikus es vegetativ vdltozdsok oly an mintazatainak a 
felismereset, amelyek kifejezetten specifikusak lennenek az egyik, vagy a masik 
emocionalis allapotra. E Idtszolagos ellentmondds valoszinuleg a kovetkezokkel 
magyarazhatd: a) Az egyes erzelmek nem kulondllo kategoridk, hanem integrdcios 
folyamatok eredmenyei. b) Az emocionalis kifejezesek, reakciok tanult komponenseket is 
iartalmaznak. c) Mas egyedek emocioinakfelismerese ugyancsak jelentos mertekben 
szerzett tulajdonsag. Mindezek az emocionalis tapasztalatok es megnyilvanuldsaik 
plaszticitdsat, egyenkent es esetenkent mutatkozo eltereseit okozhatjdk A poligrdfids 
vizgalatok eredmenyei rdmutattuk arra, hogy a legtobb szerv nuikodesenek mddosulasa 
szorosabb osszefiiggest mutat az erzelmek intenzitasaval, mint minosegevel."113 
From Aristotle onwards there have been many theories as to where the 
physiological basis of our emotional responses lies. Cannon, according to Kukorelli, 
placed the origins of emotion in the thalamus. Adam mentions Cannon in a different 
context, when discussing the sympathetic nervous system. According to Cannon this 
sympathetic system deals with the functions of alarm to danger. According to the 
external stimulus the sympathetic system tones the body to maximum preparedness. The 
resulting bodily transformations are the same as those which Kukorelli describes as 
resulting from emotion, which rather begs the question whether, or not, the two things 
may be connected, despite the functions of the sympathetic nervous system being 
basically centred in the spinal column. This brings to mind those wonderful Leonardo 
anatomical drawings in the Queen's collection, which I studied at length many years ago. 
At that time the spinal column was thought to be the seat of the soul and, consequently, 
the basis of human behaviour. Some of Leonardo's drawings were, thus, anatomically 
incorrect in the lumber region. At the time I puzzled that someone who was so observant 
could be blinded by ideology. I now suspect that this might have been intentional on his 
part. Could he not have been trying to explain, visually, something other. 
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And now you will, perhaps, allow me an emotional reaction. 'The needs of 
aesthetics'; 'the longing for beauty'. These phrases of Kukorelli, in themselves, sound 
beautiful. That this may be the basis of one of our drives is a wonderful idea, and one 
with which I can only sympathise. For, indeed, is not this the basis of the life which the 
artist chooses for himself. 
With all this in mind, I should now like to return to the problem I posed earlier in 
this chapter. How may somebody have a deep response Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, or 
indeed any piece of music, whilst being ignorant of the compositional complexities of the 
music itself. In other words, if the listener has not learnt to appreciate music, how is he, 
then, able to do so. 
I suggest that the answer lies in may be thought of as a sixth sense, although I 
suspect it is rather a function of our combined sensual system and the experience 
collected by it over time. I have tried to show that the capacity of our senses is 
determined by a complex system, whose basic building bricks are determined by DNA, 
(as far as our present understanding of human biology is concerned). These bricks form 
a complex structure which determines how our senses respond to their environment. [ 
have argued that these senses may be trained. 
The origins of this 'sixth sense' are undoubtedly in the right-side of the brain, 
which we will recall, are responsible for our pictorial and pattern sense, the noting of 
visual similarities, synthesis over time, holistic images, the geometric and spatial and the 
musical. (See The brain, above). This I should like to call our 'empathetic' faculty and it 
is this which I propose as the basis for our appreciation of the language of sculpture. 
What do I mean by 'empathetic capacity'? There is, in all of us, a capacity to 
respond to heard music, to seen sculpture, to tasted wine, etc. in a way which we often 
describe as feeling - "I don't understand it, I can just feel it". It is often connected with a 
notion of instinct - "I feel it to be right". Now this capacity is one which does not involve 
that process of the brain which we refer to as logic, nor indeed our ability to formulate 
linguistic ideas. It is a capacity which is, I propose, determined by the nature of our 
sensual systems themselves. It is a capacity that may be thought of as 'instinctive', but 
there are good reasons to describe it, preferably, as 'empathetic'. 
I have shown that there is a distinction to be made between instinct and drive. One 
of our drives would appear to be the 'need for beauty'. This capacity arises out of this 
drive, but is, in itself, a response. It is a response which is totally visual, (or, indeed, 
aural), without the mediation of language and the rational. It may well be coupled with 
the memory of previous, similar, visual experiences. For this reason it should be thought 
of as empathetic - we are able to empathise with the visual form of the sculpture, or with 
the aural form of Beethoven's sympathy and this empathy causes an emotional response 
in the way I have described above.. 
Earlier I discussed some of the basic elements of sculpture's language - shape, line, 
etc. One has to have no understanding or knowledge of these in order to appreciate a 
work of sculpture, just as one need know nothing about musical scales or orchestral 
arrangement to appreciate Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. One's sense system empathises 
with them. This empathetic capacity might be mistaken with our, 'aesthetic sense', or 
our 'aesthetic capacity', but there is a distinction of terms. The basis of aesthetics is the 
recognition of certain patterns which we refer to as beautiful. Standing beside a large 
block of uncut stone we may feel a sense of its power. This sense is determined by the 
stone's size being larger than ourselves; our sense of scale. This is not an experience of 
an aesthetic order, but one based in our empathetic capacity, which works before any 
kind of value judgements, including those of aesthetics, are made. 
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The empathetic capacity is the direct response to line shape, form and gestalt - the 
direct function of the right sphere of the brain and those neurons of the eye which 'see' 
such things. It is a first and pure response. One's empathetic capacity allows for those 
rare, but real, moments when one is simply overwhelmed by a piece of music, or by a 
sculpture. There is no logical process involved in this case and no judgement. It is an 
example of what Reuben Wheeler refers to as a moment of accord; 
"WJten we, as adults, experience this sensation of accord, we know it as something 
which transcends normal time and reality, fear and desire; it is a being at one with the 
creative universe, a surrender and dissolution of the barriers of personality so that the part, 
the individual, becomes merged with the whole - the individuum." 114 
This feeling of accord, as described by Wheeler, is of course not limited to our reaction 
to a work of art. It may come whilst walking through the forest. On occasion, it is an 
immediate reaction to a work of art, based in the right side of the brain, without the 
temperance of the logical workings of the brain's left side. 
It is this same empathetic capacity which allows us to empathise with the forms, 
lines, shapes, scale and structure of a sculpture. We have no need to make a scientific 
analysis of these factors when looking at and reacting to a piece of sculpture. Our 
experience of seeing objects, touching them and moving amongst them in space, with our 
given sense mechanisms, allows us to invoke our empathetic capacity as a matter of 
natural course, as a pre-requisite of any further considerations. These moments of 
accord, this feeling of being a part of something greater than ourselves are caused by the 
holistic image of the sculpture having accordance with our empathetic capacity. I 
propose that what we call beauty is actually our empathetic capacity experiencing an 
equation between the image of the sculpture with those very configurational patterns by 
which our biological systems work. In other words, when we sense something as being 
beautiful we are making an emotional response to our recognition of the order of those 
same configurational patterns with which we, physiologically, experience the world. 
It is our empathetic capacity which allows us to respond to an Egyptian sculpture, 
about whose origins and specific cultural meanings, we know nothing. It is the 
empathetic capacity which allows the layman to appreciate sculpture. 
Our senses are constantly inundated with information, even, it would seem, during 
sleep. This information is filtered at a fast rate. I have already said that the eye 
constructs a kind of veil through which we see the world. Bombarded, as it is, with so 
much information, our optic system requires some kind of filtering system, briefly 
described by Adam above. (See 'The Optic System') It is a means of subliminally 
disregarding most of this information. If we see something that is dangerous then this 
immediately stops the random flow of incoming information and focuses our attention on 
the approaching tiger. One may describe this as the take-over of consciousness - our eyes 
are constantly looking subconsciously, and at those times when we 'pick something out' 
of this flow of information and give it our special attention, then our vision may be said 
to be conscious. But, I suspect, this is too simplistic. When we see a tiger coming towards 
us, do we actually have a conscious reaction? I think not. What appears to happen is that 
our brain recognises the tiger from the mass of optic information and thus for a moment 
we may be involved in some kind of conscious recognition, but our instinct for fear is 
activated and the adrenaline starts to pump, enabled by the sympathetic nervous system. 
As we know this chemical reaction that is fear often disables our normal physical and 
intelligent reaction to the situation. 
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Now, I have used here the example of fear to show that the selection of something 
from the flow of optic information, is not necessarily conscious. I would like now to 
argue that our visual response to a sculpture and indeed our environment is not 
primarily conscious either. We see, unaware of our seeing, until 'something catches our 
eye', or 'I happened to overhear...'. At this moment we begin to look, or hear, as the case 
may be, beyond the veil of the eye, or ear (for we filter sound too, in the same way, as, 
indeed, we do with all of our senses). At this moment our empathetic capacity is 
activated. Some shape, or form, or colour catches our eye; a certain string of words, or a 
name, our ear. This will often trigger some further rational reaction, but may also 
remain in this purely visual realm. What I believe differs between a sculpture and a 
chair is that the sculpture purposely invites the invocation of our empathetic faculty. 
The sculpture demands to be seen in the visual world of the empathetic. It may try to 
by-pass the logical workings of the brain and to empathetically invoke Wheeler's feeling 
of 'accord'. This works on a level quite outside of logic and quite outside of spoken 
language. These moments of 'accord' are the ultimate in art, moments to which all true 
art aspires. To put it another way our Cycladic figurine invokes a response in the right 
side of the brain, whilst Bernini is definitely of the left. (See chapter 1 - Illusion) 
So what I am arguing for, in short, is a reaction to sculpture, seated in the right 
side of the brain, that is purely visual, untempered by language and the rational, and 
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A diagram showing how our eye and brain may form meaning from the 
visual stimuli received when viewing a sculpture, 
* Pure visual reaction should be understood as the actual chemical reactions which 
occur, and the electrical impulses which are passed, when seeing. 
Part 3 Sculpture & Society 
Chapter 1 The sculptor's practice 
"Often, because I am trying to make a drawing, / am unable to 
draw". (My notebook 9.8.1995). 
"The same sense of unity is immanent in the mind, and is a source of vitality 
and power when it rises to the consciousness. This feeling of being in accord with life, with 
nature and with the world, comes rarely to adults, but for children it is a common 
experience. This is why we are able to regard childhood with nostalgia, as for a lost 
paradise. Children feel the world as one with themselves, and they move among the 
phenomena of experience accepting them as having a vital relationship to themselves in the 
way that their mother has. The whole world can be condensed in and expressed for a. child 
through a doll, a stone or even part of a garden or some secret place in a room. "ns 
When Henry Moore was asked for his opinion about the book written on him by 
the Jungian psychologist, Erich Neumann, he claimed not to have read it, fearing that his 
knowing too much about the psychological processes at work in his practice might 
inhibit him. This simple fact tells much about the nature of the process at work in the 
sculptor's practice and I should now like to concentrate on this. 
To begin with I must return to the distinction between the language sculptors use 
and the language used in the appreciation and analysis of art. Moore's stance is 
revealing. I have already stated that much of the activity of the sculptor is not controlled 
by logical thinking. What I previously termed as the sculptor's "instinct" is truly his 
empathetic capacity at work. The sculptor has become so familiar with its use that it is 
constantly invoked without thinking. It is the "flow" of work. When the sculptor starts 
to think logically and analytically, it is because his empathetic capacity has been 
interrupted by something. He is no longer involved with the empathetic doing, but has 
become self-conscious of what he is doing. (There is, as I shall attempt to show through 
the work of Tony Cragg, a type of sculptor who works in a much more intellectual way, 
but even here I suspect that their work is governed by more intuition than they or any of 
us care to realise). 
I should like now to look at the nature of this mysterious process which occurs 
when the sculptor makes a sculpture. The starting point will vary from sculptor to 
sculptor. Some like to work out every detail of the finished work beforehand, in detailed 
drawings or through a scale model. Others may begin with the material directly, 
bringing to it no preconceived plan, but rather a set of prejudices built up over long 
experience. Some, as in the case of certain minimal artists, may work out the concept and 
order the work to be made over the telephone. 
The amount of pre-planning is a matter of choice. The making of the sculpture 
must be understood to begin with the drawing, model-making, or with just the 
contemplation of its possible form. At some point in the procedure physical action comes 
into play. 
At this point the material comes into play. As I have already stated, different 
materials have their own logical working processes and the chosen material will 
therefore largely determine the nature of this work and, subsequently, the starting point. 
Those sculptors working with extant material such as stone or steel, will probably have a 
large stock to choose from, or indeed their starting point may be a particular block of 
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stone itself, or a group of steel parts lying around the studio. Those working with plaster 
have no such starting point - for them it is an idea and a hag of powder. 
For those who like to totally pre-plan, the actual physical process of making the 
sculpture is just the same as any kind of fabrication. If we fake the case of a stone 
sculpture that is a copy, perhaps scaled-up, of a ready prototype, the work will be the 
same as that of any stone mason and indeed some sculptors often give out such work to 
assistants. The other way - that of directly working with the materials - is more 
complicated. Whilst the mechanical procedures will be the same as those of the stone 
mason a serious of complex aesthetic decisions must be made as the work progresses. The 
working situation will be open, allowing for accidental discoveries and change. Often 
ideas will come and changes occur that were unthought of in the original planning. The 
final form is not known until it is realised. 
I recall, as a student in the 70's how the teaching staff used to talk to us of parts of 
the sculpture being 'right' and how some areas 'worked' whilst others did not. One 
never quite new what these words meant, but over the years one's feeling of 'rightness' 
and things 'working' developed, and 'rightness' became a consensus opinion. There was 
never much attempt to define 'rightness' - one just knew that things were 'right'. I 
mention this as it is, perhaps, symptomatic of the problem of describing the non-verbal 
visual world, in words. 
At some point in the making of the sculpture the work will stop and the sculpture 
generally declared as finished, although the possibility must not be disregarded of re-
working at a later stage, often after many years. It will probably be a moment when the 
sculpture is felt to be 'right', or often, as in my case, the sculptor will find that the 
minute changes have reached saturation point and that to further work on the piece is 
unnecessary 'decoration', or that he has reached the stage where he is just playing with 
it - that to proceed further will add nothing of significance to the sculpture. Generally 
speaking the work is finished when every minute part of it is felt by the sculptor to be 
intentional. 
This then, or something close to it is what happens in the sculptor's studio. It is a 
description of a physical process. What is more difficult to write about are the mental 
and aesthetic processes involved alongside this physical practice. It is this part which 
Henry Moore did not wish to read about in Neumann, this part in which David Smith 
finds words to have no place.(See below). Moore was simply afraid of knowing too much 
about the process in which he was involved everyday. 
"If you ask why I make sculpture, I must answer that it is my way of life, my balance, 
and my justification for being."116 
I have always believed that the artist, or sculptor, works in order to make some 
sense of the confusing world which surrounds him. He may not have aspirations to make 
statements about this in his work, but, at the lowest level, the simple routine of the 
working process is a kind of ordering of the sculptor's personal life and immediate 
surroundings. His situation in the studio and his way of thinking is much closer to that of 
the child than we may care to realise. In his Notes of a Painter of 1908 Henri Matisse 
said that, "I am unable to distinguish between that which I am creating and the act of 
creating it."117 This is so near to the child at play, who is so immersed in play with a 
doll's house that, as Wheeler says, "normal time" is transcended.1181 would argue that, 
much of what the sculptor does is synonymous with the play of a child, but with one 
difference. That innocence with which the child views the world, is no longer available 
to us. The child always sees the world as something that revolves around him, he being 
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the centre. We adults know that, however much we may wish it to be so, the world is 
simply not like that. So the sculptor must re-create this state of innocence artificially, 
knowing it to be a lie, and does this either through his empathetic capacity, or through 
some pseudo-scientific theory. 
The empathetic capacity is, in itself, a way of seeing the world. Most, probably all, 
artists keep notebooks wherein they jot down or draw any piece of information that may 
seem to have relevance to their studio practice. Usually there is no logical reason for 
accepting this, or that, piece of information. It may even be something useless which, it is 
felt, may become useful one day. Such decisions are worlds away from the logic of the 
scientist. Indeed he may, in such a notebook, merely begin to doodle aimlessly, waiting 
for that moment when his empathetic capacity reveals something of interest - a 
particular configuration of lines, or imagined forms that fit into what Henry Moore calls 
his 'form-world', a process which Paul Klee refers to as 'taking a line for a walk'. 
This maybe gives the impression of the sculptor as a comatosed bumpkin, who goes 
round 'having experiences, man' (as we said in the 60's and 70's), which is of course an 
absurd notion, given the hard physical nature of most types of sculpture. (I exclude here 
so-called sculptures of 'sculptors' throwing twigs into rivers - shame on you, Andy 
Goldsworthy, for repeating this early 1970's act!) 119 
I am convinced that, for a large part of the time, the sculptor working in his studio 
has no notion of what he is doing. Conscious thinking plays a minor role in the process. 
A peculiar relationship exists between mind, body and material. The three are 
interwoven into an inextricable web. Neither words, or spoken language have a place 
here. Sculptors may talk 'about' their work, but they always talk around it and usually 
with convenient, succinct summaries which are thought up after the act. 
"Everything in this article concerns my inner experiences as an artist. The words 
were born afterwards. I do not attribute any value to what is uttered in words. Words are 
instruments of thought that assist me in my work "no 
To take an example, I have read and seen on T.V. a number of interviews with 
Henry Moore. The same few anecdotes recur again and again - the influence of 
childhood memories of massaging his mother's back, of seeing carvings in Yorkshire 
churches and the shaped rocks of the Yorkshire moors and the re-use on many occasions 
of the same few simple terms - for example his "form-wo rid". I do not mention this to 
belittle Moore in any way. Indeed, I find what little he does have to say to be uncannily 
pertinent. My point is that Moore, like all sculptors, has no need of words. He may say 
much more through the language of sculpture itself. I would go further. Generally 
speaking words, however well used, may rarely contribute to our understanding of 
sculpture. They may set a sculpture into some historical context, talk about its physical 
condition, compare it to other works, but there comes a point when they can go no 
further. They are obsolete in any attempt to understand the real meaning of a sculpture. 
Furthermore, any attempt to describe a sculpture in words makes it a captive of those 
words. The word description stops us from looking further; prevents us from seeing. 
David Smith, who wrote so well about the practice of the sculptor, is rather astute 
on the subject; 
"To the creative artists it is doubtful if aesthetics have any value except as literature. 
It is doubtful if they have any value to his historic understanding of art, because his 
aesthetics are a totality of visual memories of art images and not words. Even when 
aesthetics exist in time, relating to his work, they are made after the work is completed, by 
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minds and language other than the artist's. Historically, he is not subject to what a pedant 
thinks another artist thought, when he has direct communication with artist of all ages, in 
their own language.... 
The artist does not deny aesthetics, but his aesthetics are memory retentions 
visually selected, carry no moral, and do not operate within word limits. Verbally stated 
aesthetic summations are of no benefit in the making of a work of art."121 
In the making of a sculpture there is a vast amount of work which is routine and 
mundane. This is the physical work and during it the sculptor's mental state probably 
resembles that of any worker involved in a production job. His thoughts may wonder 
freely and will probably have little to do with the work in hand. The real business goes 
on when the sculptor stops, stands back, and starts to evaluate what he is doing. In my 
experience this may take as much, or more time than the actual physical work. Much of 
this 'thinking' is actually 'looking' - that is to say that it a kind of visual thinking without 
language. It involves the visual projection of potential changes to the forms, lines, shapes 
etc. etc. and subsequently, to the sculpture as a holistic image. 
So, if the sculptor in his practice is engaged in a kind of thinking which is not 
linguistic in the word-sense, but in a visual sense, in what kind of thinking is he 
specifically involved? The answer may well lie in those capacities of the brain which I 
briefly outlined at the beginning of the chapter on 'The Brain'. The mental state that the 
sculptor employs a great deal in the course of his work is similar to those mental states 
which would appear to be common to Buddhist thought, transcendental meditation or 
Silva Mind Control. 
It was in 1929 that Berger first analysed the electrical impulses of the brain. He 
split them into four categories, Alpha, Beta, Delta and Theta, each varying according to 
the magnitude of the frequency (cycles/second) and the amplitude ([J Volt). The Alpha 
waves are in the range 8-13/sec. and the resistance is 50pV. The Beta waves are in the 
range 13-30/sec. with a resistance of 5-50jJV. The Delta waves are in the range below 4/s 
and with an amplitude usually in excess of 50}JV. The Theta waves have a frequency of 
between 4 and 7/s with an amplitude that is smaller than that of the Delta, and larger 
than the Alpha waves.122 These different wave lengths reflect the state of the brain 
during different processes. When we are alert and paying attention to outside stimuli we 
produce Beta, and when quiet and relaxed, with eyes closed we produce Alpha waves. In 
adults Delta waves are usually produced when sleeping and Theta waves in those 
moments between sleeping and waking. Scientific study of states of meditation - as used 
in Transcendental Meditation and Silva Mind Control - would seem to suggest that the 
human mind, when in the meditative state, produces wave lengths in the Alpha range 
and sometimes the Theta. Rational activity, on the other hand, produces wavelengths in 
the Beta range.123 Silva points out that generally we produce Beta waves in our 
everyday activity at the expense of the other states; 
„ Betaban, vagyis teljesen ebren lenni nem okoz semmi kulonleges erzest, Erezheted 
magad magabiztosnak vagy felhetsz, lehetsz elfoglalt vagy tetlen, elmelyulhetsz valamiben, 
vagy eppen unatkozhatsz - Betaban a lehetosegek szama gyakorlatilag vegtelen. Mely ebb 
szinteken a legtobb ember szamdra korldtozotabbak a lehetosegek Az elet megtanitotta oket 
arra, hogy Betabanfunkcionaljanak, nepedigAlfaban vagy Thetaban."124 
In this Adam would seem to agree; 
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„Minel intenzivebb az agyi aktivitds, tehdt mineI eberebb a vizgdlt egyen, anndl kisebb 
feszultsegu es nagyobb frekvencidju hulldmok jelennek meg."125 
Adam says that when one is day dreaming in the Alpha state, the moment that one opens 
ones eyes and they receive the external light stimulus, one, in that moment, changes to 
the Beta state. What Siiva argues is that one can learn to be in the Alpha state, whilst 
carrying out one's everyday activities. 
The basis of Silva's book and his methods are various meditation techniques which 
concentrate the mind and induce the production of Alpha waves. These states closely 
correspond with the meditation of the Buddhists and even Christian prayer in its more 
developed forms. I suspect that much of the sculptor's 'thinking' activity during work is 
also in the Alpha range. During those moments of deep visual concentration I have, in 
momentary flashes of self-consciousness, been aware of the similarity of my mental state 
and those of people reporting on their experiences of meditation. It is also, I think, quite 
significant that the basis of the Silva's technique is essentially based in the visual, using 
techniques of visual associations to improve memory and analysis of problems in terms 
of visual imagery. 
This is, of course, just a guess and I suspect that wiring a sculptor up with 
electrodes to measure his brain waves whilst he is working, would be such an 
interference to his normal practice that the results of such a test would be extremely 
unreliable. One thing is certain. Logical thinking has little role to play in this stage of 
making the sculpture. It may be used during the processes of the work - for example on 
the best way to cut or weld some pieces of steel, or the best w ay to cut a form in stone, 
but otherwise it has little place in the studio. As Tony Cragg said when asked how he 
started to make a sculpture; 
"I have two or three usual ways of starting. I can literally be in my bed or I can be sitting 
somewhere, or be in the middle of a meal and have a sort of vision." 126 
Given the way in which sculptors would appear to 'think', art history tends to make the 
mistake of attributing all kinds of intentions on the part of the sculptor which he clearly 
did not have. Art critics and historians must be ever aware of differentiating between 
what a particular sculpture actually is and what they would like to see it to be, in order 
that it may fit some theory or category which is of their own devising. And I should like 
to examine this problem further, by concentrating on how we look at sculpture, as 
opposed to how the sculptor makes it, but first we must turn to other matters of 
importance in the sculptor's practice. 
Sculptors generally exhibit their work and try to sell it - for they must make a 
living. These two things also have an influence on what the sculptor makes. Let me 
explain. As the sculptor works he knows that the work will be seen - indeed the work is 
made to be seen - and most sculptors, whether they wish to or not, have some kind of 
imaginary audience. This is a hindrance to making the sculpture, but one which often 
looms its head. At the back of his mind there is always this question of how that which he 
is making will be received. However much he tries to ignore this there is always the 
worry that his friends will laugh at what he is making, or that his collectors will shun 
him. He must fight to expel such concerns and concentrate on the real value of the job in 
hand. If he worries about his fictive audience he will never get beyond pastiche. 
As a student I had many teachers and influences. Jeff Lowe once said to me that 
one should beware of making something that looks like sculpture, but is not. I think of 
this constantly. Anybody can make something that looks like a sculpture; can make 
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something which uses sculpture's language and which superficially resembles a 
sculpture. Without the hard-won image it remains a resemblance, a pastiche. 
There is an element of exhibitionism in making sculpture. There may be an actual 
audience during the course of making the sculpture and this is particularly true of works 
made in sculpture symposia, made usually in a public place, or large works made in a 
factory, where the factory workers are a kind of audience - other hands are involved. 
Fixed time limits often make the production of a work into a kind of performance. In 
certain cases sculpture events are organised wherein the sculptors actually compete 
against each other for prize money, and this is especially true of sculpture symposia in 
Italy and of ice and snow sculpture competitions. Here the whole procedure of making a 
sculpture has been turned into a kind of sporting event. There is a world-champion snow 
sculptor! In making works under such conditions there is a great deal of exhibitionism 
involved, exhibitionism which has little to do with the values one usually associates 
sculpture with. 
There is another kind of exhibitionism too. A large sculpture can impress simply 
because of it size. In the communist countries of eastern Europe a certain style of public 
sculpture grew up with the communist regime. It had two main themes: the idealisation 
of the worker, and the representation of certain political figures as heroes of the people. 
Invariably these works were of enormous size. They were created for reasons of 
propaganda rather than from any concern for the immortalisation of aesthetic value. In 
consequence there are many of them which have limited aesthetic value. Yet, invariably, 
these works impress one simply because of their, literal, enormity. 
There is a danger for the sculptor in using the elements of the language of 
sculpture in such a way. Over-blown size can evoke a sense of the objects power in the 
viewer, but it is a sense that is not in accord with the merits of the image itself and any 
resulting emotional response cannot be genuine, but will be, like the sculpture, 
sentimental. It may look like 'sculpture' but its form will be at odds with its image and it 
will be still-born. It will lack those realised fusions of matter, form and image essential to 
good sculpture. 
There is another, closely related, concern of the sculptor, and that is the question of 
style. Confusingly, we use the word 'style' in the visual arts to mean different things. 
Style can mean Expressionist, Cubist or Impressionist, etc., or it can be a reference to the 
style of a particular artist. In the first case, 'style' refers to certain common concerns 
between different artists, concerns which, more often than not, are to do with the 
technical aspects of how a painting or sculpture are constructed. That is to say that the 
style reflects certain attitudes towards making an image in a painting or sculpture. 
When we talk about the style of a particular artist it may be used in the sense of his 
relationship with one of these 'isms', or it may be a critique of certain elements in the 
artist's works en masse. 
All sculptors, whether great, good, or indifferent, may be said to have a style. As 
the sculptor works over time he accumulates certain experiences, certain personal 
idiosyncrasies, which may be said to constitute his style. The notion of an artist's 
personal style is not static, but dynamic. As the sculptor learns through practice small 
advances are made as he narrows down the almost limitless possibilities of 
representation to certain elements, or certain ways, which have a particular echo for 
him. This is his style, and it is constantly developing. 
Let us return, for a moment, to the words of Patrick Heron, which I quoted at the 
beginning of the chapter on the optic system. These ways of seeing which painting adopts 
at different periods are the result of the artists of the time inhibiting their standard 
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patterns of seeing and finding a new sense of order in the visual world beyond. The 
annotations which the artist adopts to represent his new vision constitute his style. 
Jeff Lowe's words hide an important problem for the artist, and one that one 
comes across regularly amongst young students of sculpture. For whilst the style of a 
sculptor should be the hard-won, slow development of a series of decisions over time, the 
possibility also exists of purposefully creating an 'off the peg' style, without facing the 
difficulties that true style requires. That is to say that one may simply borrow a style 
from somebody else, or even think up a distinctive 'look' for one's work. It derives from 
a desire for commercial success, or from exhibitionism, and can appear to be very 
impressive. Behind it there is an emptiness. It is all very flashy and visually exciting, 
even kinky or funky, but it has none of the deep seated value that sculpture may, and 
should, have. 
UI am at our house on the hill and I try to draw the Black hill It is covered in trees. Near 
the top of the hill these change to fir trees and these act like a crown. A black line appears 
to cut the hill at the point where the mixed trees meet this crown of darker fir trees. A series 
of ridges lie diagonally up the hill and appear to end in the flatness of this dark crown. My 
drawings are miserably inadequate. I realise that I could spend my whole life trying to get 
this 'right' on paper. I think of Cezanne and the Mont St. Victoire. How difficult, and how 
much time is needed, to get some little piece of the world down in a true way, without using 
the hollow tricks. One needs to invent a whole new language of drawing to put this hill on 
paper." (21. 5. 96, from my notebook.) 
Before we leave the problems of the sculptor's practice there is one more topic 
with which I should like to deal. It is that of drawing. Drawing is one of the most 
exacting disciplines that man has evolved, and one which allows little room for 
exhibitionism and half truths. Drawing may be approached in various ways and it is 
quite common for the sculptor to use many different kinds of 'drawing' at various times. 
There is drawing which is jotting in notebooks as a kind of visual reminder and drawing 
that is a quick sketch to explain something to somebody else. There are drawings which 
are explorations of visual ideas for some future, or current, project and there are 
drawings made of things in the world. The first two kinds of drawing are unproblematic 
- that is to say that they are just done as a matter of course, automatically, without 
thinking. The latter two kinds are more difficult as, again, there may be a market for 
these, they may be exhibited, and consequently a self-consciousness may be inhibiting. 
When we draw in the latter sense we try to break down the veils which our optic 
system throws between us and the world. We try to see beyond the imagined lines and 
see what is really there. We must look as hard as we possibly can and, having done this, 
we must then look even harder. We must employ those inhibitors against our 
conventionally learnt ways of seeing, which I wrote of earlier. The learnt patterns of 
seeing, themselves, block our real ability to see. The artist must break through these 
learnt perceptory patterns and see afresh each time he begins to draw. 
When we draw we make a series of marks to denote what we are seeing. These 
marks are representational - they try to record what, and how, we are seeing. They are 
not the actual thing and we must therefore employ a system of representation. Such 
systems may be learnt, and it is these tricks which we are taught in drawing lessons in 
school. These are conventions, and must be treated as such. They are rules which are 
meant to be, indeed must be, broken. It is possible to draw with all the tricks of a 
convention, to make a good looking image, and yet to make an empty drawing. The 
drawing, despite all its professionalism, does not go beyond the conventions and remains 
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an illustration. It does not contain truth, merely convention. It is Lowe's 'sculpture' that 
merely looks like a sculpture should lock. One must not drawr to impress others, one must 
draw to see that which is real. The drawings one makes may 'look' terrible. They may be 
clumsy and technically incompetent and, indeed, have to be, if they are to go beyond the 
tricks of drawing teachers. 
Drawings reveal. They reveal the experience of the sculptor in front of the draw n 
thing, and in a way that may be uncomfortable for the sculptor. They reveal the depth, 
or the shallowness, of his experience. They reveal the sincerity of this experience, its 
degree of profundity, or they reveal empty style and failure. In drawing the sculptor 
cannot be bombastic, he may not be over-blown. For if he is, he will not get away with it. 
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Chapter 2 Looking at sculpture 
"It is 1973 and I am studying for my bachelors degree in Nottingham. Viktor Bur gin 
gives a series of lectures on semiotics. He argues, with a large dose of help from Sassure, 
that the language we use has a structure that in turn both structures and limits the way in 
which we view the world. He uses the simple example of the Eskimo language which has a 
great number of words for what we call snow. In the English language there are only three 
words - hail, sleet, snow - although I, as a mountaineer know, se\'eral more, such as 
"spindrift". It follows from this that the Eskimo has a far greater capacity for 
distinguishing between different types of snow, whilst English speakers are prevented from 
distinguishing types of snow, beyond those permitted by their limited linguistic language." 
What Burgin failed to accommodate within his reasoning was the difference 
between spoken language, and that language which is the subject of my present 
discourse - the visual language. Whilst he was certainly correct in thinking that the 
language we use inhibits our ability to perceive, he allowed no room for a language that 
is without words, a language which is also limited, that is to say, limited by the sensory 
system which is its prime mover. 
I have tried to show that sculpture has two languages, closely interwoven, but also 
distinct - that subliminal language which the sculptor uses when working and a second, 
much more linguistically developed language, which is used when analysing and talking 
about sculpture. Again David Smith gives a good description of the difference between 
these two languages; 
"The words I use in talking about art do not bear close relationship to making art, 
nor are they necessary directives or useful explanations. They may represent views that 
govern some choice in sublimation - censored exchange or as opposites. mien I work the 
train of thought has no words, it is simply all in the visual world, the language is image." 
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I should now like to look at how the viewer understands these languages of sculpture -
the visual and the linguistic. 
The viewer may be an art historian or critic. He may be a sculptor or painter. He 
may work in a supermarket and have an interest in art, or he may know nothing of, and 
take no interest in, art. Now all these people are capable of a response to a piece of 
sculpture and will, often, gladly voice opinions. The response of the non-sculptor 
professionals will probably be a mixture of actual momentary sensual experience 
coupled with acquired cultural knowledge and will often, rather quickly, pass into the 
left side of the brain where analytic and language functions have their seat. The 
untrained eye may also have a very real response which is rooted in the functions of the 
right side of the brain. They may feel the sculpture's rightness, its power (or indeed its 
failures) without resource to learnt cultural experience, but as a direct response. It may 
even be similar to those intense moments we feel sometimes when seeing a beautiful 
landscape or the sea pounding the cliffs during a storm. There is no need for analysis or 
thinking. It is what Wheeler called the "feeling of being in accord with life, with nature, 
and the world,"ft 
f t See beginning of previous chapter. 
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I should now like to study more closely how we look at sculpture and to do this I 
should like to take an example. I choose Constantin Brancusi Maiastra in the Tate 
Gallery, London. It is a work that I know well and which I always try to visit when I am 
in London. The sculpture is small and unassuming. I must have passed it many times 
without seeing it, before I looked it up following my study of Brancusi's work in Paris 
some twenty years ago. 
Unlike much of Brancusi's work it does not have a complete base. It is set on a 
stone, in itself carved, but this is then placed on a museum box. When Serota began his 
famous re-hangs at the Tate he had the work placed on a thin, column-like base several 
metres high. It looked rather ridiculous as thus it purported to be a 'monumental' work, 
which it certainly is not. It is a very private sculpture and normally it stands on a base 
slightly below eye level.128 
The work is made of bronze, or perhaps brass - its colour is that of brass - which 
has been highly polished. Knowing its background is immaterial to our appreciation of 
the work, but it supposedly 'represents' a mythical bird from Rumanian folk tales. The 
base, as I have said is a lightly decorated block of stone, which tapers at the bottom. This 
tapering contributes to a feeling that the sculpture, although rooted on the ground, is 
capable of 'taking off into flight. In another version of the work in the collection of Mr. 
and Mrs. John Cowles, Minneapolis, Minnesota, the effect of the base is quite different. 
Also of stone, the sides are cut in one plane in a zig-zag pattern and this firmly roots the 
work to the ground. 
The sculpture bears some resemblance to a bird. There is a curv ed neck-form 
tapering into an indentation which stands for a mouth and a larger, overblown form 
standing for a body, of which the back part tapers down until it reaches the stone 
support. At the front of this 'wing' configuration, coming out of the base and tapering 
towards the form of the body, is a rather mechanical wedge of material, which seems to 
have a number of functions. Firstly it functions visually as a physical support for the 
large mass of the body form above it. Secondly it counterpoints the tapering of the 
wings, tapering as it does in the opposite direction to them. It also acts as a counterpoint 
to all the forms of the sculpture, having a kind of geometric quality caused by its edges, 
in what is otherwise a very rounded work. 
The more one looks at the work, the more it seems to grow. It is small in size but its 
scale is enormous. There are a number of factors which may contribute to this effect. 
Firstly there is the poise of the sculpture. It seems to be perfectly in balance between two 
states - the state of rest and the potential state of flight. Secondly its polished surface 
catches and reflects light. It, like many of Brancusi's polished works, seems to act as a 
centre of the surrounding space, a point which sucks in the light and reflects it back with 
distortions caused by the contours of its form-bound surface. This effect is best witnessed 
when his works are placed near the centre of the room and not pushed up against walls, 
as so often happens in museums. (There is a work in the modern collection in Vienna 
which activates the whole space around it, despite being set in what is a rather densely 
packed collection). A third may be its overwhelming sense of wholeness. The curves of 
the forms lead the eye around and around the work and in a way in which the whole 
volition is to the top. The slit of the mouth is like a comma, which temporarily arrests the 
wandering eye, but does not stop it, before it continues its journey down the front of the 
neck and over the swelling body. As the eye travels slowly down over the belly the 
undercurve leads back into the wings, which shoot its path upwards again, or it may 
travel down the support-like protrusion where it hits the 'ground' so hard that it 
bounces upwards again. 
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There Is a simple but pertinent statement made by the sculptor Glyn Williams 
when describing an ancient Mexican sculpture in a show he was reviewing; 
"One has never seen anything like it before and yet it is completely believable as an object; 
it has the confidence and clarity of afunctional artefact Complete credibility presented in 
new form is what singles out the world's greatest sculptures, and this is certainly one of 
them "129 
I think this may be applied to this Brancusi sculpture too. 
I have tried, here, to give a description in words of the physical nature of this 
object. I have never, until know, tried to make an analysis of this work in such a way. On 
the many occasions that I have seen this work it has never been necessary. I do not 
usually 'look' at sculpture in this way. I have said nothing of its meaning, nothing of why 
it moves me and nothing of how I always feel so enriched for having studied it, after my 
many visits to see it. It may be that these feelings are aroused, as Baumgartner would 
have it, through the very nature of my optic system - that its form has an empathy with 
the form of my optic system. Perhaps some deep psychological recognition is invoked, as 
the Jungian psychologists would have it, or differently as the British 'Object-Relations' 
school would have it. It is at this point that words become useless. We might write at 
length about what this Brancusi sculpture expresses and, indeed, what Brancusi was 
trying to do with it, but I think that we would come not much nearer to understanding. 
As I have already said, sculpture is a language without words. However much we may 
have read about Brancusi, however much we may speak or write about him, these words 
do not assist us in the act of looking. Indeed, they may even hinder us. The act of looking 
at, and the aesthetic experience resulting from this looking, is in no way governed by 
words. We may later analyse the work, as I have done to some extent above and we may 
set it in some kind of context with other works of art, or indeed other non-art objects, 
but this is secondary and nothing to do with the act of looking at the sculpture. The act 
of looking is a function of our body, whose rules are determined by our given biological 
system. Our aesthetic response is a residue of the workings of the system. The rest -
analysis, contextual and critical evaluation - are of another order. This is why our fictive 
supermarket worker who knows nothing about art can have an aesthetic response to 
Brancusi's sculpture, just as I do. Not knowing about twentieth century sculpture and 
the seminal role of Brancusi, is of no hindrance. She, and I also, may respond in the same 
way to the work of our unknown ancient Egyptian sculptor, or to the Cycladic figurine 
that I spoke of earlier. 
It would be easy to stop here and disregard the vast amount of words that have 
been written about the history of sculpture as being irrelevant appendages to our 
appreciation of a sculpture as a visual thing, whose meaning resides in, and is of, the 
visual. This would be silly, for Popper's World Three, the world of knowledge, 
undoubtedly has a role to play in our appreciation of sculpture. My argument is with the 
balance. Our obsession with words and the intellect have tended to make us forget the 
real experience of sculpture and to befuddle it with concepts of confusion. A lack of 
belief and sense of security of our place in the order of things lead us to try to analyse 
everything, including our experiences. The analysis has become more important than the 
experience itself. We value the analysis at the expense of the experience. 
Of course art history has a role. I have been at pains to show that the 'instruments' 
of our faculties are genetically given, but that we must learn how to use these faculties. 
We can train our eye to respond to the movements of a tennis ball and we can train our 
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ear to hear the nuances of a symphony and its orchestration. What art history can 
undoubtedly do is help us to develop our sense of the visual and those values associated 
with it. We can learn about the tricks that have been employed at various times to create 
illusion - for example Renaissance perspective, or Cubist space, in painting. We can 
learn colour theories and learn about shape, form etc, etc. We can even learn 
complicated constructions about how these might convey meaning. This knowledge is 
acquired by reading and by looking at sculpture through the eyes of this knowledge. 
Such knowledge may conceivably affect our prime visual response too, but this is 
something that cannot be proved and something that I suspect is not true. I really do 
believe that, however much we know, those moments of primal awareness which we can 
experience when looking at a sculpture or listening to Mozart, are not affected by 
accrued knowledge. They may, however, be more readily available to our ability to 
perceive through our improved, accrued, capacity to break down the veil which the 
functioning of the eye and ear put before the world. Ultimately, art history is for the 
viewer of art The artist has no use for the contextual and analytical, accept to analyse 
how another sculptor has created a particular effect as a prelude to incorporating it into 
his own work. Otherwise David Smith is right; 
"Historically, he (the sculptor) is not subject to what a pedant thinks another artist 
thought, when he has direct communication with artists of all ages, in their own 
language..."130 
In short, what differs between the way we look at sculpture from the way the 
sculptor 'thinks' whilst producing i t might be summed up as follows. The viewer brings 
to the work a collection of experiences and knowledge and generally applies this to his 
appreciation of the work. It is exactly the type of experience and knowledge, which the 
viewer brings to the work, which the sculptor must forget, when making the work. The 
sculptor must begin again from a point of artificial innocence each time he makes a 
work. He must, at the same time, aspire to make an image which is profoundly moving or 
profoundly meaningful to the viewer. The viewer may have difficulty in 'seeing' a piece 
of sculpture because he is not used to using those inhibitors which break down the usual 
patterns of seeing which he employs. 
There are exceptions to this rule. One, when the viewer experiences one of those 
rare moments when he is profoundly moved by the sculpture. These moments are 
outside of rational evaluation. The second exception is that of the 'rational' sculptor and 
I believe that Tony Cragg may be classified as such. 
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Chapter 3 The sculpture of Tony Cragg 
"Tony Cragg makes visible the language of sculpture itself." 
I wrote this note to myself when I began to write this thesis and I should like to use 
Cragg's work as an example to show the way in which a sculpture encodes meaning 
through its image. 
I cannot say that I particularly enjoy Cragg's work - in some ways it is the 
antithesis of what I think the proper role of sculpture to be. Yet, having said this, 
Cragg's sculptures are indeed memorable. They worry me as I find it difficult to place 
them into a niche in my thinking and long after I have left their presence their image 
remains burnt in my conscious memory. I have come to realise that the reason for this is 
perhaps because they deal with the fundamental language of sculpture and the way in 
which we see sculpture, as the subject of the work, and this in a very raw way. 
Demosthenes Davvetas has said that; 
"Indeed, every new development in his work can be read as a penetrating critique of man in 
his environment. Tony Cragg sets the natural world against the world produced by man and 
studies their interaction. In this way, we see, in the rawness of the materials he uses, the 
first stage of matter battling against the cultural structures which dominate our ways of 
thinking."131 
In my first chapter I outlined some of the aspects of sculpture's visual language 
and I should now like to illustrate these in action through some of Cragg's works. The 
first thing to say about Cragg's works are that they are not objects in the sense that 1 
have so far argued sculpture to be. Generally they tend to be a kind of tableau of found 
things out of which he constructs a new image. Their visual impact is very strong and 
there is a strange aura about them. One is looking at something which, in its parts, is one 
thing, and in the totality of the parts together, something quite different. We may 
understand this better by looking at some examples. 
Cragg went through a long period of making images constructed of plastic waste. 
Pieces of found plastic were arranged alongside each other on the wall or floor and their 
outlines and internal patterns constituted an image of something else. A good example is 
Policeman of 1988. The work is made of a number of found blue plastic elements. One 
cannot tell if these have been arranged in their found state, or whether some have been 
directly cut to fill their role as parts in the overall image - 1 suspect that the latter is true, 
but it is perhaps unimportant. Many of the elements are recognisable things in their own 
right, for example the lid of a large plastic paint tub and some plastic bottles. All the 
elements are mounted on a white wall, none of them touching, and visually fixed there 
only in as much as they relate to the overall image. The image of the policeman is 
'dressed' in riot gear, 'wearing' a strapped helmet with raised visor and a flap to protect 
his neck, and 'carries' a shield and long baton, apparently both in the same hand. One 
must assume that the shield is 'suspended' from what appears to be a strap and is in 
front of the baton. Our eye constructs a sense of depth, in which the figure 'stands' in 
profile. On the free arm, nearest to us, a cuff is denoted by the head of what appears to 
be a broken canoe paddle and another piece of plastic at the top of the arm acts as 
'stripes'. In other words the policeman 'is' in uniform. 
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Now one must understand that this image is entirely constructed through illusion. 
The juxtaposed plastic parts relate to each other by line and shape and thus the illusion 
is conjured up of the image of a policeman in riot gear. It is left to the viewer to 
construct the image out of the separate elements. What is Interesting is that there is little 
room for ambiguity in ones reading of what the different parts stand for. Cragg has tight 
control of the way in which we respond visually to the work. 
In the interview with Davvetas Cragg states that; 
"Sculpture is not a single image, but all the images that one can draw from an object 
Sculpture is more of a real thing; it must be linked to the body, to displacement, to the 
world. It is more a question of experience than a question of image, it's all about 
expressing something." 
When asked if he considers himself to be a sculptor he answers that; 
"Yes. It's the most appropriate way to describe my activity, although I am not keen on the 
idea of object maker." 
These two statements are apparently contradictory and may serve as a good example of 
the difficulties sculptors get into when they use the language of words to describe their 
activity. Firstly he does not like the idea of 'object maker' and yet wishes us to draw all 
the images we can from the 'object', and secondly he confuses the idea of image in his 
work. It is essential to the nature of 'Policeman' that it is one specific image. One is 
unable, because of the very nature of the work, to draw any other images from it. It 
would not work as an image and as a sculpture if this were so. Therefore, by its nature, 
such a work is incapable of expressing anything. What it does do, more than any other 
image I can think of, is literally lay bare the way in which our visual system and mind 
construct an image through the illusion created by line, shape, material, space, etc. - Le. 
the language of sculpture. This is Cragg's, not inconsiderable, achievement. 
There is the a temptation to leave Cragg here, but it would be unfair and unworthy 
not to study further his considerable oeuvre. I should now like to look at what one might 
describe as his 'furniture' works. I should like to use two examples here, 'Village' 1988 
and 'Taxi!' of 1983. 'Village' consists of four 'houses' constructed from wood, and a 
table. Two houses are on the floor under the table and two stand atop. The houses are 
approximately house-shaped, with irregular, rustic, geometry and no details - no doors, 
windows or chimneys. They are irregular gabled box-like shapes with a sloping top, or 
roof. 'Taxi!' consists of a wooden drum, (the sort on which wire is coiled for storage and 
transport), which supports an upended box and a wooden sheet behind i t Behind this 
stands a thin wooden disc. A pair of shoes are placed in the box and a closed violin case 
lies on its side on top of i t A long tube is juxtaposed into the composition, leaning, unlike 
the box and back-plate which are vertical, at an angle. The bottom of the tube almost 
falls off the base drum as it rests at its mid-point against the upper side of the box. All 
the elements of both works are covered in a scrawl of drawn lines - black in the case of 
'Village', white in 'Taxi!'. 
These works are clearly of a different order from the plastic works which were 
essentially flat and pictorial. In the plastic works there was an implication of depth 
within the image, as I have shown in my description of the riot policeman, whilst the 
actual depth of the plastic elements was immaterial to the nature of the image. In these 
'furniture' works three dimensionality has a much greater role - they consist of objects 
arranged in real space and not the artificial pictorial space of 'Policeman'. In 'Taxi!' the 
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parts may be simply found parts which are un-worked. In 'Village' the houses have 
obviously been made by Cragg, whilst the table is almost certainly found. 
The arrangement of parts seems casual, especially in the case of 'village' and 
would visually be accidental were it not for the drawn lines which visually hold the 
different elements together in some kind of relationship. Viewed from certain positions 
these lines appear to continue across the different elements and it is they alone which 
create a sense of fixed relationships between the parts, in our minds. 
The image created by the juxtaposition of the parts in these works is much more 
esoteric than that of 'Policeman'. In 'Policeman', as I have tried to show, the sculpture 
was about the way in which our visual sense constructs the image. Any further 
associations aroused by the image are totally incidental and uninteresting. Indeed the 
nature of the object is such that it specifically does not invoke our capacity to associate. 
'Village' and 'Taxi!' work in quite a different way. 
The houses in 'Village' are irregular. They invite one to associate them with the 
houses of a real village which are, indeed, often rustic and irregular. They invite one to 
imagine a sculpture by Cragg that would be called 'Town' in which the houses would be 
of a rigidly geometric nature. The seemingly random placement of the houses is also 
typical of a village, where the positions of buildings has developed through use and 
practicality over a long period of time and not, generally, through planning decisions 
made by city councillors. The kitchen table, with its essential drawer is like one found in 
almost every village home and, around which village life revolves, as anyone who, like 
me, lives in a village will know.132 That the table is above two of the houses and under 
the other two also raises certain associations in one's mind. Here the table is at the 
physical centre of the sculpture and, by association, of village life. It shelters two of the 
houses, suggesting that without the table there would be no community and no life in the 
village. It also supports two of the houses suggesting that the table is that which is the 
fundament of village life. 
The exclamation mark in the title of 'Taxi!' is very important. It implies a situation 
- that of someone calling for a taxi as they have to transport this luggage that is the 
sculpture. One is invited to view the wooden plate as a wall, the box as a cupboard or 
shelves, and the shoes and the violin as someone's clothes and 'things' respectively. The 
tube may be a roll of drawings or a roll of wallpaper, or perhaps just a tube, a waste 
water pipe. Most importantly, the title and the apparently accidental nature of the 
juxtaposition of the parts in the sculpture, suggest that someone has packed them 
together thus in preparation for moving them. 
In both these works the title is integral to our understanding of the sculpture. If we 
did not know that 'Village' is thus named we would almost certainly not make the 
associations I have just made. Just so with 'Taxi!' These two sculptures then must be 
viewed as metaphors for their titles. Without the titles they would seem to be a rather 
random arrangement of objects, interesting or not, in themselves. The titles focus our 
attention and invite us to view these arrangements in a specific way. The titles focus the 
works as image. We now have a sculpture that is a metaphorical image of the village and 
another that is a metaphorical image of someone waiting for a taxi. The title unifies the 
parts in an image and directs our response. 
These works of Cragg's appeal to our logical reasoning. What I have chosen to call 
our empathetic capacity has little role in our reading of his work. Our reaction to it is 
not based in the purely visual, but in an intellectual evaluation of the works before us. If 
'Policeman' makes visible the way in which our visual capacities operate, then 'Village', 
and 'Taxi!', dependant as they are on their titles for meaning, are a visual 
demonstration of the way in which objects trigger mental associations. Again, these 
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aroused associations seem to be quite specific, almost didactic. I see no evidence for the 
possibility of 'expression' within these works. Their appeal is not to the emotions and 
they do not express anything about the world outside of themselves. They illustrate. 
They seem to operate in a totally rational, intellectual way, in which the way we see 
them is bound by their context in a gallery or museum and by their title. They are 
encoded messages, easily readable. Once one has read the message there is nothing else. 
Intrinsically they are not interesting. They are memorable for the images which they 
construct. 
There is nothing that relates 'village' to the real experience of living in a village. 
The sculpture is simply a conceptual notion of two aspects of village life - that in a 
village the houses are not straight, and that the kitchen table is central to that village life. 
Lacking a basis in real experience the possibility of expression is excluded. 'Village' and 
'Taxi!' are gestures which make visible the way that our minds associate objects in a 
metaphorical sense. This is their, and Cragg's, achievement, but let us not confuse this 
with 'expression'. 
Sculptures do not express anything. They encode. They can encode intellectual 
meaning, as in the case of Cragg, or they can encode a direct sensual response, as in the 
case of Brancusi. What we confusingly refer to as expression is not latent in the 
sculpture. A sculpture cannot express anything. It may trigger something in the mind of 
the viewer, which the viewer mistakenly calls the 'expression' of the sculpture. 
'Expression' is the viewer's. The viewer creates the notion of that which the sculpture 
encodes as 'expressing' something. Cragg's work is an extraordinary example of 
sculpture that encodes meaning in such a specific intellectual way, that it virtually 
excludes the possibility of the viewer finding 'expression' in it. 
Cragg's works have involved an interaction with a wide range of materials and 
cover a considerable range of styles. Yet, each time I look at Cragg's work, whether it is 
a piece made of arranged metal retorts, a plastic piece, a furniture piece, or a work made 
in clay, I feel the same thing. I feel that his works always invoke in me a state of self-
consciousness. That is to say that they make me aware of how I am looking at them, and 
this self-consciousness which the works invoke, excludes any possibility of the sculptures 
arousing any other response to them. However interesting they are - however visually 
awkward and arresting - they have, so far, always been lacking for me, being of the 
rational world and without magic. Being all 'of the head' and thus dependant on rational 
evaluation, they fail to move me in any deep way, however thought provoking they may 
be. They do not refer to the world outside of sculpture, to life, nor to our experience of 
these. They are about the language of sculpture itself and about the way in which the 
language of sculpture is able to encode ideas. 
You may notice a difference between the way in which I have written about 
Cragg's work and the way in which I wrote earlier of Brancusi's sculpture in the Tate 
Gallery. Cragg's work appeals to the intellect. It encodes an intellectual reaction using 
language. One may talk about what it 'means', for Cragg's work is essentially narrative 
in nature; perhaps even literary. The Brancusi, on the other hand, involves a direct 
appeal to our visual senses. It is an embodiment, a manifestation of force. However much 
one may wish to describe it and its meaning one will never come near. It defies linguistic 
description of its meaning simply because it is not of 'word' language. It is of quite a 
different order from Cragg's work. It invokes a much deeper response in us than Cragg, 
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a response of empathy with this mysterious, indescribable, un-graspable thing. For 
this is sculpture at its greatest 
Chapter 4 Car! Andre and 'The Bricks' 
In the 197G's the Tate Gallery in London purchased Equivalent VIH, a sculpture 
by Carl Andre. Scandal ensued, or at least the popular press did its best to arouse one. 
Twenty years on we may look differently at the matter. 
The sculpture in question consists of a stack of bricks laid out on the floor. They 
are ordinary bricks and indeed Andre had resold them to the merchant from whom he 
purchased them when they remained unsold, (as art, that is), after their first showing. 
When the Tate approached him he simply bought some new bricks and re-stacked the 
piece and 'took the money and ran'. I suppose that the Tate's directors were not 
prepared for the scandal that was to ensue. So what was the problem with this work? 
The popular press asked all the obvious questions - how could a stack of un-worked 
bricks be art; how could the artist charge so much for a stack of ordinary bricks; how 
could he resell the art work to the brick merchant at cost price, re-buy the bricks, as 
bricks, and sell them to the Tate, much more expensively, as art; what business did the 
Tate have buying expensive bricks; why did not the Tate buy ordinary-priced bricks and 
make the WGrk themselves, etc, etc. It was as if the press, who normally cares nothing 
about sculpture, had suddenly decided to take a moral stance and 'put modern sculpture 
right'. The whole story lasted a few days, was prolonged when somebody vandalised the 
work by throwing paint on it, and then died, as the press left sculpture to fight for itself 
and the popular papers returned to their more usual form of pornography. Perhaps I 
should apologise for bringing the bricks scandal up again. 
When I finally saw the restored sculpture I was not over impressed. I bumped into 
a sculptor friend beside it, who muttered that there is no way of telling if it is hollow or 
not. This was true. One could count the number of bricks which were visible and guess 
the number that were inside; one could see that the whole stack resembled the shape of 
one of the individual bricks from which it was made; one could see that they were real, 
un-worked, stacked bricks. I suppose one could have contemplated on a mass of 
mathematical relationships in the work, if there were any - I did not. That was it, unless 
I missed something. 
Equivalent VIII was a 'sculpture' because it had been put in a gallery. It was and 
is a stack of bricks. Its context invited us to look at it as a piece of sculpture and this 
implies a different way of looking. As a 'visual' person I often look at such things in 
builders merchants and enjoy them visually, just as I can enjoy a good tree, a pile of 
wood, raw blocks of stone, or a pretty girl. These are not sculpture and presenting them 
in an art context does not make sculpture of them either. We may look at the pile of 
bricks because it is in the Tate, whereas we probably would have not if they were 
stumbled upon in the real world. We will probably react in a certain 'art-way', perhaps 
similar to the way that I have described above, and maybe at that time, in the seventies, 
our reaction might have been tempered with a degree of shock or surprise. We might 
know about Duchamp and Minimal sculpture. Whatever, I suspect that our prime 
response was not of a profound kind. We see so many 'ordinary' things in the course of 
every day that we ignore most of them. This one may have surprised us, for what was it 
doing in the Tate? 
If we really try hard we can squeeze some kind of 'meaning' or 'value' out of 
Equivalent VIII. It may really have some deep mathematical logic to it that I have 
missed. It does not offend me in any way. I am quite happy for it to be in the Tate - it 
does say something about art in the 70's. Actually it just bores me. I can think of little 
that is more mundane, unless it is another Carl Andre sculpture which we can see in so 
many of the major museums around the world. 
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But, enough. I have no wish to trash Carl Andre here, but rather to point out my 
persona! prejudice. In fact Andre was significant in that he was a kind of final point in 
the deconstruction of sculpture. Andre pared sculpture down to the point where there 
was nothing left - no meaning, no aesthetic response, just mind boggling boredom. This 
was Andre's purpose - to debunk sculpture of all value. After this nadir sculpture could 
only become richer again, or die. 
In an awful kind of way Andre was profoundly honest. He made sculpture that was 
devoid of meaning - in the sense of the traditional meaning of sculpture - and thus 
devoid of function, except as merchandise. I can think of little that reflects better the 
state of the intellectual, moral and political bankruptcy of the 197Q's. Peter Fuller spoke 
of the lack of a shared symbolic order which the contemporary artist has to work in 
absence of. Andre, in his gesturing, epitomised this state of the arts. Andre chose to bring 
into the gallery a piece of the real world, unaltered. He did not try to encode a truth 
about the real world in an object, but merely presented a rather uninteresting piece of 
that world in what purported to be a sculpture. It does not properly deserve the 
appellation, if the word 'sculpture' is to have any meaning. 
Andre's work says nothing of the world, nothing about our being in it and nothing 
even about the language of sculpture itself. It does, perhaps, say something about the 
lack of judgement prevalent amongst museum curators, and a great deal about the way 
in which 'sculpture' has become a market commodity with a financial value far in excess 
of any worth that it may have. This is my prejudice. This is why Andre does not, for me, 
make sculpture. If Tony Cragg's work is an example of, what I have chosen to call, 
'intellectual' sculpture at its best, then Carl Andre's work is intellectual sculpture at its 
worst. 
Before I leave Andre, I must mention one final thought. Andre accepted the 
emptiness. His work lays bare the moral and spiritual emptiness of our society. We, or at 
least our repositories for art, the museums, value this nothingness. From this point of 
view Andre's work contains some truth. This is a truth of context, of a sociological and 
social nature. The work itself does not encode it. Its context in the gallery does. When I 
look around at what else is going on in sculpture; when I look at what I am doing, I can, 
in moments of despondency, believe that Andre's stance is more truthful than that of 
those of us who try to make sculpture a meaningful language once again, in a society that 
does not have much use for it.13 
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Chapter 5 Michelangelo 
It is 1979, my time as Sculpture Fellow at Bath Academy of Art. I take delight in 
walking in the gardens of Corsham Hall, of a weekend. On one occasion I meet Lord 
Methuen and we fall into conversation. He invites me to look at his Michelangelo. lam 
excited at the prospect and, yet, soon disappointed at the sight of the small, uninteresting 
putti. My only previous experience of seeing Michelangelo's work was that of the Royal 
Academy's Tondo, which was hung in such a bad place that it was impossible to see -
although I have subsequently been rewarded with a closer look - and the Dying Slave in the 
Louvre in Paris. The latter seemed to have much more to say much about eroticism and, 
quite contrary to its title, seemed to be more about sensuous life, than dying. I must confess 
that my impressions of Michelangelo at this point are not exactly of a profound kind, 
indeed,... 
I think it was in 1982 that I finally visited Italy with the distinct intention of 
studying Michelangelo's work. I had always been fascinated, in particular, by the late 
Pietas, which, of course, I knew only from photographs. It was a profound experience to 
see them 'in the flesh'. 
If you are expecting here an evaluation of that which I hold to be of extreme value 
in sculpture, you may be disappointed. Michelangelo's work is, for me, problematic, but 
I hope that I can show through it the range of responses which a sculpture may encode. 
I should, as I have already criticised Fuller's and Freud's analysis of it, perhaps, 
begin with his Moses. It is a sculpture which, for me, falls into a similar category as his 
David. That is to say, that it encodes on several different levels. Firstly, it is narrative. It 
tells a story. Freud elaborated this in time, as a moment after a series of actions and I 
agree with Fuller that his analysis was wrong. The story that it would appear to 
represent, or relate, is that of the moment when Moses receives the tablets from God, 
turns and sees that the people are dancing around a golden calf that they have made. 
He is angry. Freud and Fuller make much of the position of the right hand. I think that 
the matter is quite simple. The right hand is, whilst holding the tablets and Moses' 
beard, also pointing in the direction of his gaze, whilst his left hand is pointing towards 
the tablets. One can almost imagine a cartoonists balloon coming from his mouth saying 
something like, 'I'm really pissed off with you lot. The real God has given us this gift and 
you are dancing round that idol like a lot of pagans.' This, of course, sounds crude and 
rather cynical, but I do believe that, at the level of the story teller, Michelangelo's 
sculpture was, often, extremely weak, employing, as it does in this case, some extremely 
banal devices. If we look at his David, from the point of view of its narrative, my 
argument will, hopefully, become clearer. The David of the Bible story, was a small weak 
boy, who slew the giant Goliath. Michelangelo's David is, on the other hand, a specimen 
of the human physique at its most perfect and strong. There is little in the sculpture 
which actually equates it with its subject. In both of these sculptures Michelangelo fails, 
for me, at the narrative level. 
Now let us imagine that we see either of these sculptures without knowing their 
titles. Fuller states that; 
"Michelangelo has deliberately left Moses with the traditional horns which he sports in 
medieval imagery. He must have known that these were derived from a mistranslation of 
the Hebrew word for 'ray of light'. But he retains them to emphasise the sensuality, 
earthiness, perhaps even the sexual potency of his figure." 13 
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I would suggest that Michelangelo retained the horns as a sign that his sculpture actually 
depicts Moses, for without this indication based in tradition, we would have no inkling 
that this is not just a figure of a bearded scholar holding some books. With the David 
there is even less which connects the sculpture to its narrative subject - merely a rather 
unconvincing sling and a hand which cups an invisible stone shot. 
I can understand Michelangelo's dilemma. The narrative subject of the sculptures 
was of no real interest to him. It was entirely a secondary concern and Freud's 
fascination with the narrative aspects only confirm his lack of understanding, which 
Fuller, for different reasons, also attributes to his text; 
"... I am no connoisseur in art, but simply a layman. I have often observed that the subject-
matter of works of art has a stronger attraction to me than their formal and technical 
qualities, though to the artist their value lies first and foremost in these latter. I am unable 
rightly to appreciate many of the methods used and the effects obtained in art."136 
Freud's problem is that he constructs a complicated reading of the work, based on its 
narrative, a narrative which the sculpture does not, successfully encode. Freud has made 
the mistake, as Fuller so often did, of using his vast knowledge - and his particular 
knowledge, in this case concerning the story of Moses, - to evaluate the work in terms 
which are simply not encoded within it. What concerned Michelangelo, here, was clearly 
of quite a different order, for when he wished to be 'narrative' he could be so at a high 
level, as is witnessed by his Pieta in St. Peters in Rome, and even more so in his frescoes 
for the Sistene Chapel. The real 'message' of the two works is rather 'embodied', as I 
chose to put it in my first chapter, for want of a better term. 
Now Freud also says that, to the artist, the value of works of art lie in their formal 
and technical qualities. This is again quite wrong. These things, in themselves, have no 
value. They are tools, or means to an end. For the artist it is the final image and the 
responses which it, actually, encodes, which have value for him. Naturally another 
sculptor looking at the work, and indeed Michelangelo himself, pays attention to formal 
concerns, for this is his language. But it is a language which only has value in relation to 
the final image and its successful, or unsuccessful, encoding of meaning. The failure of so 
many writers on art, to understand this leads them to make, as Freud did in his study of 
Moses, interpolations which the work itself does not carry. In other words, Freud was 
writing about what he, the viewer, was bringing to the work, and not about what is 
extant within it. 
The problem of this associative approach to looking at art, as employed here by 
Freud, is that it, as a method, negates the possibility of absolute aesthetic value in art. 
For if each viewer brings his ow n intellectual clutter to the work, the possibility of 
consensus is denied. Absolute aesthetic value may only be understood if the viewer 
concentrates strictly on what is actually extant, that which is encoded, within the work. 
This is why I have found it necessary to place the source of aesthetic appreciation in a 
physiologically based response to the object. Associations which the sculpture may 
arouse are, if not specifically encoded as part of the image, personal to the viewer and 
cannot therefore be considered in any system of aesthetic value. For value, if it is to have 
any meaning at all as a concept, must be shared. 
If these two works of Michelangelo encode their story rather weakly they certainly 
work at other levels in a much more forceful way. I remember going into the art school's 
bronze foundry at Manchester for the first time and seeing on the wall a plaster cast of 
an eye. I immediately recognised it as a cast taken from Michelangelo's David, although 
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I had never even, actually, seen the work at the time. Just recently I was staying in my 
friend's studio in Finland where there were several other, easily recognisable, bits of 
David. Both Moses and David have an extraordinary presence. In both works the 
representation of a facial expression is extremely forceful, just as, in both works, the 
hands have a major importance. Here, Fuller's attempt to describe the facial expression 
of Moses seems lacking. Indeed, I think that one can never describe it adequately, for the 
facial expressions of both the Moses and David, appear to change the more one looks at 
than if it lingers on, say,"the sculpture's eye. The whole of the facial expression is 
certainly something more than the parts. 
This presence is constructed, too, by the almost over-brimming sense of strength 
within the bodies. Michelangelo seems, actually, to be much more interested in the 
muscular power of his models, than in the theme which they are supposed to illustrate. 
They are extraordinarily well-carved and one can, certainly as a sculptor, feel the 
excitement with which Michelangelo caressed the muscular forms out of the stone. The 
detail of the cloth and the beard in the Moses is quite remarkable and he has clearly 
gone to great lengths to activate every inch of the stone's surface. The folds of the cloth 
are very deeply cut and are so visually heavy asa-result of this, as is the beard. Contrary 
to Freud's analysis, the figure seems so heavy as to be incapable of movement. 
The power of Moses, and it is visually the power of the figure which would seem to 
be the real subject of the work, is embodied throughout the work. Everything in it 
contributes to a sense of terrible, frightening power, as if the figure might burst out from 
its skin. Even the rather limpid, draped right hand acts as a counterpoint to the 
enormous muscularity of the left arm and so increases its strength. It is a hand which is 
almost a trade-mark of Michelangelo. It has a visual quality similar to the limpid hand of 
the Creation of Adam, in the Sistene Chapel, and it is there again in the Dying Slave in 
the Louvre. It is even present in the right hand of Christ in the Pieta in Florence. It is a 
technical device, and one which Leonardo also employed in his Madonna of the Rocks, 
this limpid hand suggests a form of grace, stylised, though it may be. It is through such 
tender, graceful, passages that Michelangelo is able to, (contrary to Leonardo's 
intention), to make some of the other passages of the work seem so powerful, in contrast. 
I could go on to describe the purely formal aspects of line, shape, etc., but I think 
that it is unnecessary. I must, finally, return to the image. The image of both the 
sculptures are quite other than that which they purport to represent. The entire merit of 
both the works has nothing to do with the subjects that they are supposed to represent 
and, in this sense, they must be regarded as failures. But only in this sense. The matching 
of image to theme has not been successful, although the images in themselves are 
enthralling. 
We should, now, compare these two sculptures to the Dying Slave in Paris. It also 
has nothing to do with its subject - dying. It works quite differently, though, from the 
Moses and David. Michelangelo has made a work whose actual subject would seem to be 
a male figure in the throws of experiencing agony, (or ecstasy, for they are visually 
almost indistinguishable). The problem here, and this is why it is for me one of his least 
satisfactory works, is that he has tried to literally illustrate this. He has copied a pose 
and facial expression which is perhaps analogous to this feeling. He has done it very self-
consciously and, for this reason, the work is rather sentimental. He has not embodied the 
notion within every passage of the work, as he did do in Moses and David, but rather 
carv ed what he intellectually understood to be a pose that illustrates this emotion. The 
caning is brilliant, as always with Michelangelo, but the resulting image is extremely 
weak. It, perhaps alone amongst his works, has, almost, the quality of a Chippendale. It 
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is a work whose pose is excessively erotic and, exceeding the bounds of a healthy interest 
in the human body, has become tainted with an over-spilling sexual desire. This would 
not be bad if the sculpture really technically embodied this desire, but it, rather, 
illustrates it in a sentimental way. It is almost a three-dimensional pin-up. Illustration, in 
this sense, has to be avoided in the making of sculpture. 
You may have noticed that I have not mentioned empathy in connection with any 
of these two works. The reason for this is that they simply do not arouse this capacity in 
me. The late Pietas do, and, after years of consideration, I think I have an inkling of why 
this is. Let me explain. 
On that first visit to Italy I had very little money and my time was therefore 
limited. I had prepared a short list of 'musts', at the top of which was the Rondanini 
Pieta in Milan. I sought it out and, during two days in the city, saw nothing else. I 
returned to it again and again to check that it was still there and still profoundly moving. 
It was, and I suspect, still is. 
Of course the work was unfinished at Michelangelo's death. Its most noticeable 
characteristic is the presence of two right arms on the Christ figure. Michelangelo 
deliberately broke the stone in his dissatisfaction. The figure of Mary, much too young to 
be Christ's mother, clings frailty to the sagging body of Christ with its overlong, wilting 
legs. I could write of the formal relationships - the rhythm between the legs of Christ 
and those of Mary -, indeed, of a whole manner of things, but none of them help to focus 
the profound effect of the work on me. It was only much later that I began to understand 
one part of the work's power for me. 
I later saw the captives in Florence. They, too, had excited me in photograph, but I 
realised that they were very contrived. For their day they were most unusual, but I felt 
that the polished forms did not properly emerge from the rough blocks. They seemed, 
visually, to be almost stuck on. They did, however, help me to realise what constitutes 
part of the power of the Rondanini Pieta. 
The folds of the cloth and beard in Moses are signs to me that Michelangelo was 
captivated by the sensual possibilities of the marble itself. The sculpture certainly had 
little to do with the story of Moses. The captives were an extension of this passionate 
interest. They constitute an extraordinary step outside the bounds of the sculptural 
language of his day. They are an extension of something I mentioned in the first chapter, 
the realisation of form through the development from the rough to the smooth stone. It is 
almost as if Michelangelo's sculptural quest became untenable for him and in the 
Rondanini Pieta we have the final exemplar. I can think of few works so imbued with 
humanity. Michelangelo's failure has taken on universal dimensions. His sense of failing 
as a sculptor has found the perfect equation in the failure of mankind symbolised in the 
crucifixion of Christ. His personal failings are encoded in an image which truly 
symbolises human failing. It is probably an accidental association which Michelangelo 
may have changed had he finished the work, but in breaking that original arm away 
from the figure of Christ he made something which is profoundly tragic. 
More than this I cannot say. My words have not described my experience of the 
sculpture, but they perhaps go some way towards defining the sort of thinking the 
experience later aroused in me. 
I cannot leave Michelangelo without mentioning the Pieta in the Cathedral 
Museum in Florence. Although this work, too, is unfinished, it has a much greater formal 
coherence and wholeness than the Rondanini Pieta. I mention this in order to emphasise 
the fragmentary nature of the other, and to suggest that, what I have referred to as a 
holistic image, should be understood to require an evaluation not based on a formal 
sense of wholeness, but, rather, on a sense of spiritual wholeness. But this sculpture has 
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both. Unfinished, though it is, it is surely the pinnacle, not only of Michelangelo's oeuvre, 
but also of Renaissance sculpture as a whole. 
The work employs a number of formal conventions. Of particular note is the 
hierarchical triangular superstructure, gashed by the distorted leg of Christ. The figures 
are distorted in their internal proportions and in their size relationships to each other. 
(Christ straightened out would be incredibly tall). One could analyse such 'tricks' for 
hours, as I did, myself, in Florence. Suffice to say that each formal element is essential to 
the total image. 
One may read the work in a narrative sense. The central figure is obviously dead 
and is being held so, so, tenderly by the grieving man and woman behind him, who may 
well be his parents. The second, diminished, childlike, female figure seems to be taking 
little active event in carrying the dead figure, but is rather turning away in sorrow. We 
will probably be familiar with the specific story which the work narrates and will almost 
certainly reaci to the symbolism of the work,137 
The work certainly has a tremendous emotional impact. I can think of few 
sculptures which embody a sense of tragedy and despair in the way that the Christ 
figure does, in this work. These feelings are heightened by the contrasting tenderness of 
certain passages of the work, in particular, the tender clutching hand of the mother on 
the one side and the father on the other. The whole hunched form of the father figure 
seems to be determined not by the great physical effort in which he must be involved, 
but rather by a feeling of tender embracing. 
I could go on for a long time discussing the work in this way, but I do not think it 
will help us to understand, at all, its power and emotion. It is simply one of those 
extraordinary objects which is beyond words and beyond explanations. It is profoundly 
moving and its secrets will never be unlocked. It must remain in the visual world from 
which it derives and we must be content to marvel at it, and be moved by it, without 
anything so banal as 'understanding' it. 
Chapter 6 Toothpaste and the Museum 
"As part of the business of everything being made a commodity, the shop window has taken 
the place of the altar-piece and the painting. Tens of thousands look into these windows 
and wonder. Here are the modern still-lives and the modern heroes and heroines. The 
function of the shop-window tableau is really the same as that of sculpture for the Greeks, 
or frescoes for the Italians of the Renaissance. These works appealed because they 
embodied the hopes, the ideals, the potentiality of most of the people who looked at them. 
Today there is only one common ideal, created and fostered by commerce: it is the principle 
that Only what you haven't got is worth having The shop window is the living expression 
of this ideal."138 
I have just paid a visit to our bathroom and have brought with me some randomly 
chosen bottles, tubes and cans of the stuff which we fee! it necessary to adorn ourselves 
with, presumably in order to enrich our lives. There is a can of "8 x 4 INTENSIVE FOR 
MEN MARKANT DEODORANT" with "NEUE WIRKFORMEL", a bottle of 
"SANAJRA Liquid Hair Neu", a plastic bottle of "NEW Safeguard Antibacterial Shower 
Gel" and a tube of "NEW NATURAL PH-BALANCE blend-a-med". What these four 
products have in common is the word, "new". 
In our modern society we are bombarded by the media with advertisements for 
such products. The packaging of the products frequently incorporates this word, "new" 
Advertisements in 'new-spapers', magazines, on the radio and television constantly 
bring to our attention some new product, or indeed an old product in new clothes, and 
try to convince us that purchasing these is essential for our well-being. Recent Blend-a-
med advertisements on Hungarian Television have shown a medical man, who is 
probably an actor, in a laboratory or surgery setting. We are asked to believe that this 
man must know what a good toothpaste is as he is either a dentist and thus responsible 
for our toothcare, or a research scientist who has just done extensive research, either 
testing, or creating this wonderful product. 
Of course we may choose to avoid such blah biah by not reading newspapers, 
magazines or watching television. However, the bombardment does not stop there. As 
we walk through the shopping streets of our cities the bombardment begins again, whilst 
the suburbs are full of super-human size advertisement hoardings. We may even believe 
that we do not look at these, they have become so much a part of our town environment. 
Even in this case we are, subliminaily, unable to avoid them. Their message is primitive. 
One will have no aesthetic experience in front of them as one may with a painting. 
Maximally, they may make you chuckle, or I suppose one may actually long for the 
sunny or wild climates which the products are often set in, depending on their type. 
Advertising knows no bounds in its attempt to sell. There is an advertisement on 
MTV at this time for "City Man" deodorants and aftershaves in which a beautiful 
woman smells the man who is apparently wearing the stuff and proceeds to make love 
with him on the floor in the background, whilst the product is presented in all its glory 
in the foreground. The message is, 'Use city man and you can get your rocks off with 
nice girls'. The trouble is that it works and we buy the stuff and perhaps, even more 
stupidly, are not disappointed with it if we do not get the girl. 
Peter Fuller showed through a study of Ruskin, in his book Theoria, 139how the 
advance of monopoly capitalism in the 19th Century destroyed moral value through its 
undermining of religion, a theme dealt with much earlier by Wheeler in part two of 
Man, Nature & Art.1401 am sure that I am not the first to point out that the moral code 
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which previously ordered the functioning of our society, has been replaced by the media 
and advertising. 
The reason for this is probably twofold. Firstly the 'media' is non-participatory 
and son-community based. Television soap operas show us how we might be socially 
interacting were we not sat alone in front of this box. (I say, 'alone' for watching 
television is a totally un-coramunal activity, even though a number of people may watch 
the same box at the same time.) It was, I understand, quite norma! in my village, in the 
days before the advent of television, to meet together in the village hall of an evening for 
a chat. The first television in the village was later installed in the hall and everyone 
collected together of an evening to watch together. Nowadays, everyone watches at home 
and is many houses there are televisions in each room, so that everyone may watch a 
different programme at the same time. If one tries to escape to the pub one is greeted 
with television there too. The television is causal of the break up off community life. 
One of the attractions and dangers of television is that it requires so creative 
participatory thought. Everything is presented in easy to understand blocks of 
information and is presented as being real, in a theatre one knows that the actors are 
playing out roles and one is required to suspend belief of this knowledge and enter into 
the fantasy world of theatre. Television does not do this. The actors are working in 'real* 
settings. One does not have to imagine a street or a room, or a swimming pool. The 
actors are filmed in real locations and appear to be in part of that same real world in 
which we are sitting. This is television's power and its weakness. It turns everything it 
touches into consumable trivia, easy to digest, and if you are having problems one of the 
advertisements will no doubt tell you which remedy to take for them. There is so such 
thing as critical viewing. This is also a myth created by television companies who are 
perhaps a little self-conscious of the damage that they are doing, Television replaces the 
morality and order of community life with sentimental emotion aroused in response to 
its villains and heroes. One may not even have a real meaningful emotional response to 
television. It invites only sentimentality. 
The media have also undermined moral and community values by making as feel 
permanently inadequate. The strategy of advertising Is remarkably simple. You are 
useless and under-fulfilled because you have sot bought this or that product. One Is 
constantly under pressure to look new - buy new clothes, have a new hair style, a 
complete re-image job - and to acquire; to buy all those useless gadgets that one is 
pressured to believe are essential for life. 'How couid your car ever move using that old 
cheap oil - buy new brill oil and life will sever be the same again', until of course new 
brill oil becomes old and there is an even newer, 'better', product. It is this concept of 
newness which has perhaps done more than anything to destroy morality in the years 
since the Second World War. 
Newness has become the goal of life in itself. By looking sew we will feel happy, so 
we are told. By buying new gadgets our life will be made easier, we are told, (which 
should give us more time to watch more blah blah on television). "Don't think, just do 
it", as one of my sisters says, having been on one of those brain-washing American 
personal development courses. Success in life is measured by how much buying power 
one has accrued, how big a house one has and how big, and how new, a car. Oh!, and 
don't forget to brush your teeth with your new, better, improved, longer lasting, double 
protection toothpaste. 
So much for the toothpaste. Now for the Museum. I have suggested that this media 
hype has undermined the moral fabric of society. One of the results of this would seem to 
be the arrival of the age of nostalgia. From our standpoint of today, lacking any sense of 
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communal values, we have begun to view the past with a great sense of nostalgia for the 
ostensible order that its society had, and this has given rise to the age of the museum. 
We now have museums for everything. Museums are no longer just the collections 
of art and artefacts from various world cultures, which they once were. We now have 
transport museums, science museums, industrial museums, folk-art museums, museums 
of rural life, textile, glass and ceramics museums, museums of musical instruments, 
museums devoted to pop stars, philatelic museums, pipe museums, tobacco museums, toy 
museums, space museums and yes even soap and toothpaste museums. There is almost 
nothing that man has produced, particularly in this century, which is not collected in 
some museum somewhere. What are we exactly collecting all this stuff for, or rather 
why? Surely these products are not so important that they all need conserving for future 
prosperity. 
The answer would seem to lie in a sense of utter collective insecurity. Until the 
decline of the power of the church as an active spiritual force in our lives, life must have 
had a much greater sense of order to it. Society, even in big cities, was community based, 
being based around a parish. The church provided moral guidance and a sense of order, 
a sense of belonging to something larger than the individual - belonging to a parish, a 
community, a country and ultimately, the universe. The church, and its guidance, 
provided a reassuring central role in solving the problems of everyday life. It provided a 
focus and order in a confusing world. 
What I have just written may seem a romantic over-simplification and indeed it 
may be. Life in the big cities two hundred or more years ago was probably just us 
squalid, perhaps even more so than it may be today. Crime, poverty, disease and tragedy 
were rife, just as today, indeed, maybe more so. Yet the church was a real force, there if 
one chose to belong, as it seemed most people did (often by force, rather than desire). 
Those difficult questions of where we come from, what are we doing here, and where we 
are going were answered by belief. The tragedy of death was surrounded by ritual, as 
were the joys of birth. Life may have been hard, but it had a sense of order and purpose, 
which generally seems lacking in society today. We are ail running very fast but 
probably have little idea of where we are heading. Television helps null our senses and 
real-life experience, thus decreasing the danger of as 'stopping doing it and thinking.' 
As Wheeler puts it; 
"We are most aware of this togetherness of things, of a mutual immanence, when we are 
living within the fra mewo rk of an organic community. Today the community is dead; 
replaced by vast metropolitan agglomerations which are destroying the country and 
enervating the souls of the people who live in them. We have become infected with a 
megalomania which atrophies the small resources of the individual, so that more and more 
he is forced back into himself, and declines into neurosis, perversion, bitterness and 
frustration which can only be expended eventually in the vast wars civilization prepares for 
itself The community is dead, and we must lose no time in recognising that man is in 
greater danger from the environment of his own creation, than ever Neolithic man was 
from his natural one. Our most urgent task is to bring back into modern life the values and 
awareness which were indigenous to the organic communities of the past but which are 
absent in the new world environment of the machine."141 
It is this absence of 'values and awareness' which have made us museum mad. Lacking a 
sense of values on which to base our judgements we are obsessed with preserving 
everything, for this is our only means to relate ourselves to the course of history. We find 
solace in visiting a museum of rural life in which we may see the buildings, instruments, 
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tools and impedimenta of a life style that has passed forever. We see in it a kind of order 
ana a simplicity and feei nostalgic for a life that was more fulfilled than our chaotic 
existence. 
Of course the museum is a lie. The museum of rural life does sot show the mud. the 
biting cold of winter, the deathly smell of the sick bed. It is a packaged lie, a half-truth, 
made comfortable so that we may indulge and enjoy our feelings of nostalgia. The 
museum has not been created to preserve these things for posterity, but to give us the 
chance to place ourselves into the mill of history, to consume this long-gone lifestyle asd 
reflect nostalgically on its order and simplicity. We are given an anaesthetised 
experience which will help us for a short while in focusing our own confusion of 
absences. 
Waldemar Jasuszcsak is not alone in suggesting that the art gallery or 
contemporary art museum may be seen as in some way taking over the role of the 
church. 
"What you have to remember is that art today has become one of the performing arts. 
Art galleries are places where you go in search of a certain kind of kinky experience. 
Today's art gallery is a cross between a church and a disco. It is somewhere for people to 
go in search of frisson. To be moved. Shifted Taken out of their usual context It is where 
the jaded urban imagination goes for its after-hours fun. It encourages what Hans 
Sedlmayer called 'the creative act of viewing'. Unless you accept thai art of the Jeff Koons 
kind is as much the product of the spectator's imagination as the artist's you will iwer 
understand most of what is being produced at the cow-catcher end of art today. 
Koons and Co. are actually addressing a significant late 20th century problem with 
which you, as a follower of Morris, will already be familiar: How do you enfranchise the 
urban worker's after-hours imagination? What do you give that imagination to keep it 
healthy, wet-nosed and happy now that the worker no longer has control over his own 
produce and no longer has access to the fruits of his own labour? How can a modem city 
mind have an imaginative life without running off and becoming another wobbly Welsh 
potter? 
It is important to accept that this modern city life, archetypically in New York, is all 
the things we fear - and will continue to be those things. Art must face up to the fact that its 
main task at the moment is actually a rather humble one - to supply the frustrated city 
dweller with morsels of spirituality."142 
I have read elsewhere that in the last few years attendances of New York and 
London exhibitions have broken all records. Some shows have had audiences of over 1 
million visitors, extraordinary by any accounts. It would indeed seem that there is a new 
audience in need of some kind of spiritual experience. 
But there is a danger too in this. Because of toothpaste we have become a 
generation of the new. Newness is often seen as a mark of status - the fact that something 
is new is marketed as a guarantee of its value and quality. But this is only marketing and 
most of these products have no value at all, except monetary. Only this week there was 
an article in the newspaper about a leading toothpaste company having to change its 
saturation advertising strategy in Hungary as the Public Health Department had 
announced that the ingredient on which the company had been plugging its toothpaste is 
actually harmful to teeth and especially to children's teeth, to which the marketing 
campaign was specifically targeted. (Throw out the Blend-a-med!). So this concept of 
'new' as a positive value judgement is a lie. It is a lie that science also sustains. New 
scientific theories are always seen as an advance. The fact that they may be retrogressive 
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to our understanding of the world, is inconceivable. I suspect that they are circular - that 
we, like time, go round in circles and that science goes round in circles, just as concerns 
in art certainly do. 
Newness has had a profound affect in the art world and powerful art dealers have 
seized the chance to make money out of every new fad which they have chosen to 
promote. Art movements have replaced each other at an extraordinary rate in this 
century, and particularly since the 60's. Here too newness has often been mistaken as a 
stamp of quality - the fact that an artist who is doing something that has never been done 
before is enough to gain his work maximum media and art world coverage and high 
prices in the galleries. The work may literally be rubbish, having monetary, but no 
aesthetic value. Videos and photos of people throwing twigs into water must belong to 
this category. 
I have run the risk of labelling myself as an arch conservative. I have no wish to 
say that what is new is bad and what is old is good, but merely to point out that the fact 
of something being new (or indeed old) does not confer any value on it at all. I have 
written with admiration of Tony Cragg's sculpture, which is certainly 'new'. But it is 
not only new, but is, in its way, of an extremely high standard. Thankfully there is much 
new work which is thus. Sadly, although not surprisingly, tbere is much that has been 
promoted recently, which is not. 
Similarly 'oldness' does not confer real value on an object, other than perhaps 
monetary value, and our museums have bccome store-rooms for much junk which has 
value only as cheap entertainment. Our obsession with the 'old' and the 'new' are 
merely symptomatic of our insecurity in a monopoly capitalist world whose values are 
entirely antagonistic to the idea of the community and a meaningful relationship to each 
other and to our environment. Moral and spiritual value have been replaced by 
monetary value. We perhaps visit museums, just as art galleries, in an attempt to placate 
our sense of the loss of order and loss of our sense of place in a meaningful society and 
in the world. 
The loss of moral and spir i tual value is, I think, synonymous with the decline of the 
church as a powerful force in o u r lives. It is, therefore , a loss of God. As a result our 
society has become obsessed wi th the material . I now wish to consider two types of 
material ism. The first is this obsession with mater ia ! gain, to which I have alluded above. 
The second is an obsession with finding a material is t basis for the world, and for our 
experience of it. Science is no longer a study tha t is paral le l to religious belief in our 
world view, but it now a t tempts to explain away religion and our need for it, by locating 
all experience in material subst ra tes . W e have seen tha t science is unable to distinguish 
the physiological difference be tween different emotions, bu t its ability to measure what 
happens physiologically when we experience emotion is an illustration of its obsession 
with the material . 
Given this new, Godless, wor ld view, we have, undoubtedly caused by feelings of 
incompleteness, established subst i tutes for religion. Symptomatic of this need is the 
almost idolic worship of cer ta in pop stars by young people. A ra ther weak form of such a 
substi tute might be par ty politics, fo r each political p a r t y tr ies to lay down a set of 
ideological premises with which to o rde r society and o u r position in it. But whilst 
political part ies may take a s tance about religion and the spiritual, it is, unless the pa r ty 
is tied to a par t icular religion, normal ly a stance of tolerance, and even when the pa r ty is 
of an ostensibly religious na tu re , such as the Chr is t ian Democrats , then the Christianity 
par t is a minor aspect beside the temporal power which the par ty advocates. 
A more profound religious substi tute is that of psychology. Psychology purpor t s to 
explain the inexplicable pa r t s of life - emotion, instinct, self awareness - those things 
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which science has difficulty in, ultimately, basing in the material. Interestingly enough, 
psychologists seem to regard their theories as being based in the material, too. Bui I 
think that psychological theory is characteristically speculative, for, although it is based 
on observation of behaviour, we shall never establish a series of chcmical processes 
which explain our mental relationship with, say, our mother. 
Jung's theory does not replace Freud's and the theory of, say, Melanie Klein 
replaces neither Freud, nor Jung. That is to say that developments in psychological 
theory are not in any way related to advances towards some kind of truth, but are 
merely other plausible theories to explain the workings of the non-rational mind. So 
psychological theory is divided into different schools of thought and thus require belief 
as a basis for school membership. They are in this sense exactly like religions, and the 
differing schools of psychology are like the different religious schools, say the difference 
between Catholic, Church of England, Methodist, etc., or, more radically, between 
Christianity and Buddhism. Ones subscription to a particular school of psychology, or to 
a particular religion, depends on belief. 
Psychology tries to analyse those experiences which are not of the intellect, in an 
intellectual way. What this means is that, because of our knowledge of psychology, it is 
difficult to have a genuine experience of a non-intellectual kind, as this experience is 
tarnished by an intellectual attitude towards such experience. The tenets of science and 
psychology together, and our obsession with the intellectual, make such pure un-
intellectual response more and more difficult, and what we consider to be a pure un-
intellectual response is, often, only a bastardised form of it. 
This is why the visual arts and music are so Important. They are. despite the 
intellectual attempts to destroy them in the modern period, the last bastions of pure 
gratifying response, which is not tainted by the intellect. They alone have the ability to 
encode that which allows that experience of 'being at one' with the world, through the 
empathetic visual, or aural, response, which is essential to healthy existence. Those 
practising within these arts must not be allowed to forget this heavy burden. 
When the tenets of psychology are applied to the analysis of the visual arts we get 
into problems. Psychology may suggest interesting ways to approach the intellectual 
evaluation of a sculpture, but the real problems arise if we see the sculpture as encoding 
actual psychological states which govern our reaction to them. I should like to explain 
this by reference to Peter Fuller's essay on the Venus de Milo.143 There are aspects of 
this essay which are quite breathtaking and, in particular, this may be said of the 
research that has gone into his version of the discovery of the work and its bringing to 
Paris, the subsequent reactions to it, and the many attempts to suggest how it may, in its 
original state, have looked. It is the conclusions which Fuller makes about the work, 
which I find to be, frankly, silly. 
Now it would take too much space to go through all the arguments that Fuller puts 
forward in his essay, so I must, here, just summarise some of the pertinent points. 
Basically he discusses the difference between the whole figure as it once was, and the 
fragment that it now is. He discusses the 'timeiessness' of the work Finally, with the 
help of Kleinian psychology, he suggests what the work means. These three aspects of his 
essay, I should like to discuss now. 
In the 19th Century numerous attempts were made to 'complete' the statue, 
through description, drawings and models of how the work may once have looked. 
Fuller goes into considerable detail of these restorations. He claims that; 
"Almost certainly a characteristic of the original statue was its sense of wholeness; the 
dominating feature of the surviving part is that of fragmentation."144 
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He suggests that a significant shift in attitude occurred between the Greek period, the 
finding of the work, and the modern period; 
"They, as it were saw' themselves in the broken Venus, but as the century progressed, so did 
the tendency to relate io her as if she were an intact, ideal, and unsurpassable whole."145 
So Fuller is arguing that the loss of the original arms, and, perhaps, other elements, has 
meant that we are not now able to view the work from its original narrative point of 
view, as the elements in the work which were narrative have simply disappeared. He 
suggests that it has, as a result become less timebound and it is, as It is now, able to carry 
a great many different meanings. He introduces Kieinian psychology, whose footstone is 
the idea of the external object and its relation to the internal object. He argues that the 
sculpture, in its damaged state, requires that we complete it internally. He claims that 
the ultimate meaning of the work is that as a representation of the Mother. I have 
problems with all aspects of his thesis. 
Fuller suggests that the loss of the narrative specifics of the work have lead us to 
read the work in a different way from the Greeks. The Greeks loathed incompleteness 
and fragmentation. We have learnt to view the work, as it is now, as constituting a 
whole. Up to this point I agree. He goes on to argue that we now see only a reduced 
form, but that we can, today, respond to this in a different way; 
"Earlier I described how the disappearance of the arms further released the torso 
from that specific signifying system within which it was originally produced; but now we 
are also in a position to explain the apparent aesthetic superiority of the present mutilated 
version over its original, It seems to me that the totality of injuries which the statue 
suffered amounted to a relatively drastic change within the signifier itself: the statue now 
becomes not only the representation of a woman, or an idealised' woman, i.e. a goddess of 
carnal love, but also a vivid externalisation of one of the commonest 'internal objects:'146 
Now this 'internal object' is none other than the 'internal mother'. I cannot see how-
Fuller can claim that the figure is both a representation of the 'goddess of carnal love' 
and the 'eternal mother' at the same time, for the two things essentially negate each 
other, unless he wishes us to believe in some kind of unhealthy sexual attitude towards 
our mothers. I think the problem in the meaning of the sculpture goes even deeper than 
this. Fuller also describes the sculpture thus; 
"The sculptor of the Venus rendered an expressive representation of the body of a 
beautiful, mature, maternal woman - about 30 years old - through the way in which he 
worked his marble."147 
I simply disagree with Fuller,s reading of the work. I am sure that his intellectual 
programme has prevented him from, quite literally, seeing what is before him. I can see 
nothing in the work vaguely suggestive of motherhood and I would suggest the model's 
age to be rather younger. Where Fuller sees 'mother' I only see a sexually attractive 
young girl. 
Another of Fuller's problems with the meaning, and I am surprised that he did not 
pick up on it himself, is with the title of the work. 'Venus' is a Nineteenth Century title, 
given to the work when it was rediscovered. There is nothing in the work itself which 
denotes it as such, it may well rather represent a young girl which the sculptor 
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particularly admired. Fuller has been carried away in bis supposed reading of the work 
by an irrelevant title and his obsession with psychoanalysis, neither of which helps us to 
understand the work and rather blinds us, certainly so in Fuller's case, to what is extant 
in the sculpture. 
What is significant about the loss of the arms is that it illustrates a shift in thinking. 
In the Greek period, and in the Renaissance too, for that matter, the sculpture, as it is 
now, would have had little value because of its incompleteness. For the prevalent 
sculptural language of those periods was one which was essentially narrative, and the 
Venus, as she is now, has no narrative content. What we have learnt is to see sculpture 
much more as an object in the sense described by William Tucker in his, 'The Language 
of Sculpture'.148 That is to say that we can react to this torso as an aesthetic holistic 
form rather than to some literary notion. Sculpture today has become less concerncd 
with literary meaning and is more concentrated in the visual. In other words, today a 
sculpture would not depict a god or goddess, as in the Greek or Renaissance periods, but 
actually embodv 'god-ness' and act as a substitute for it. 
Fuller goes much further in his psychoanalytical reading of the Venus; 
"It might be said that the Venus, in its mutilated state, evokes in its receptive viewers the 
affects attaching to their most primitive phantasies about savaging the mother's body, and 
the consequent reparative process; whereas the Slave n merely titillates by evoking (within 
a format of cultural rationalisations) those perverse se:cual images which are thermelves 
characteristic defences against working through that which gives rise to them." * 
Perhaps the problem is that I am simply not a receptive viewer, and I hope never to be 
so if it involves rue in such spurious evaluations. Fuller even claims that the fight which 
was supposed to have taken place to capture the Venus has psychological overtones; 
"And now, I hope, you will be able to see why I dwelt so long and in such detail on 
two components in the early history of the resurrected Venus: the fight on the beach, and 
the reparation or reconstruction of the figure. The fight (or the rumoured fight for if it was 
only imagined, or greatly exaggerated, then my point would be strengthened rather than 
weakened) came to symbolise the phantasy of attack on the mother's body, or rather on the 
internal representation of that body. The Venus was dragged from the earth, a 'timeless' 
goddess, like some imago salvaged from the unconscious: she was, it seems, subjected to 
gross ill-treatment, and mishandling, perhaps to actual mutilation. But she survived. And 
behind all those attempts to lie about what had happened, to cover it up, perhaps even to 
elaborate it, behind all those rumours about which bits had been broken off by whom, lay 
those powerful unconscious phantasies concerning the mother's body so vividly described 
by the Kleinian analysts."15 
I think you will now see why I advocate a direct, visual, non-verbal, response to 
sculpture. Had Fuller known nothing of the finding of, and subsequent history of, the 
Venus, and had he not known through its, relatively, recently applied title that it is a 
Venus, he would have, I suspect, never dreamt of this fantastic, (or phantastic) 
construction of meaning. Wonderful reading though his essay may be, not one word of 
his analysis of the sculpture's meaning has foundation in the sculpture itself. 
I have come a long way from the toothpaste in a short space of time, but I hope I 
have illustrated why the direct visual response to art is so important, not only as an 
" 'The Greek Slave' by Hiram Powers. 
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alternative to intellectual readings of art, but as a means of restoring real value into a 
valueless society. 
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Chapter 7 True Brit 
"As scientific understanding has grown, so our world has become dehumanized. Man feels 
himself isolated in the cosmos, because he is no longer involved in nature and has lost his 
emotional "unconscious identity" with natural phenomena. These have slowly lost their 
symbolic implications. Thunder is no longer the voice of an angry god, nor is lightning his 
avenging missile. No river contains a spirit, no tree is the life principle of a man, no snake 
the embodiment of wisdom, no mountain cave the home of a great demon. No voices now 
speak to man from stones, plants, and animals, nor does he speak to them beliei'ing they 
can hear. His contact with nature has gone, and with it has gone the profound emotional 
energy that this symbolic connection supplied," 151 
I re-read ail this material yesterday and found that something was missing. Before 
I went to sleep I was worrying the problem over in my mind and in the night I dreamt 
about the Queen of England who was paying a visit and was rather ill. She asked for my 
arm on several occasions to help her up and down steps and after I escorted her down to 
her quarters in the basement I found many drops of thick pink blood on the stairs. 
When I awoke I realised what was missing. For a language of sculpture to have 
any real meaning it must be related to the world outside of itself. The sculptor must have 
a dynamic relationship to the world and it is this which feeds him and his work. We must 
look again at the idea of environment which, I have so far argued, affects the way that a 
sculpture is seen, affccts the way in which we learn to use our biological systems, and 
possibly has a genetic cffcct, too. 
I have, for the last eleven years, been living in central Europe. I am frequently 
asked why I left England and came here, and also what the difference is between 
England and Hungary, where I now live. I tend to give some pat answers to these 
questions, but there is a part of the reason which I have rarely spoken of, and it has a 
bearing on my present subject. 
Leaving England brought into sharp focus what England means for me. I do not 
mean this in a nostalgic way - I do not miss England - but there are certain aspects of my 
Englishness which are still a dynamic force in my world view. 
From the moment when we are born we enter into a dynamic relationship with our 
environment - that is to say, that it is a relationship of give and take. We learn mostly 
from our parents and immediate family at first, and then from our play-mates. When we 
begin to enter establishments of education, either at kindergarten level, or in infants 
school, we start to learn of our context in a town, region, country, world and, ultimately, 
the universe. We are instilled with a sense of place through an understanding of history, 
geography and the natural sciences, and we are also instilled with values. 
The values which I was taught in England were, basically, those of the Anglican 
Church and those of the English Nation. Wre were taught that the British Empire was 
something great that it had put the 'great' in Great Britain, and that killing a few-
natives here or there was not essentially wrong, even if a bit unfortunate, for through 
such slaughter we had become powerful and ruled the world. Even whilst I was learning 
such stuff I had my doubts, for my sense of the merakwas-obvieusly-ffiueb stronger,-I— 
could only see the idea of the British Empire and, indeed, the nation, to be based in the 
idea of gain - both in-^financial-sense-and-in^he senseof gaining-power, The Empire's-
'divide and rule' policy, which favoured a minority religious group in the occupied 
created the problems which we now have in Ireland today and those which caused havoc 
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in India earlier in the century and which still have their repercussions today. This is to 
say nothing of the wars of the Crusades, fought in God's name against the 'Infidels'. 
So I am unable to be proud to be British. Here I should say, English, for Wales and 
Scotland are occupied countries, as well as Ireland. However embarrassed I may be by 
what my countrymen have done in the world in the past, I am not, however, able to 
disown mv Englishness, and have no desire to do so. w c? 7 
One's sense of one's own country is refined in a long absence from it, and through 
comparison to that new country in which one lives. So whilst there is much that I dislike 
about England for its political historical - and here I might add that the nihilistic, 
divisive, heavy hand of Thatcher's rule were amongst the reasons that I left - there is 
much of England that is so much 'in my blood' (although not my genes, it would appear), 
that it forms a major part of my world view. 
Margaret Thatcher used all the means of power at her disposal to consolidate her 
power. When there was opposition she swept it away, quite literally, by force, as in the 
case of the miner's strike, or by subterfuge. When faccd with the difficult situation 
where ail five Metropolitan Councils were in the hands of the socialists she simply 
abolished the councils. Her system of rate-capping was devised to divide local councils. 
Each council was given a fixed budget from central government funds with which it had 
to work in addition to any own income that it had. Those councils who cut services and 
saved money then got extra money, whilst those who improved services subsequently got 
less money. In other words, Thatcher devised a system whereby all Conserv ative 
councils who behaved in line with central government thinking, received extra money, 
and all those Socialist councils, who did not, were left virtually bankrupt. The arguments 
that Thatcher regularly used in the media to back up her policies were the same -
sometimes even word for word - as those put forward by the 19th Century factory 
owners to the government inspectors in defence of the appalling working conditions 
which they subjected their workers to - adults and children alike. Margaret Thatcher 
epitomised, for me, much that is evil in humanity. Her world was megalomaniac and it 
left no room for people in a community sense. She made belief in the future difficult, and 
'hope', impossible. For an artist, her kind of world is untenable. 
I have dwelt, perhaps rather too long, on the things which I have learnt to evaluate 
as wrong in the immediate environment of my birthiand. These too are important, for 
what we perceive as wrong defines, in opposition, that which we see as right. 
Interestingly, almost all those things of value, which, for me, make up that concept 
of Englishness to which I subscribe, are cultural, in one sense or the other. My culture is 
that of Chaucer, Shakespeare, Fielding and Dickens, of Purcell and of English folk song, 
of Constable and Turner, and of Ben Nicholson and Henry Moore. I have directly 
chosen a few names out of the many, who would seem to have a distinct Englishness 
about them. But these are examples of what may be seen to be English Culture and what 
I should like to look at is 'Englishness' itself. 
I have already mentioned Hosldn's 'The Making of the English Landscape'.152 
When I first came across this book many years ago it taught me that the remains of our 
history are visible to an extraordinary extent in our English landscape and it helped to 
focus my attention on the landscape itself as a kind of cultural artefact. What England 
has given to me more than anything is a love - no, it is more than love - of the sea and the 
land itself, although I should say that my Englishness must be extended here to include 
the mountains of North Wales and the Scottish Hebrides, where I fulfilled so much time. 
This is a landscape primarily of the visual, but also of interest as a document of man's 
interaction with the landscape over thousands of years. One does not have to travel 
more than a few miles out of suburban sprawl before one sees a stone circle, standing 
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stone, or some mediaeval field patterns. The road one is travelling on may well he 
Roman, and the 'nature' one sees, except in one or two very remote places in the British 
isles, man-made. 
Here, in Hungary, light and colour are different from that which we find in 
England. There, are those wonderfully dramatic grey skies, the wind, those deep, deep 
greens, which Constable saw so well. There is the smell of sea brine, the cry of the 
seagull and the violent sea-storms. Here there is a burning sunlight that washes out 
colour and softens forms and edges. In England objects seem dark and heavy, in 
Hungary light and dissolved. Here I prefer to rise at dawn and work in daylight. In 
England I enjoyed the electric light of late night working. 
As well as the landscape and the sea I own those actual artefacts of man - the stone 
circles and burial chambers, the figures and mazes cut into the turf of the chalk hills, the 
Roman towns of Chester and Bath, the great Romanesque and Gothic cathedrals and the 
village churches from all ages, to name but a few of my possessions. They are all signs of 
man trying to create a meaningful and dynamic relationship with his environment. 
That I miss certain football grounds and pubs is in a sense nostalgic, but I suspect 
that what I really miss in them is the community that went with them. I certainly miss 
the British Museum, that store-house of plundered treasure from around the world. It, 
perhaps more than anything, gave me a sense of the relationship of the cultural artefacts 
of my own environment, to that of the larger world. I hope that I have brought with me 
my English sense of humour. 
So what does Hungary mean to me. How do I react to my new environment. I must 
say that I never realised quite how English I am until I came to live here. It is much 
more than a question of learning a new language. Customs are different, but once 
accepted can be enjoyed, firstly for their novelty, and later, because the customs are 
related to time - that is to say that they occur annually at the same time each year - they 
give a sense of belonging to a community and order. This is particularly evident in the 
customs of the village community in which I live. 
Then there is the question of historical and cultural background. I can learn about 
Hungarian history, but I can never feel it. I have no emotional reaction to it, and if I do 
it must be of a sentimental nature. It is not my history. The same is true of the culture. 
At a simple level I was brought up on different nursery rhymes and children's songs and 
I am horrified at the racism in a song that my daughter sings in which a Turkish child 
cuts the leg of a stork, which is healed, in the next line of the song, by a Hungarian child. 
The origin obviously goes back to the Turkish occupation of Hungary, but even so. It 
certainly does not seem the sort of song which will help international peace and 
understanding. Of course English children have similar songs, and worse too. This is an 
example of how we subtly learn the values of our nation. 
On a higher level I can enjoy the cultural artefacts of Hungary, in the same way as 
I can enjoy those of the Japanese or Yoruba. There are, inevitably, things which may be 
encoded in them that are to do with their specific time and place, which I shall probably 
miss, not having grown up with their presence. I cannot feel them to be mine in quite the 
same way, except for those which move me profoundly. As my experience of these is at a 
purely visual and sensual level, my profound experience of them is personal and I can 
possess them. 
Until recently I have been unable to enjoy the landscape in the same way. It is fine 
and I can enjoy seeing it, but it is only now that I can say that I can possess it, but only 
one small part of it. Let me explain. My wife and I recently bought a run-down vineyard 
on the hill above our village. It has a small house on it and the sloping grounds look 
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across the valley to the Black Hill, which looms above it. On this piece of land I have 
those deep feelings of belonging which I also experience so often in Britain. This has 
nothing to do with ownership - I had the feeling the first time I was there, before we 
bought it, and indeed that it why we acquired it. But with this one small exception, this 
landscape is not mine. 
Recently, I was asked about these matters by a journalist who was writing 
something about me for some magazine or other. He asked that, if the landscape of the 
Welsh mountains, where my mother lives, is so personal and important to me then why 
do I choose to live here, where I do not have such a dynamic relationship to the 
landscape. My answer was rather simple. I said that I would be unable to work in Wales. 
It is so overwhelming that I would merely walk and look and enjoy the environment. To 
make sculpture I need a more neutral environment, which is not so distracting, whether 
that is in Kings Cross, London, where I had my last studio, or Palkonya, the Hungarian 
village in which I have my current studio. 
In fact for the artist it is the studio which is the first environment In some ways it 
works in a self contained way. The artists must go out of it at times to bring new 
experience into it, to freshen it up, to develop it, and it is on this that the relationship 
between the sculptor and the world, and implied in this, the sculpture and the world 
outside of it feeds. I do not need to be in Wales, or in England, for Wales and England to 
constitute a very real part of my world view. Similarly I do not need to sec a particular 
sculpture in the British Museum which moved me, to remember my experience of it. 
Popper's World 3 is there if I need to take from it. What I do need, though, is a sense of 
belonging in a dynamic community which is, I suspect, what Palkonya means to me. 
[ hope that the reason for this rather personal aside will become apparent when I 
look at the subject of self-expression shortly. 
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Part 4 Towards a Conclusion 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
I have wandered far from my original analysis of the physical aspects of the 
language of sculpture. I have tried to show that the way in which we are able to respond 
to, and evaluate, sculpture is dependant on our biological conditioning and our 
individual and collective world view, based, as it is in accrued experience of the world 
and learnt knowledge. I have also tried to focus attention on the problems that my 
profession faces in contemporary society and how, despite its beleaguered position, it is, 
perhaps, of more importance than at any other time in man's history, as a potential 
healer of society's self-inflicted wounds. It remains to weave together the many threads 
that I have taken up and to offer a notion of sculpture's role in the future. 
I shall begin by returning to the three Worlds of Karl Popper. To recap. Popper 
has split the various capacities of human experience into three categories, or Worlds as 
he calls them. World One is the world of physical objects and states and he sub-divides 
this into three categories - firstly the inorganic part of the physical world which includes 
the matter and energy of the cosmos, secondly the biological which includes the physical 
structure of human beings and its action, and thirdly the material substrates of 
creativity; of tools; of machines; of books; of works of art and of music. World Two is 
the world of conscious states which includes our subjective knowledge and our 
experience of perception; thinking; emotions; dispositional intentions; memories; dreams 
and creative imagination. The Third World is that of knowledge in its objective state 
and here he lists our philosophical, theological, scicntific, historical, literary, artistic and 
technological knowledge. He also puts in the Third World our theoretical systems - those 
of scientific problems and criiical arguments. 
I have so far spoken of how the structure of the brain and eye determine in 
themselves the way in which we see, and in our case see sculpture. These systems may be 
regarded as part of the material substrates of works of art. They, and our resultant 
empathetic capacity belong to World One, although in practice our empathetic capacity 
is often tempered with our subjective knowledge and our experience of perception of 
World Two - the experience gained by practising our use of these systems. Our later 
analysis of what we have seen aspires to the objectivity of World Three, but is inevitably 
tempered by our subjectivity of World Two. 
I have attempted to make a clear distinction here between that which is physically 
given, i.e. the substrates of World One and that which is learnt, which belongs to Worlds 
Two and Three. At the moment of birth the 'equipment' of World One is present, whilst 
the knowledge of World Three is totally absent The subjective experiences of World 
Two have previously begun, albeit at a minimal level, and begin proper from the 
moment of birth. (The studies of psychologists in particular suggest that we have 
memories of our time in the mother's womb, even though these are at a subliminal level). 
Thus the material substrates of works of art and human creativity are given at birth. 
The practised use of these substrates creates memories of previous usage and thus we 
can develop our creative imagination, train the finesses of the functioning of these 
systems. We can thus enrich subjectively our creative imagination. 
World Three presents a different case and we must understand this objective 
knowledge to be of the kind that is not acquired through direct experience, but from 
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books, etc. Thus our knowledge of art history essentially belongs to World Three, whilst 
art appreciation is of Worlds One and Two. 
The brain must be understood to be an organ and part of our central nervous 
system, in the same way as our eye is part of our optic system. It is a physical given. The 
concept of 'mind' must be understood to be the things which we do with this given 
equipment. The brain belongs to Popper's World 1. What we do with would seem to be 
of World 2. World 2 is the world of the mind. 
This would be a convenient distinction to understand the difference between brain 
and mind, but it is, I fear, not so simple a matter. Popper puts not only the structure of 
living beings in World 1, but also their actions. Here lies the difficulty. Thought, 
emotion, memory are essentially actions of the brain structure and should then belong to 
World 1. But there is a difference, minute though it may be. 
When we see a sculpture we, firstly, use those faculties which are situated in the 
right side of our brain. These faculties are a function of the system itself. Fear is not a 
conscious act, but what we call instinctive. It is a function of our biological system and 
belongs to World 1. So too with the sculpture. Our appreciation of it as a holistic gestalt 
is of World 1. It is only when our perception and emotion become conscious, that they 
enter World 2. What I have chosen to call our 'empathetic capacity' is a function of our 
biological system and it belongs to World 1. The sculptor working in his studio is largely 
operating within World 1. When self-consciousness interferes with the flow of the work, 
this is World 2 experience. Our ability to have aesthetic experiences is solely of World 1. 
As Baumgartner put it, 
"The functional organization of the visual system leads to a representation of the 
surround in a dynamic pattern of neuronal activity. It constructs for us a reality which fits 
our interactions with the physical world. What we prefer as beautiful or pleasing may be a 
visual input which corresponds optimally to the processing rules of the system. The rules 
are given. However, within the wealth of visual experiences due to learning within a frame 
of conventions, the preference of acceptance can be changed "154 
I should now like to make a distinction between the Worlds of the sculptural 
language. As Popper did in classifying all human experience I choose three worlds, but 
these should in no way be seen as alternatives to Popper. They should be regarded as an 
appendage to Popper and of value only in regard to the language of sculpture, whose 
workings they will, I hope, help to clarify. 
World A is a physical world determined by our biological systems and their 
functions. The capacities of our right brain - in particular our ability to recognise gestalt 
images - are founded here. What I have chosen to call our empathetic capacity is also 
founded here. The capacities of World A are genetically, biologically, given. Here one 
must also classify all those functions of our mind which are not tempered by learning. 
These must include some of our instinctive behaviour and some of our emotional 
response. 
World B is a world of two parts. Part 1 is also a physical world, but one which is 
tempered by learning. As children we do not see in three dimensions. We do not walk, 
and have little control of our movements and our bodily functions are rather 
uncoordinated. We must learn to move in space in the world. Coupled with this learning 
is an ever increasing self-awareness of our own body as a physical entity in the world. As 
we learn to walk and move physically in the environment we also learn those notions of 
size and scale which I discussed in the first chapter. Much of our understanding of 
sculpture is the intuitive empathy between the sculpture and our self-awareness of our 
own physical existence. We must add here those parts of our instinctive behaviour and 
emotional response which are tempered by learnt experience. Part 2 of World B is the 
world of dreaming and our subconscious. In other words World B contains those 
faculties over which our mind does not exercise rational control. 
World C is the world of the mind that is intellect. It is the conscious part of us. It 
contains such capacities as rational thinking, self-analysis. The actual patterns of our 
logical thinking almost certainly reflect the biological patterns with which our brain 
system works but these must have language in order to allow thinking and logical 
reasoning. We can only think and reason in language. Worlds A and B are non-verbal 
and visual. World C is the world of language and linguistically based mind functions. 
What I wish to distinguish in this classification is the difference between the 
rational functions of our brain, which rely on language, those functions which are 
without language, but which are developed through experience and those functions 
which are completely determined in the patterns of the biological system itself, which 
are genetically given and untainted by learning and language. On this basis our 
appreciation of sculpture is at three levels -1 ) the primal biological reaction in which 
our systems recognise those forms and patterns which are inherent in their own mode of 
functioning, 2) a non-linguistic reaction based in a subliminal comparison to our own 
physical experience of being in the world. 3) rational, logical evaluation of the seen 
sculpture. 
I wonder if it is not the thalamus which 'decides' which kind of response to invoke 
as it switches the in-coming visual information to the various area of the brain. 
I have argued that we are able to evaluate sculpture in the three ways mentioned 
above. I have tried to show through the workings of eye and brain how the first kind of 
evaluation is possible. The third, rational kind of evaluation I have tried to illustrate in 
the chapters on 'The Sculptor's Practice', 'Looking at Sculpture' and, particularly, 
through a look at the work of Tony Cragg. I have yet to deal with the complicated way 
in which a sculpture may encode information which allows us to make subliminal 
comparisons with our experience of being in the world. 
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Chapter 2 Reading the Image 
"Alias! and konne ye been agast of swevenys? 
Nothyng, God woot, but vanitee in sweven is. 
Swevenes engendren of replecciouns, 
And ofte of fume and complecciouns, 
When humours been to habundant in a wight. 
Certes this dreem, which ye han met to-nyght, 
Cometh of the greete superfluytee 
Of youre rede colera, pardee, 
Which causeth folk to dreden in hir dremes 
Of arwes, and of fyr with rede lemes, 
Of rede beestes, that they wol hem byte, 
Of contek, and of whelpes, grete and lyte; 
Right as the humour of malencolie 
Causeth ful many a man in sleep to crie 
For feere of blake beres, or boles blake, 
Or elles blake develes wol him take. 
Of othere humours koude I telle also 
That werken many a man in sleep ful wo; 
But I wol passe as lightly as I katu "1SS 
The astute reader will no doubt have noticed that I have argued for two basic 
reactions to sculpture, one which is conscious and one which is subconscious. I have 
made an equation of these two basic reactions with the two different hemispheres of the 
human brain. 
The intellectual, conscious evaluation, whose origin is in the left side of the brain is 
fairly straightforward. If we make a linguistic description of the sculpture in question -
if we analyse its parts and relationships consciously - that is to say, if we look at how the 
sculpture is configured to convey meaning, then we are using our intellectual responses. 
If we 'read' the sculpture in a literary way - as a sculpture illustrating some event - this 
too is at an intellectual level. We may also react to the sculpture by comparing it to other 
works of the same artists, or place it into the context of works by other sculptors. Now 
all this activity is on an intellectual level whose responses are based in verbal language. 
It is when we come to the second kind of response - the subconscious reaction - that 
matters become decidedly more complicated. It is on this that I should now like to 
concentrate. 
The subconscious reaction is based in our physical response, which I mentioned 
first when dealing with the physical aspects of the language of sculpture in Part 1. The 
importance of this physical reaction is rarely recognised by writers on sculpture. Our 
learnt experience of moving amongst objects in the world, our spatial experience, our 
experience of the material of things, our intuitive response to scale and, even, our sense 
of fear of the unknown all have a major part to play in our evaluation of sculpture. We 
make subconscious equations between these accrued experiences of the world and the 
forms of the sculpture in front of us. If we do react subconsciously to the sculpture, if we 
are affected psychologically by form, then the origin of these capacities is undoubtedly 
complexly intermeshed with our physical experience of the sculpture being an analogy 
for our own physical experience of being in the world. In other words we are capable of 
empathising with the forms of the sculpture, without any intellectual interference and 
this, I have argued, is why someone with no experience of looking at sculpture, may, on 
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occasion, be profoundly moved by it. But the big question concerns the nature of this 
subconscious evaluation. What are those 'triggers' encoded within the sculpture which 
allow us to react to it in a subconscious way, and how does our subconscious work in a 
physiological sense. 
"The artist is, as it were, not so free in his creative work as he may think he is. If his work is 
performed in a more or less unconscious way, it is controlled by laws of nature that, on the 
deepest level, correspond to the laws of the psyche and vice versa."156 
I think it is fair to say that most writers, when discussing how we understand art, 
use the idea of the symbol and, essentially tied to it, the tenets of psychology. I have tried 
to show the problems which Fuller ran into in using psychoanalytic theory as a basis for 
appreciation of art, when he constructed meanings for sculptures which were simply not 
encoded in them. In other words he was guilty of projecting his own intellectual readings 
into a symbolism which simply did not exist in the work. But having pointed out this 
danger, there can be no doubt that psychology and the symbol have a role in our 
capacity to subconsciously evaluate that which is encoded in the sculpture. 
I must say here that I cannot help thinking that the idea of the symbol has been 
postured in order to conveniently explain something which is enormously complicated. 
Basically we use the word symbol when we speak of something that is one thing, but 
alludes to, or is representational of, something else. 
It is usual to make a distinction between 'sign' and 'symbol'. A sign is something 
like a traffic sign which tells us at what speed we may drive, or which potential hazards 
we must be alert to at certain points on the road. We learn to equate this sign with a 
particular message, but the sign itself has no inherent qualities. It is a pictogram which 
we learn to react to in a certain way. A symbol, on the other hand, is much more than 
this. Its meaning is not of the same kind. It, like the sign, may be universally understood, 
but it also has its own inherent qualities and a complex meaning which is not limited to 
one specific message. 
In our European society the cross of Christ is undoubtedly the most potent symbol. 
It does not give a specific instruction to us, like the traffic sign, but invokes a response in 
us that is at once collective and individual. Collectively it reminds us of the death of 
Christ on the cross, but we have, also, a reaction to it that is very personal, and this may 
include indifference. That is to say that, even if we no longer find any personal 
gratification in contemplating the cross of Christ, we still, even in our indifference, react 
to it as a symbol and not, as a sign. This reaction, which is both collective and personal is 
essential to the idea of the symbol. 
One of the problems I have with the idea of the symbol is that it has become a 
debased word. It is used much too freely and in all sorts of contexts. I think it to be a 
much more serious word than such use should warrant. I choose two random examples, 
from the first two books that come to hand: 
"Le jeu de balle etaitpratique avant la Conquete dans toute I'aire mesoamericaine, du 
Mexique au Costa Rica, ainsi qu 'aux Antilles. On pense que les joueurs se servaient surtout 
de leurs hanches pour frapper la balle,faite de caoutchouc. Les terrains de jeu etaient 
sacres, la balle symbolisait le soleil et les parties avaient une signification religieuse et 
„ 157 cosmique. 
I must confess to an allergy to such texts. The presumption has been made that 
something over several hundred years old, from a relatively unknown South American 
117 
culture was symbolic and 'with a religious and cosmic significance'. We can not really 
know what the significance of this sport was to the participants and the suggestion of 
symbolic connotations is a projection from our standpoint of today, and rather a 
surprising one seeing the apparent disintegration of any active symbolic language in our 
contemporary society. More of this in a minute. As a ball game is in question, in which 
'the ball symbolises the sun' it does make one wonder where such speculation originates 
from. I suppose that the writer of these words also sees modern football as symbolising 
man's striving for community action and success, endowed through being played on 
sacred ground and involving the kicking of the moon into the net of the great fisherman 
of the night. No! We use the term 'symbol' much too lightly. 
Or try this: 
"The Greek gods were human bodies universalizing the semantic principle of 
existence. They were already symbols and, if you wish, signs."158 
I cannot for the life of me think what Neizvestny wishes to prove with such confusion. I 
hope that I can do better, although I am not so sure. But before I try I should add that I 
have heard many, often but not always young, sculptors who, in talking or writing about 
their work, saying that, "My sculpture symbolises " This is one of the grandest 
delusions, for their work never does symbolise that which they claim it to, and invariably 
symbolises nothing at all. 
1 should like to turn to Wheeler for help. 159Wheeler discusses the painting of the 
'Madonna and Child with Donor' by Piero Delia Francesco in Florence. This is a classic 
example of the sacra conversazione. The donor of the fresco to the chapel in which it is 
found, has had himself painted kneeling before the Virgin Mary and the baby Jesus. For 
the people of Florence it was a demonstration of self-importance by the donor - that he 
should be kneeling in the 'actual' presence of Jesus. Of course this is merely an illusion, 
but even today, after the painting has lost much of its original presence, it is an image 
which has a remarkable degree of believability about it. The trompe l'oueil architecture 
is still convincing and I am inclined to think that in the days before television and 
photographs that the viewers may well have seen this painting as a record of an actual 
event. But this is an aside from my main point. 
Wheeler points out that the upper half of the painting works on a symbolic level. 
The arch, the scallop shell and the egg are all symbols, he would have it; 
"The arch for the Romans had been a primitive effigy of Janus the Divine Sky. Janus 
was an older Jupiter, a sky god, and the Romans used the same word janus for the god as 
they used for the arch. Moreover Janus was the god of beginnings. The scallop shell is an 
ancient symbol of the female sex organ, and the egg has a universal significance as a 
symbol of rebirth and life." 160 
Now, those of us brought up on the tradition of chocolate Easter eggs probably have 
little reaction to the Easter egg as symbol, but rather enjoy its sweet tooth-rotting taste. 
Our capacity to react to symbols has become anaesthetised. I do wonder, too, if the 
Renaissance audience to the Piero Delia Francesco understood the depiction of these 
symbols better. Anyone familiar with the Hieroglyphics of Horropollo will probably, like 
me, be sceptical. Such guide books as these, which illustrate and explain the meanings of 
Christian symbols, are surely evidence that these symbols were not widely recognised as 
such. Contemplation of the egg as a symbol of the renewal of the seasons, life and time, is 
straightforward enough and perhaps widely appreciated. The arch as Janus and the 
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scallop as the female sex organ are perhaps more dubious. They may be intellectually 
understood to be symbolic, but to the few rather than the mass. In this case the scallop 
shell cannot be said to have inherent qualities which invoke symbolic response in the 
mass of people, but only value as a sign which they can learn from a book, much as we 
learn the Highway Code. So tied to the symbol is the problem of its range of 
acceptability - the notion that a symbol may only be a symbol if its symbolic meaning has 
wide acceptance as such. 
But there is another problem which arises here. When I walk through an arch in 
one of the great cathedrals of England it is often a moving experience. I am often 
overwhelmed by its physicality and there may be some subconscious symbolism involved 
in my reaction, but it never leads to contemplation of Janus, or to other symbolic 
meaning which the experience may have. So the question remains; does the symbol work 
subconsciously or consciously. The answer would seem to be that the symbol may invite 
reactions of both kinds. That is to say that a symbol may work on our subconscious and 
our physical reaction to it may remain on this subconscious level, or we may then begin 
to make an intellectual evaluation of this experience and of the meaning of the symbol in 
question. 
I propose that much of what we call symbolism in sculpture is not, strictly 
speaking, symbolic. A cross in a sculpture is firstly a sign and not a symbol. Because it is 
a real thing we read it firstly as it actually is. A cross in a sculpture of a crucified Christ 
is an actual physical cross and invites us to read it, initially, as such. It is through our 
capacity to formulate symbols that we can read it as a substitute for that other Cross of 
Jesus. Is not, then, the actual depicted cross merely a visual simile for the Cross of Jesus. 
Is it not just an illustration of the Cross of Jesus. In this case, as illustration, it may refer 
us intellectually to the idea of the cross as a symbol for something else. This is how a 
symbol works on an intellectual level in sculpture. It is a simile or metaphor which 
triggers quite different associations. Here, the symbol does not work on a subconscious 
level, but an intellectual one and any reaction of a symbolic kind which we may have is 
logical and literary and dependent on our seeing this cross as an illustration of the other 
symbolic cross. 
There are certain literary symbols that I love - Odysseus' encounter with the 
sirens, the fall of Icarus, the adventures of the Celtic hero Cu Chulaind and his all too-
human drunken romp through ancient Ireland, the devilish actions of the trickster Loki 
from Norse mythology and even the tidal bore in D. H. Lawrence's 'The Virgin and the 
Gypsy'.161 These all appeal to me on an intellectual level as literary ideas which 
encapsulate certain ideas about life. I cannot help thinking, then, that symbolism and its 
sphere of action is essentially literary and therefore of words. Sculpture, and probably 
painting too, uses, when working in a narrative way, signs which may refer to literary 
symbols. But sculpture does not always give realised bodily form to the symbol itself. 
Bernini's 'The Ecstasy of St. Theresa' is a wonderful example. It tries to symbolise, but 
fails. It is merely a set of signs, acting as similes for a literary event. The Cycladic figure 
to which I compared it is much nearer to what we may think of as a symbol which works 
on the subconscious. It may be considered to be a symbol of life, of womanhood, or 
something for which we cannot find words. It encapsulates these things, and much more. 
We have turned full circle and come back to what I previously referred to, in Part 
1, as Narrative and Embodiment. Narrative sculpture does not use symbols but 
illustrates something which our intellect may know of as being understood as symbolic. 
That type of sculpture which is 'embodiment' is not literary and we appreciate it at a 
level without language. Such sculpture embodies that which it means. I accept that here 
a symbolic language of the subconscious may assist us in recognising what we physically 
see, as alluding to something spiritual, which we cannot see. Here our subconscious 
reaction relies on our empathetic relationship of the forms, lines and shapes - i.e. the 
formal aspects - of the sculpture, with our accrued experience of our own being in the 
world, and in addition our reaction to the gestalt image. 
So if we must distinguish between symbols which appeal to our intellect and 
symbols which make a more direct appeal to us on a subconscious level, then we are left 
with the same problem with which we began this chapter, that is, the nature of the 
process which occurs when we react subconsciously to a sculpture. The explanation 
would appear to lie in psychology and, of particular use, here, are certain concepts 
forwarded by Carl Jung. 
"Thus a word or an image is symbolic when it implies something more than its 
obvious and immediate meaning. It has a wider "unconscious" aspect that is never 
precisely defined or fully explained. Nor can one hope to define or explain it As the mind 
explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason. 
But this conscious use of symbols is only one aspect of a psychological fact of great 
importance: Man also produces symbols unconsciously and spontaneously, in the form of 
dreams..... 
There are. moreover, unconscious aspects of our perception of reality. The first is the 
fact that even our senses react to real phenomena, sights and sounds, they are somehow 
translated from the realm of reality into that of the mind. Within the mind they become 
psychic events, whose ultimate nature is unknowable....."162 
It would seem that Jung, as I do, believed in two kinds of symbolism. The first is 
the intellectual, conscious, or literary symbol which may awaken our subconscious. The 
second is the reverse, a subconscious symbolic reaction which may, in turn, cause a 
reaction in our consciousness. The first kind I have already dealt with. 
Now, you may recall that I quoted Kukorelli, earlier, who suggested that our 
instincts are genetically instilled in our brain.163 What Jung argues through his theory 
of'archetypes', or 'primordial images', is that each of our instincts has a corresponding 
psychic manifestation; 
"Here I must clarify the relation between instincts and archetypes: what we properly call 
instincts are physiological urges, and are perceived by the senses. But at the same time, 
they also manifest themselves in fantasies and often reveal their presence only by symbolic 
images. These manifestations are what I call archetypes."164 
Furthermore Jung's theory of archetypes has within it a notion of constancy. If each of 
us has the same genetically determined instincts, then we can expect a high degree of 
similarity between the images, or symbols, deriving from these physiologically based 
instincts. He is, thus, able to argue for the notion of a 'collective unconscious', based on 
those psychic reactions which echo these commonly shared instincts. Thus Jung's theory 
of archetypes is still, for me, the most convincing idea put forward by psychology to 
explain this relationship between the human physiological aspects of perception and its 
ensuing mental reaction. I would go so far as to say that such a relationship between our 
physiological conditioning and some corresponding psychic event, is the basis of all the 
various schools of psychological thought, even if some of them do not openly recognise 
this. So when we react to our Cycladic female figure as 'thing' it may well awaken our 
genetically based instincts and, in turn, cause a parallel psychic event of a symbolic 
nature. This, essentially, occurs on a subconscious level. 
It is when Jung, in his other books, goes into details of the nature of specific 
archetypes that I have difficulty. He seems to move further and further away from the 
idea of instinct - that is to say physiologically-based notions. Our instincts are based, I 
have previously suggested in our need for self-preservation, so that our taking milk from 
the mother's breast might be described as an instinctive act. It is when we try to 
construct from this the concept of an archetypal mother that we run into problems, for 
how can we really know the nature of the psychic symbol which our instinct to suckle 
gives rise to. What I am suggesting is that there is a great deal of supposition and 
guesswork involved. I suggest that it is at this point that we find the differing theories of 
the various psychoanalytical schools diverge. I accept that our instincts have a 
corresponding symbolic psychic effect, but I am neither sufficiently brave, nor 
sufficiently interested, to attempt to try and analyse that which is essentially mysterious. 
I quite understand Henry Moore not wishing to read Neumann's analysis of his works, 
for the sculptor lives this symbolic world and has no need to analyse it. 
I have another problem with Jung's version of human psychology. He places 
enormous stress on the importance of dreams. I too think that dreams have an important 
psychological role, but Jung was almost invariably concerned with the analysis of the 
dreams of psychologically unstable patients. I believe that the role of dreams is 
therapeutic. That is to say that during sleep we rejuvenate not only physically, but 
mentally too. For the normal healthy human dreaming is a way of subconsciously 
working through psychic problems and difficult mental issues which we confront in our 
everyday life. We have no need to understand these for their recuperative effect to 
work. Lt is only in extreme cases of mental disturbance that a patient's intellectual 
confrontation with his subconscious would seem to be beneficial. In other words, in the 
normal run of things our dreams effect a balance between our psyche and our physical 
existence. It is only when this balance becomes upset that a conscience effort is needed to 
evaluate the bad things that are happening in our psyche. 
I remember seeing in the late seventies the 'Outsider" exhibition at the Hayward 
Gallery in London. It was a vast mixture of images from mentally ill patients, visionary 
and naive artists. There were some immensely powerful images, but one was acutely 
aware of the mental unbalance of their author. I have seen similar graffiti images in our 
big cities, especially in toilets, and often concerning the penis, or female sexual organs. 
Now such images are obviously a form of mental release for their authors and may also 
exude a kind of raw power to their viewers. But the healthy viewer does not feel any 
sense of gratification in them. He may, as I did in this exhibition, recognise the direct 
power of the images, but they are outside of his personal experience and make an appeal 
only to a sense of fear - fear that he may too, one day, be in such a dislocated mental 
state. 
So my problem with Jung's theory, as with most psychological theory, is that it is 
particularly reliant on such cases, at the expense of consideration of the more balanced 
human psyche. I put less value on his findings than on the nun's priest's ideas on dreams, 
for Chaucer at least used a fine poetic language. Whilst I am sure that Jung's analytic 
sessions may have helped many patients, there is little evidence that his archetypes in a 
larger sense have much use in our understanding of the way in which sculpture 
communicates and this is true, not only of Jungian, but all, psychology. 
There is no doubt that certain events in our lives - the reaching of puberty, first 
sexual activity, etc. - are not only physical, but also psychological, events. As Fuller 
argued, these events are common to most of us, but it is much more difficult to show that 
the psychological effect of them is similar in each of us. Furthermore, I propose that it is 
impossible to prove that this or that sculpture is making a subconscious appeal to those 
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psychic events which we experienced as a result of our pubescent, or other, development. 
Indeed, I can think of very few sculptures which seem to awaken in me some deeper 
sense of life's meaning, for which I can consciously locate this reaction with any degree 
of certainty. I have mentioned Michelangelo's Pieta in Florence, which does seem to 
convey a strong sense of the heart-rending tragedy of the death of an offspring for the 
parents, and there are some, particularly primitive images, which seem to exude a 
strongly recognisable sense of sexuality. But generally speaking the communication of 
the sculpture on a subconscious level, remains subconscious and any attempt to make 
this reaction conscious not only leads us into the difficulties we find in Fuller's 
interpolating meaning into the sculpture, instead of extrapolating from it, but I believe 
that the intellectualisation of this mysterious process will actually destroy its reparative 
effect. In other words, once we try to understand this sometime overwhelmingly 
mysterious experience of the sculpture, we can no longer experience it. 
There may be cases where high art has involved such images of mental distress, as 
we saw in the 'Outsiders' show, and I am thinking here particularly of the paintings and 
graphics of Edvard Munch, which I last saw in Stuttgart a few years ago. But generally 
speaking the images that art provides, and particularly those of sculpture, are generally 
of a reparative nature, as are healthy dreams, and not only reparative for their authors. 
For even in sculpture's most grotesque forms, such as in Keinholz's 'State City Hospital' 
there is a parallel cathartic affect which appeases our sense of horror. No, what we 
consider to be great sculpture cannot be the product of a perverse mind, for its appeal, 
its message, would be of an extremely limited range, appealing only to the few, and 
generally only of curiosity value. 
You may recall that I used the work of Tony Cragg to illustrate a kind of sculpture 
which generally invites an intellectual evaluation. But even Cragg, when working, is 
exercising his subconscious capacities. Jung suggests that an important capacity of the 
subconscious is its ability to bring into consciousness new juxtapositions of material, 
which the conscious had never entertained before. 165You will recall that Cragg claims to 
have a 'sort of vision'. Through nurturing his subconscious the sculptor has a rich 
source of new visual juxtapositions. Many of these he will reject until one or other seems 
to have a particular poignancy and becomes sifted out from the herd. I do not believe at 
this stage he has any idea why this image should be any more valuable than the others. I 
think that it may well have some psychic resonance which he recognises subliminally as 
being of particular importance to what Moore called his 'form-world', and, perhaps, the 
world outside of sculpture. I suggest that the visual world of the sculptor is deeply 
rooted in this faculty, rather than on the language-based logic of the left brain. 
Now Jung, in the first part of 'Man & his Symbols' is at pains to point out that our 
ability to react to symbols has become anaesthetised in the modern period. It may be that 
shared belief and the community of a coherent healthy society are pre-requisites of the 
ability to enjoy a shared symbolic order. I suspect that the lack of these pre-requisites 
make it difficult for me to believe in a dynamic symbolic system at present and thus, to 
believe that the symbol has any meaningful role in our, intellectual evaluation of 
sculpture today. I also believe that the effects of the modern medium of television and, to 
some extent film, has been partly responsible for the anaesthetising of our ability to 
make an imaginative response to what we are seeing and that this, too, has helped to 
destroy our sense of a dynamic intellectually symbolic world. Peter Fuller also took up 
this theme of Jung's on many occasions and suggested that this lack of a symbolic order 
presents a major problem to artists today, in that there is no common basis of their 
language. This is certainly true in an intellectual sense, but it is, I propose, only half the 
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story. For whilst our ability to make intellectual evaluations of symbols has, indeed, 
become debased, there is no doubt that the kind of subconscious symbolic language I 
have just described is as potent a force as it ever was in the appreciation of sculpture, 
and that it must be nurtured today in a world which finds little intellectual value in 
symbolism. As Jung puts it; 
"What we call civilized consciousness has steadily separated itself from the basic instincts. 
But these instincts have not disappeared. They have merely lost their contact with our 
consciousness and are thus forced to assert themselves in an indirect fashion. This may be 
by means of physical symptoms in the case of a neurosis, or by means of incidents of 
various kinds, like unaccountable moods, unexpected forgetfulness, or mistakes in 
speech.".166 
Jung also makes another important point about the difference between the modern 
and ancient attitude towards symbolic imagination; 
"The fact is that informer times men did not reflect upon their symbols; they lived them 
and were unconsciously animated by their meaning." 167 
The implication of what he is saying, and this I believe to be the main difficulty in 
appreciating the language of sculpture today, is that we are obsessed with analysing our 
experience. We have become so concerned to understand our experiences intellectually, 
that we no longer able to actually experience them. What I am suggesting is that the 
visual world in which sculptors live, and the visual language which they use is still 
holistic. That is to say that sculptors do not intellectually analyse their subconscious life, 
or symbols, but live them and are unconsciously animated by their meaning. They may 
consciously use literary symbols in a metaphoric way, but the symbolic language of their 
unconscious is employed automatically and subliminally, and they have no need to 
analyse or understand it. It follows that a state of mental openness and readiness in the 
viewer is a prerequisite, if he is to understand the messages encoded in the sculpture, 
and that this is largely dependant on the exercising of his subconscious empathetic 
capacity. It is the exercising of this capacity which the viewer finds so difficult at 
present. He has become so used to using his intellectual capacities that he may simply be 
afraid of allowing himself to be lost in the unknown of a pure empathetic reaction to 
something as harmless as a piece of sculpture. It may also be true that he has become so 
used to analysing intellectually his experience, that a direct, visual, subconscious 
reaction is no longer available to him. When people tell me that they do not understand a 
particular piece of sculpture I usually recommend that they simply look at it harder and 
I mean this not patronisingly, but quite literally. I propose that it is here that the basic 
difference lies between the way in which sculptors and non-sculptors regard sculpture. 
Generally speaking, but by no means always, the sculptor is ready to both create and 
react to sculpture in a visual subconscious way, whilst the viewer invariably requires a 
rational explanation of that which is before him. 
There is a remarkable similarity between the idea of Jung's archetypes and that of 
the way a sculpture communicates. For Jung the archetype is a mental, subconscious 
reaction based in the physical substrates of human physiology.168 Our reaction to a 
sculpture, or in other words the meaning we construct when viewing a piece of 
sculpture, is a mental reaction to the physical substrates, i.e. the physical presence and 
form, of the sculpture. So n sculpture may be thought of as a physical manifestation of 
the human psyche. The sc^ pture may therefore have a reparative role, just as the dream 
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does. It will have such a role when the meaning it encodes is based in matters universal, 
which may, (or may not, depending on your stance towards psychology) be linked to 
Jung's archetypes, but which are certainly linked to those psychic equivalents 
constructed by our own physiological being. This is why sculpture has a redemptive role 
to play in today's society. It is a last bastion of the world of subconscious symbolism. The 
viewer may be facing an object which not only encodes the psyche of the sculptor, but 
also acts as a mirror of his, the viewer's, own psyche. No wonder that it may be 
uncomfortable for him to leave the realm of intellectual security, when faced with it. 
I was, earlier, at pains to suggest that much of the activity of the sculptor in his 
studio takes place at a subconscious level; that logical, conscious thought has a small part 
to play in his working procedures. I have also argued that the sculptor's task is to try 
and control that which is encoded in the image to which the viewer must react. These 
two arguments would seem to be contradictory, and I believe that they are. It is here 
that we have the nub of the problem of creating meaning in sculpture. The sculptor, 
residing in the world of the visual, finds appropriate forms and shapes to convey certain 
concepts about the world. But he does this at a subconscious level, rather than as a 
rational programme. The forms that he chooses may, inevitably, reveal things about 
himself which he does not consciously know. So, in simple terms, what I am arguing is 
that a sculpture is a physical manifestation of the sculptor's psyche. It is the unseeable 
made visual. If I am right, then this means that the question of universal appreciation of 
a particular artists work is reliant on his psyche, in visualised form, awaking deep and 
meaningful echoes in the respective psyche of his viewers. This is the world of our 
empathetic capacity. Whether or not the symbol has a role to play in this process is 
perhaps irrelevant, for, as Jung himself has suggested, symbols are merely used; 
"to represent concepts that we cannot define or fully comprehend "169 
What is sure is that our physiological processes would seem to have a corresponding 
psychic event and that sculpture, at its best, is a physical manifestation of this mysterious 
relationship between the physical and the mental. 
I have argued that our ability to react to a symbolic language has been somewhat 
anaesthetised. That is to say, that when we consciously recognise the symbol of the Cross 
of Christ it rarely triggers our reaction to the contemplation of the deeper meaning of 
the Cross. It works rather as a metaphor, than as a dynamic symbol. When sculptors 
consciously use such devices in the narrative content of their work, they are, today, 
metaphors for that which may have, at other times, been symbolic in a true sense. 
I stand by this argument, but we must remember that sculpture can communicate 
in more than one way. A sculpture may communicate through narrative. I have just 
argued that it may communicate to our subconscious. The type of symbolic language 
which has become debased is that of the consciously derived symbol, whilst the 
subconscious, symbolic, communicative mode has a vital role, just as it ever did in the 
history of sculpture. It is dependant on the reaction of the right-sided hemisphere of our 
brain and upon the psychic events which occur in parallel to certain physiologically 
based perceptions. So I am arguing that in our present society the narrative, with its 
metaphors, and the subconscious symbolism of the empathetic are the two modes of 
communication which remain for sculpture, whilst the possibility of a truly dynamic, 
conscious, symbolic language is denied to us. 
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Having said ail this I must mention one other thought. I have no doubt that 
Fuller's intellectual evaluation of his reaction to the Venus de Mi Jo was quite sincere. 
For him, he may really have experienced these things in response to the sculpture. So my 
hypothesis may be entirely wrong and the sculpture may simply act as a kind of psychic 
kicking post which allows for any and all interpretations. But if I believed this I would 
no longer be able to practise as a sculptor. For the standpoint of the sculptor is that he is 
in some way in control of what he is encoding in the objects that he is making. For the 
sculptor has something to communicate about being in the world. He does this in the 
visual language of his profession and it is, I hope I have been able to show, a language in 
which words are of no use. His is a language of shape and form, of the neural reactions 
which perception of these forms gives rise to, and of the ability of our physiological 
equipment to make an imaginative dynamic relationship between the physical nature of 
objects, and their corresponding psychic effect. What is more, the sculpture he has made 
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A simplified diagram of how, I believe, we may perceive sculpture. 
Chapter 3 6 d 
My friend Ldszio is here mending my fork-lift and he asks me what I am working on. I tell 
him what I am writing about. He is interested and our discussion continues later over a 
beer. He mentions a book that he has been reading and, a few days later, calls me to tell me 
he has bought a copy for me. It lies on my shelves for some months. Laci was sure it would 
help me and, when I read it, I find that he is right, although not, I suspect, for the reasons 
that he was thinking of. 
Johannes Greber was born in 1874 in Switzerland. Following studies in Trier, he 
was ordained into the Catholic Church and was soon sent to the parish of Hunsruck 
where it became apparent that he was endowed with unusual healing powers. In 1923 a 
stranger appeared in his office and asked him to visit a 'spiritualist' prayer-meeting in 
which a youth was apparently possessed by a messenger of God. Sceptical, at first, 
Greber continued his contact with this and other messengers and later published a book 
of the teachings passed on to him.170 
Greber made short-hand notes of his encounters with God's messengers and the 
first part of his book contains the background story and a selection of these interviews. 
The messengers had a hierarchy and his chief messenger was very close to God himself. 
There is an uncanny authenticity to the messages which he relates in part 1, but this is 
beside my point. What is of particular interest to me is the second part of the book, 'The 
Laws of the Life-force', and you will, I hope, bear with me if I make a precis of the main 
points of the transcriptions. 
We are told that the ancient scholars were correct in construing that man consists 
of body, mind (or spirit), and 'soul'. If the mind or intellect wishes to move the body, it 
requires an energy source and this is the soul, or the 'life-force' of the Bible. (In 
Hungarian: 6d). Life-force can be found in everything which God has made; in all men, 
animals, plants, stones, minerals, water, all the heavenly bodies, in every intellect and in 
everything which exists. The life-force is not material, but of the spirit, and is always 
connected with the spirit, in that it is the driving force of the spirit. The spirit contains 
the life force. Where there is life, there is life-force, and where there is life-force there is 
spirit, so that there is spirit (or soul) in everything. The life-force is similar to our 
earthly currents, e.g. electricity, none of which are purely physical and none purely of 
the spirit. 
The human body, as well of that of animals, plants and minerals are condensed 
forms of the life-force and all growth is dependant on the fundamental laws of the life-
force. Each living thing has a different combination of the life-force and this is true of 
different members of the same species and this is why we are all visibly different. We are 
unable to understand the secret of life - of how things grow and become. It is the 
invisible life-force which causes these things to happen. The air, water and food contain 
life force and our body extracts the required 6 d from these as they pass through the 
blood. 
The life-force in the air, in water and in food comes from the earth, which, as a 
heavenly body, contains a mixture of life-force and also radiates it. The earth contains 
all the necessary types of Od necessary for the life sustained on it, but it also collects the 
radiation of life-force from all other planets, particularly from those which are near to 
it. Each heavenly body has its own life-force mixture, which is different from that of all 
other heavenly bodies. AH the heavenly bodies radiate life-force to the earth in different 
measure and, as the planets are constantly moving, the concentration of this radiation 
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constantly changes too. The position of the planets at birth have, therefore, an enormous 
impact on our being. (This is, of course, the fundamental principal of the Babylonian 
horoscope). So the body of all living things is a mixture of compressed life-force, derived 
from the 6 d radiation of the earth and its surrounding heavenly bodies. 
Three different states of the life-force may be distinguished in all living things; that 
of the spirit which has achieved bodily form in the living thing, that which provides the 
driving-force of the body, and, finally, the solidified life-force, which we call 'body'. The 
relationship of these controls health and sickness, and earthly life and death. When the 
earthly body dies the life-force of the spirit takes over the body's life-force. The body 
itself has no independent life-force, but only that of its related spirit. When the physical 
body is sick the life-force of the mind has the power to heal the body. This healing power 
may also be transferred to other living things. When we use plant-, animal-, or mineral-
based, medicines we are taking the life-force from the respective plant, animal, or 
mineral. When a mother strokes her sick child she is passing on this healing life-force. 
Every living thing has a life-force aura, as do the planets. The earth's magnetic 
pull is part of its life-force radiation. The aura of a body has a similar form to that body. 
This is our 'astral body'. This cannot be seen. The life of the mind, of our environment 
and of all natural force exists in wave form. All thoughts and wishes are enabled by 
oscillations of the life-force, which the mind, as the carrier of the life-force, enables. All 
bodily senses and mental feelings are based in the oscillations of the Od. Sounds, colours, 
taste, smell and touch are facilitated by the vibration of life-force. Everything which we 
see and experience is based in the vibrations of the life-force. 
The exact workings of this cosmic system are God's secret and will never be 
revealed to man. Man searches for the overview, for the meaning of life, but finds only 
parts of the answer: 
„Az egesz kozmoszt atdromlo es minden testet athatolo od rezgesei a szamok nagy isteni 
titkan alapulnak Ti, kis ernberek sohasem fogj&tok ezt a titkot kideriteni. Ti a 
vilagtortenesek egysegszama utdn kutattok Ezt nem fogjatok megtal&lni, jollehet egyes 
szamtitkokat mar megfejtettetek. Ismeritek az egyes hangok hullamainak szamdt. 
Probalkoztok a szinek ddhullamzdsanak alapjat kepezd szamok kutatdsdval. De mindez mi 
az eldttetek elzart igazsagok vegtelen tengerevel szemben?"171 
The harmonious oscillations of the life-force give rise to a sense of beauty, health, 
joy, peace and happiness, whilst disharmonious oscillations cause hate, sickness, pain 
and unhappiness. The oscillations of our life-force affect not only ourselves, but those 
around us. These oscillations leave a trace on our own Od body. Here lies our capacity 
of memory. These traces may also be perceived in us by others. 
Perhaps this is enough. The teachings continue, but I hope that you have got the 
idea, and may see, in the light of what I have written before, where this is leading to. As I 
read this text, of which I have only given a brief outline, I was astonished by how similar 
it is to certain aspects of Einstein's physics, to the psychological theories of Jung, to 
much Buddhist teaching and indeed to some aspects of the evolutionary genetic theory 
which I described earlier. 
At first sight the explanation may lie in the fact that the world view presented here 
is general, non-specific, simple and, thus, all-inclusive. This may be true, for it seems not 
so far from the mundane, and it is certainly difficult to find fault with it. But I propose 
that there may be another reason why these messages may seem to have connections to 
so many, various, schools of thought. 
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You may recall Eccles' difficulty with an evolutionary theory which allowed no 
space for mental experiences: 
"The modern Darwinian theory of evolution is defective in that it does not even recognise 
the extraordinary problem that is presented by living organisms acquiring mental 
experiences of a non-material kind that are in another world from the world of matter-
energy, which was formerly globally comprehensive."172 
I have already expressed something of my own difficulties in accepting the modern, 
genetic, version of evolution. I should, in the light of Greber' text, like to return to the 
question. Evolutionary genetics is based on observation. It would appear that there is 
considerable evidence which suggests a probability that we may have genetically evolved 
in the way in which Dawkins or Smith suggest. There is no concrete proof, but even if we 
accept their hypothesis to be correct, there is absolutely no notion at all in the theory of 
how, or why, evolution occurred. As a logical construction derived from a series of 
possible events, it seems most convincing. The same may also be said, I wouid say with 
much more certainty, of Einstein's physics. But both of these theories explain only a 
world of physical aspects. 
If you are expecting me to suggest that Greber's spiritualism fills the gaps in 
modern genetic theory and Einsteinian physics, then you are wrong. But, Greber is 
important to my argument in that the teachings contained in 'the laws of the life-force" 
in part 2 of his book are an example of a holistic world view. Einstein's physics and 
evolutionary genetics deal with single aspects of our existence - how the physical world 
behaves, in the first case, and how we derived our present physical form, in the second. 
These teachings from Greber's messenger of God, try to explain every aspect of our 
being, and, I think, do so rather well, for they contain, albeit in a simplified form, 
Einsteinian physics in a world view that is both physical and spiritual, at one and the 
same time. 
One of the greatest problems which modern science faces is that it has come to rely 
more and more on an intellectual analysis of a purely physical world. Its findings are 
essentially materialist and its methods, of the intellectual thinking of the left brain. 
Whereas Darwin still had room for God, albeit very little room, we rarely find modern 
scientific research which considers that life is not only a complex of material states. 
I am not the first to point out that there is a new trend in modern scientific 
research. Many scientists have become aware of the limitations of their experiments. 
Pick up any book in which one scientist is criticising the findings of another and he will 
invariably find fault with the methodology of the experiments adopted. For too often the 
experimenter will allow his own aims to subconsciously affect the methodology and 
outcome of the experiment. That is to say that, the desired results affect the whole 
procedure from the start and make it difficult for the experimenter to be truly 
objective.173 This has meant that scientific research has become more statistically based. 
The scientist no longer says categorically that this, or that, is true, but rather that on 
available statistical evidence, this, or that, would seem to be demonstrable. In other 
words the search for empirical laws would seem to have been put to one side, in favour 
of observations of how matter would seem to behave. So much scientific research, 
dealing with the physical, may be seen to have abandoned its endeavour to find holistic 
meaning in, and of, the world. Just as our society has abandoned the right brain in 
favour of the logic of the left, so has physics forgotten the metaphysical, which was once 
an integral part of it. 
I have made mention of a number of writers who suggest that there is a 
correspondence between the way in which we experience the world and the 
physiological patterns employed by those biological systems which are enabling this 
experience. One of our biological systems is that part of the left brain responsible for 
intellectual reasoning. It too, I believe, has the ability only to work in limited ways. What 
we consider to be 'logical' may well be a correspondence between certain thought 
patterns - or brain-wave patterns - and the physiological process in which the relevant 
parts of the brain are involved during 'rational' thinking. 
If we wish to analyse that part of the self which is not physical we run into great 
problems. We must try and use intellectual arguments which are limited in their scope 
by the nature of the system producing them, and by the limits of the language, to explain 
something which is essentially beyond the rational. So in every hypothesis about the 
physical or non-physical world, there comes a point where rational argument is no 
longer of any use. We, probably, never will understand the world, (as Greber's 
messenger said we never would), although we feel the need to try. But in each hypothesis 
of meaning which is put forward there comes a point where belief must come into play. 
Einstein's theory can never be proved to be true, but it can be, and is, believed in, just as 
some believe in the God and Christ of the Bible. 
It follows from this that there is a further link between genetic evolutionary 
theory, Einsteinian physics, and Greber. Given the limited pattern of our logic, these, 
and all scientific theories, require belief, just as do religions. We can rarely discover 
something that is really new. What we can find is new ways in which to attempt to 
explain and understand. But, unable to say that this or that is absolutely true, we must 
rely on belief to fill the gap left by the inability of logical thought to grasp the intangible. 
So we must view scientific theories as models which may help us to understand the 
world. The models which we seem to favour at present are based exclusively in the 
physical nature of the world, whilst religious models are left to deal with the spiritual. 
And now I must confess. The laws of the 6 d of part 2 in Greber's book is 
extremely close to the world view which I have held for some time, although I knew 
nothing of him until the last few days. For contemporary physics I suspect that it is much 
too wishy-washy. I am not sure, either, that I believe in God - certainly not in the 
Christian sense - if I may be allowed to have the life-force without him. I suppose that 
for me the life-force is god, whilst the God of the Bible is much too near to Jung's 
archetypes for my liking. He smacks of a convenient way to categorise the inexplicable. 
But there is, perhaps, no other way in which our rational capacities can equate and 
understand those intangible aspects of life, which are so vital to a healthy existence. 
Perhaps the only part of the Bible's teachings which I have never, or rarely, 
doubted is the notion that 'God is everywhere". Now Greber's text on the Od suggests a 
plausible notion of how this may be. It is essentially an animist theory, in which each 
tree, river, stone, each living thing and, indeed, man-made artefact, has its own spirit. It 
is to this world view which I subscribe. Now Einstein's relativity theory, albeit 
differently, is founded in the notion of forces in relation to each other, in much the same 
way as Greber's 'theory', if I may call it that, and I have little doubt that Einstein's 
theory is correct, although Einstein did not, I think, see his physical theory of the world 
as being dynamically related to God. My belief is that the 'life-force', or Od, and the 
energy of Einstein's physics, are themselves God. In other words I suspect that what we 
refer to as God, may have had his own God too. The notion of God personified seems to 
me to be a convenient way for the human brain to grasp the ungraspable and one to 
which I can not easily subscribe. God as a kind of head master, or spiritual king or prime 
minister, is a concept which I suspect is man-made, - if we assume that the thesis of 
I 
130 
Lethridge and Von Baniken is incorrect, which it may well not be - whilst the idea of a 
synonymously based physical and spiritual life-force is, perhaps, not. 
You may, justifiably, ask what ail this has to do with the way in which we 
understand sculpture. In a roundabout way I think that it does. I have been at pains to 
argue that certain capacities with which we are endowed are common to all of us, and I 
shall be looking at this problem again, in a different light, in the next chapter. I have 
spent some time with Greber's Od, because it is in some w ays the antithesis of what I 
have been trying to argue about biological constancy between us. For the world 
described by Greber's messenger of God is one which is somehow all inclusive and yet 
individual. In other words it tries to explain a world which is both objective and 
subjective and, in this, it is much closer to the way in which we view sculpture, than the 
approach of modern science, which is concerned with the objective alone. 
"Modern physics and physiology throw a new light upon the ancient problem of 
perception. If there is to be anything that can be called 'perception it must be in some 
degree an effect of the object perceived, and it must more or less resemble the object if it is 
to be a source of knowledge of the object..... What we can know of physical objects in this 
way, however, is only certain abstract properties of structure.... Our knowledge of the 
physical world, therefore, is only abstract and mathematical." 1/4 
Bertrand Russell belonged to the 'objective analysis' school of philosophy, which 
tried purposefully to expunge all subjective experience from philosophy and find truths 
which could really be considered as absolutely objective. What he argues is that all 
previous philosophy was infected by various moral standpoints, which made objectivity 
an impossibility. He suggests that the new standpoint of his school is applicable in all 
fields of life; 
"In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms, one of the few unifying forces is scientific 
truthfulness, by which I mean the habit of basing our beliefs upon observations and 
inferences as impersonal, and as much divested of local and temperamental bias, as is 
possible for human beings. To have insisted upon the introduction of this virtue into 
philosophy, and to have invented a powerful method by which it can be rendered fruitful, 
are the chief merits of the philosophical school of which I am a member. The habit of 
careful veracity acquired in the practice of this philosophical method can be extended to 
the whole sphere of human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of fanaticism 
with an increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual understanding."175 
Now Russell's philosophical standpoint would seem to have had a grip on 
contemporary science and thought, and indeed on art and sculpture, since he first wrote 
these words in 1946. Wre have been trying to create an objective world view, often based 
on mathematical models, which may be considered to be wholly objective. It is a model 
based on the logical procedures of the left brain, and here mathematics may truly be 
described as providing the most logical language that we have. The problem with it is 
that it thus directly excludes that part of our existence which is subjective. 
The great achievement of Eccles was to establish that thoughts are capable of 
causing physical and chemical reactions in our bodies, and, this he did by using 
Einsteinian physics which were, until now, thought to be totally objective. 
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"Following Margenau (1984), the hypothesis is that mind-brain interaction is 
analogous to a probability field of quantum mechanics, which has neither mass nor energy 
yet can cause effective action at microsites. More specifically it is proposed that the mental 
concentration involved in intentions or planned thinking can cause neural events by a 
process analogous to the probability fields of quantum mechanics." 176 
In other words intentions and planned thinking may be causal of physical responses. 
Now, our thoughts and intentions must be seen as personal and, therefore, subjective, 
even if we are trying to make an objective analysis. Eccles' thesis has therefore 
undermined the entire trend of modern scientific thinking, for it has reinstated the 
importance of the subjective, and done this in the language of 'objectively' based 
science. We are, therefore, no longer able to conceive of a purely objective world, as 
such, as our conception, or perception, of it is, in part, subjective. 
I suspect, then, that Greber's Od, and other world views similar to it, is nearer to 
the truth than Einstein's relativity theory, for Einstein deals only with the specifically 
physical part of our world, whereas the laws of the Od, general as they are, at least deal 
with the problem of the relationship between the subjective and objective. So the 
implication is that, following Eccles, we must think in terms of a 'post modernist' 
science, in which we must, again, construct a scientific world view which deals not only 
with the objective world, but with the subjective too. This is true not only for science, 
but for sculpture too, and I believe that, in both fields, this requires a reinstatement of 
the importance of the right brain. 
Before we leave the subject of the 'life force' I must mention one area of research 
that has always had a particular fascination for me. Many years ago 1 visited, quite by 
chance, the Merry Maidens stone circle, near La mo ma, in Cornwall. T was walking 
along the road nearby and discovered an ancient burial chamber under the road, which 
1 crawled into. I then felt impelled to retrace my steps and found this stone circle in a 
field, hidden by a high hedge. As I entered it I felt a great surge of energy. It was 
something like a mild electric shock and it left me feeling quite dizzy. I began to read up 
on the circle, in hope of finding some explanation, and it was then that I discovered 
Lethbridge's book, which f have already mentioned in another context.177 Lethbridge 
had a similar experience at the same circle when dousing there. 
Further reading lead me on to the work of a number of writers including that of 
Guy Underwood. Now Underwood went much further and wrote of energies almost 
immeasurable and unknown to orthodox science. Many of the stone circles and standing 
stones of Britain are erected from quartzite stone, which we recognise today as being an 
especially good conductor. Many theories have been put forward with regards to this 
earth energy.1781 quote Underwood: 
"Observations of the influence which affects the water diviner suggests that a principle of 
nature exists which is unknown to, or unidentified by science. Its main characteristics are 
that it appears to be generated from within the Earth, and to cause wave motion 
perpendicular to the Earth's surface; that it has great penetrative power; that it affects the 
nen'e cells of animals; that it forms spiral patterns; and is controlled by mathematical laws 
involving principally the numbers 3 and 7. Until it can be otherwise identified, I shall refer 
to it as the Earth Force. It could be an unknown principle, but it seems more likely that it is 
an unrecognised effect of some already established force, such as magnetism or gravity. 
The Earth Force manifests itself in lines of discontinuity, which I call geodetic lines, 
and which form a network on the surface of the Earth. The lower animals instinctively 
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perceive and use these lines, and their behaviour is considerably affected by them. Man is 
similarly affected, but less strongly, and cannot usually perceive the lines without artificial 
assistance."179 
I must confess that since reading this and other material like it in the seventies, that 
I have found little that has been added (unless I have been looking in the wrong places), 
but my hunch was, and still is, that there may be scientific evidence to be found to take 
'Od' out of the realms of the spiritual, alone, and base it, at the same time, in the realms 
of the physical. 
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Chapter 4 Taste and self-expression 
Earlier on I spent what may have seemed an inordinate amount of space trying to 
establish the existence of a notion of genetic constancy between each of us. If such a 
genetic constancy exists then we may argue that the mechanisms of our biological 
functions also have a considerable degree of constancy. I have suggested that our sense 
of moral value has been eroded, as has our ability to react to a dynamic symbolic system. 
I have suggested that their erosion has been caused by a lack of constancy of belief. I 
have suggested that the ultimate experience of art, the recognition of overwhelming 
beauty is a result of our shared biological systems making a kind of equation between the 
operating patterns which they employ and certain configurations extant in the piece of 
sculpture being viewed. I have also suggested that certain physiological structures may 
have parallel psychic factors, and that there may be a subconscious interaction between 
the psychic state of the sculptor and that of the viewer, mediated by the information 
encoded in the sculpture. This is the basis of my aesthetic theory. The importance of the 
notion of constancy, which has already arisen on occasion, will, I hope, become more 
apparent through a brief look at ideas on taste and the notion of self expression on the 
part of the sculptor. 
As with every writer who has tackled the subject, Peter Fuller ran into difficulties 
when he dealt with the question of 'taste' in his essay 'Questions of Taste'.180 It is one of 
those essays which makes enjoyable reading for, at his best, Fuller certainly had a knack 
of combining serious argument with a good measure of humour. Interestingly the essay 
reveals a great deal of Fuller's own 'taste', in the sense of personal prejudice. What 
Fuller argues is that there is such a thing as taste in this sense of personal prejudice, but 
that this is not real taste. He uses, as I have elsewhere, the simile of the wine connoisseur: 
"He may well have a general preference for clarets rather than burgundies, and a 
particular liking for that distinctive, though hardly superb, wine he first drank on his 
wedding day. But, he will tell us, his fancies do prevent him from discriminating between a 
bad claret and a good burgundy; nor from recognising that there are, in fact, better 
vintages of his wedding day wine than the one he personally prefers. When he makes 
statements of this kind, our connoisseur is acknowledging that he, too, is not merely 
judging for himself, but for everyone. He regards quality more as if it was a property of the 
wine itself rather than an arbitrary response of the taste buds."181 
What Fuller argues then, as do many writers on the subject, is that there is, on the one 
hand, something which we may call personal taste and something else which we may call 
a 'universal' taste. Fuller suggest several possibilities as to the origin of this universal 
taste. In the above quote it may be seen to be a function of the object itself, a function of 
the wine. He has also, elsewhere, suggested that there may be a psychological foundation 
for this faculty.182 In fact, in this essay, he has no answers, but rather brilliantly worries 
the problem of what determines our faculty of real taste. The nearest thing to an answer 
that he gives is a kind of melange of the biologically determined functioning of our senses 
and acquired 'culturally and socially determined habits'. 
Fuller introduces Immanuel Kant's ideas on taste although, ultimately, he does not 
entirely agree with them. Kant argued that logically when a man says that, 'Canary 
wine is pleasant' what he really means is that 'Canary wine is pleasant for me'. Kant 
argues that such statements are matters of 'taste' and personal to us. One may not, 
however, make such judgements when talking about beauty, as when someone makes a 
judgement about beauty, "he supposes in others the same satisfaction; he judges not 
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merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of 
things."™ 
Fuller argues with Kant's thesis on the basis that Kant has made 'taste' a personal 
thing as distinguished from an appreciation of beauty and he, Fuller, thinks that real 
'taste' is something more than personal preference. I suppose that I agree with them 
both in some degree. Our appreciation of beauty certainly has nothing to do with 
personal preference and the notion of what we call 'taste' is indeed, as Fuller says based 
on some sort of socially and culturally determined consensus. The important distinction 
for me is that the exercising of taste is an acquired - i.e. culturally learnt - activity, 
governed by intellect. The appreciation of beauty, I propose, is not. 
I have proposed that the appreciation of ultimate beauty in sculpture is 
biologically determined and therefore relatively constant, although our reaction to this 
ultimate beauty is dependant on our ability to break down the veils which our biological 
systems throw up in their normal workings. The rest of what we call aesthetics is, I 
propose, based on taste. That is to say that it is a culturally learnt ability to recognise 
beauty, but on an intellectual level. That is to say that it is based on consensus and not 
constancy. 
Taste, then, and much of what we call aesthetics, is reliant on comparative values. 
I have made such comparative judgements throughout this text when discussing certain 
sculptures. They are intellectual judgements. As a sculptor I believe in an ultimate 
beauty, beyond taste and beyond comparative value judgements. It is this beauty, and 
only this, whose origin I place entirely in a constant biological function. 
Now if beauty is not a personal thing - although our experience of it, inevitably is -
then we must once again return to the activity of the sculptor in his studio. If he, as I 
have suggested, is involved in an activity which resembles in some degree that of a child 
at play, how may he possibly make something which triggers a profound response to 
beauty. 
The comment is often made that the artist indulges in self expression. This is, to 
some extent a mistake, or at any rate a gross over-simplification. Of course the sculptor 
can only present a personal view, but the artist's personality, per se, is generally 
uninteresting. It only has value when it becomes related to the world outside of himself. 
Then it may have meaning for others. Werner Herzog, the film director, once said in an 
interview that his films were all based on a personal passion, but that this passion had no 
meaning unless it could be amalgamated into a relationship with some universal theme. 
In a previous chapter, I gave some background to my own personal world. I 
mentioned in it some of those things which I feel to be of great importance to the way in 
which I see the world. These are personal prejudices. I quite purposely mentioned my 
dislike of Thatcherite politics. Now, if I were to make this the subject of my sculpture, it 
would be self-expression, an expression of my political views, or rather, of those views to 
which I do not subscribe. Hans Haacke makes sculpture that is political. His works 
involve critiques of the business strategies of large companies and, pointing a finger at 
corruption and immorality, as they do, are, I imagine, of considerable embarrassment to 
those companies. Now these are sculptures that appeal purely to the intellect. They 
remain personal to Haacke and particular to their time and place. They have no 
qualities which relate them to life and morality in a wider sense than their political 
message, aimed at a very specific target. They are in no way universal and, indeed, that 
is clearly not their intention. They carry a strong political message, but at the price of 
any possible aesthetic reaction. This is all right and a valid standpoint for a sculptor to 
take, but it is one which is, for me, fundamentally lacking. 
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I should like to return, for a moment, to Fuller's essay on Michelangelo's Moses, 
and to one particular passage; 
"Michelangelo was, of course, a homosexual. If Leonardo was the painter of the 
blissful maternal smile, then Michelangelo was the sculptor of the male body in struggle, of 
paternal power, and the father-son relationship. Many of his best known images-David, 
God creating Adam on the Sistene ceiling, the representations of the prophets, the slaves, 
the Moses, and the Son of Man returning in the Last Judgement-spr/n^ from this nexus. At 
different moments of his life, the focus of Michelangelo's interest shifted from son to father 
and back again. The male nude became for him the instrument of expression; he was 
notoriously uneasy with the unclothed female body. Thus the haunting statue of Night is 
transparently that of a youth with female elements less than lovingly added on. The 
convention by which Renaissance sculptors generally worked their female nudes from male 
models cannot provide a sufficient explanation of his work, especially when one remembers 
that towards the end of his life Michelangelo developed an impassioned spiritual obsession 
for a religious woman, Vittoria Colonna, whom he described in a poem as 'A man, a god 
rather, inside a woman.' The sub-theme of Michelangelo's iconography-as manifested in 
the pietas and sculptures of the Virgin and Child-is that of his longing for the lost absent 
mother."184 
Quite unknowingly I, earlier, criticised the same works on different grounds. I argued 
that Moses, David, and the Dying Slave, seemed unrelated to their purported subject. I, 
also, suggested grounds for the inadequacy of the captives. For once I think that the first 
part of Fuller's analysis may be, partly, correct, although, as usual, he goes too far. 
There is simply no basis in the works for his seeing 'paternal power, and the father-son 
relationship'. These works do contain a sense of personal fascination with the male body, 
itself, on the part of Michelangelo and this may be of a sexual kind. What is important, 
for me, is that these works have not successfully, transcended Michelangelo's 
personality. They really have a great sense of self-expression but have not successfully 
related the self to the universal. That is why, fine as they are, they are not profound. I 
utterly disagree with Fuller about the later Pietas, for they are, I believe, universal and I 
suspect that Fuller is reading too much into the fact that the female figures are simply 
unfinished. As we see them they appear to be profoundly tender, and in no way 
obsessive. 
If I were to use my love of the Welsh, or indeed the English, landscape as the basis 
of my sculpture, this too would be a meaningless form of self-expression and, 
subsequently rather uninteresting, unless I am able to lift it to a higher level in which the 
self is negated, in favour of that in it which is universal. In truth, the Welsh landscape 
has value to me, although it has little visual impact on my sculpture. If I wish to make it 
a major part of my work then my relationship to it must be subsumed in something 
greater than me, if it is to have any meaning other than that of personal gratification. 
The problem is that this greater thing, the universal, cannot be programmatic. That is to 
say that a sculptor cannot begin to make a sculpture and think of how it will relate to the 
universal. One is almost inclined to think that this happens by accident, as it would 
appear it must do, for there are no ready formulas. 
I have already suggested that our aesthetic responses are not of our own 
controlling. They are a primary function of our biological system. They are pre-
conscious and their nature is determined by our biological systems themselves. 
If I make a sculpture it may contain my version of the 'truth', or a part of it. This 
is meaningless self expression unless you agree with it - that is to say that it arouses in 
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you the same accord of understanding of this 'truth'. Logically, if only some of you agree 
with it then the basis of this agreement is probably learnt - it is in part an agreement 
based on 'taste', and implied in this, on learning; for 'taste' is learnt. If all of you agree 
with it then it may be said to express a truth that is based in our biological condition and 
common to all. As we know there is no such sculpture which encodes some universally 
recognised truth and so the mistake is often made that our aesthetic capacity is based in 
taste. This is not so. We are all unable to agree as to what is truth in a sculpture because 
our learning blinds us. Our learning actually inhibits us in the use of our pure 
biologically-conditioned response. Our learning prejudices the use of our empathetic 
capacity, not our lack of learning. Learning inhibits the use of our primal biologically-
determined reactions. Learning gives rise to 'taste', but 'taste' is acquired and developed 
and must be distinguished from our real aesthetic capacity, our ultimate sense of order, 
which is often referred to as beauty. 
Those moments of 'truth' encoded in a sculpture are something which the artist 
perhaps stumbles upon - constant engagement and openness allow that he may 
sometimes manage to shut off the inhibitor that is taste and to reach the ultimate basic 
level of the biological system itself. This, encoded in the sculpture is the universal truth 
that is available to those not too inhibited to empathise with it. Those who evaluate 
through the dictates of taste will not have this real, fundamental, reaction to the truth, 
but a quasi-intellectual physical reaction, which they mistake for the truth. 
I believe in a response to sculpture that is essentially visual and of the physical 
world. The exercise of taste is a language-based mind response. What we often refer to 
as beauty in art is a recognition at a purely physical level of the encoded order that is 
equatable with our extant biological order. When we experience something which we 
find beautiful in a landscape, or in a work of art or music, or even in those moments of 
beauty experienced in solving some complex mathematical problem, our biological 
system is recognising those patterns on which its own functioning is based. This is our 
ultimate aesthetic experience. Our experience of a thing as being beautiful depends on 
that thing reflecting, rather like a mirror does, the configurations of that biological 
system experiencing the thing. A sculpture's ultimate purpose is, through its visual 
language, to encode such experiences. 
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Chapter 5 Our Times and Time 
"The aim of life and the business of education should be the development of the 
ability to interpret experience to the end of perceiving reality. And this reality is something 
which cannot be measured, analysed, reduced to constituent parts or embalmed in a set of 
rules. It is something which is perceived through the work of art, through religion, through 
science or through the act ofprofoundly living. In the last it cannot be described but felt, 
and the true expression of our deeper feelings is, for the most of mankind, achieved 
through the medium of art, whether it be poetry, music, painting or folk-song".185 
Modern education has placed too much stress on logic. The requirements of 
Academia force us to think and write in a logical way. Our modern society has become 
geared to this way of thinking. Our empathetic capacity has become a second-class way 
of evaluating the world. We are literally taught to fear experience of a kind which is not 
logical, in that it is not considered to be materialist. I hope that I have shown that this 
non-logical, non-linguistic experience is, in its primary state, much more materialist than 
'logical' thinking. Logical thinking may be governed by the pattern systems of our brain 
but it is sullied by the limitations of language. The majority of its arguments are based 
not on real problems, but on the inadequacy of language itself to adequately explain 
things. On the other hand we have no control over our prime aesthetic response - it is 
the recognition of the patterns of our biological system presented in a visual analogy. As 
Jung puts it; 
"We are so accustomed to the apparently rational nature of our world that we can scarcely 
imagine anything happening that cannot be explained by common sense. The primitive 
man confronted by a shock of this kind would not doubt his sanity; he would think of 
fetishes, spirits, or gods.'186 
In science lessons in school we had a particular order in which we were made to 
present our experiments. First we must write out the Aim of the experiment, then the 
Method, our Results and, finally, our Conclusions. This system determined the way we 
approached what we were doing and blocked us from really seeing what was happening. 
The pre-conditioned aims blinded us to anything which did not fit into the self-contained 
system. I can give a classic example. In one biology lesson we were taken to the school's 
sports hall where we had our heart beat and blood pressures measured. We then 
engaged in violent exercise and repeated these measurements. Finally we were made to 
lie down for half an hour and a third set of readings were taken. The aim of the 
experiment was to show the effect of exercise on our blood pressure and heart. The 
Result was already implied in the Aim. AH the class, with the exception of yours truly, 
showed the same result. Exercise increased the heart rate and blood pressure, which 
were restored to their normal levels after a period of rest. I cheated. I had been 
experimenting at the time with some simple meditation techniques which were capable 
of regulating the heart beat. Before the first reading I was able to increase my heart rate 
and, subsequently, decrease it after the exercise. Following the rest period I increased it 
again. When all the results were pooled the teacher counted my results as an aberration 
and suggested, (half) jokingly, that I visit a doctor. After the lesson he asked me how I 
had done this trick. My reply was to smile and tap the side of my head with my 
forefinger. 
Now of course I had played a childish prank, but in retrospect what I did shows the 
inadequacy of this type of scientific thinking, (at schoolboy level, at least). The real 
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conclusion of the experiment should not have been that 'exercise increases our heart-
rate and blood pressure', but that 'the mind is able to affect and alter our normal 
physical behaviour'. Because we were looking for a particular result in our experiment 
we were unable to realise the much more interesting result which my tom-foolery had 
exposed, and, indeed, it has taken me a long-time to realise the real significance of the 
real Conclusion of this experiment. 
Logical thinking is based on the type of system involved in the methodology of our 
school science experiments. We tend to know the answers before we begin the search. 
We try to find proofs of what we already know or suspect, rather than perceiving what 
is really before us. We order information in rigid pre-conceived patterns. The type of 
thinking which sculptors indulge in is much more complexly interwoven. Theirs is not a 
linear 'Aim, Method, Result, Conclusion' type of thinking, but they use a thinking system 
which allows the most curious of juxtapositions. The sculptor sets up a working 
environment which particularly encourages those connections of visual and ideitic 
information which are outside of the normal thinking patterns. The right brain is given 
free rein. 
This current obsession with logic has had its effects in the arts too. Conceptual Art 
and Deconstructionism purport to a kind of art which is self-conscious. It no longer tries 
to make art which relates to the world as it exists outside of art, but looks at the very 
structure of the visual processes of art, themselves. It is art about the act of making art. 
Structuralist criticism in the world of literature is similar. Structuralist critics were no 
longer interested in what a novel may have to say about the world, but in how it was 
written. Criticism of contemporary art exhibitions dwell on the curatorship rather than 
the art. The age of 'fun fair art' would appear to be upon us. If the art carries no 
meaningful messages put it together in an interesting way. Make juxtapositions and it 
will give kicks. 
"It is 1993. I have a show in Wernau. I visit the Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart. It is a fine new 
building with lots of glass which allow glimpses across the central courtyards. The 
collection appears literally to unfold itself as one moves through the varied spaces. The 
building as a repository for art is exceptional and moving through it is itself an experience. 
It is the nearest thing I can think of to a 'cathedral' for art. I enter a room and there is a 
Carl Andre floor piece - a long 'carpet' of steel plates that pass through the door into the 
next room One is 'forced' to walk on it. It leads to the back wall which is full of video 
monitors, the only other work in the large room It is Nam June Paik's Joseph Beuys piece 
and the screens are full of images of Beuys doing what Beuys does. I have just come from 
looking at the medieval altars in another part of the museum This is the high altar of 
modern art. The monitors are literally configured like an altar and the Andre is the red 
carpet leading up to it This is our Zeitgeist" 
As a student we formed a scratch orchestra within the Fine Art Department with 
Michael Nyman, who was teaching there at the time - Foster's Social Orchestra. We 
played, or rather tried to play, tunes by the minor American composer, Stephen Foster 
and hence the name of our ensemble. At this time Nyman published a book on avant-
garde music. I found difficulty in equating the sort of World 2 music which Nyman 
seemed to value in his book with Stephen Foster. Nyman gave a simple answer to my 
question; "but I like tunes", he said. I was delighted to see, or rather hear, that Nyman 
has, in recent years with some help from Purcell, been able to combine his interest in 
systems with tunes and is now writing what may, once again, be termed 'music'. (And 
how fine it is too!) 
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So too, many of the visual artists who have seemingly left the strictly logical and 
began to literally paint again or make sculpture of a more traditional kind. There are 
signs of a new engagement with the real world. And yet So much of what is being 
done seems to be so self-conscious. As an art student in the 70's I was teethed on 
conceptualism. Such teaching as there was, was not about the practice of making 
sculpture, but about the eminence of the idea as the be all and end all. Everyday when I 
go into my studio I have to fight with my self-consciousness. My self-consciousness wants 
me to make art that is about art. I try to switch it off and often get nervous that what I 
am doing is not modern. I fear using my own empathetic capacity. I am a victim of my 
time. 
Sometimes I forget how much we owe to classical Greece. Our philosophy, science, 
mathematics, geometry, economics and art are based in the tenets of ancient Greece. 
Sometimes One feels we are so far away from it, but we have hardly made a step 
forward in two and a half thousand years. Perhaps that is our mistake. Perhaps there is 
no forward, only circular time like the seasons, and a reoccurrence again and again of 
the same issues. In retrospect Minimal Art was pure classical Greek, and Land Art a 
manifestation of renewed interest in the Romantic. The kind of dualistic response I have 
proposed for our response to sculpture, or something very similar to it, may be traced 
back to Aristotle; 
„Aristotles a tapasztalatok ket kategoridjat kiilomti el. Az egyik (erzekeles, etvagy stb.) 
a test es a lelek egyideju aktivitasanak a termeke. A masik, a raciondlis, intellektualis 
tapasztalat (a gondolkodas) viszont egyedul a lelek tevekentsegebol fakad "187 
The idea that art reflects the Zeitgeist, or the spirit of the age, was around in the 
70's. It was used as a kind of apology for what we were doing. Art would indeed seem to 
reflect the spirit of its age, but it should not be used as an excuse for making bad art The 
argument went that it does not matter what you do or make, the object will inevitably 
reflect the spirit of the age. How convenient. As if this were enough. 
I have been at pains to show that the artist at work largely uses his empathetic 
capacity at the expense of the logic of World 2. But, as you will probably have surmised, 
World 2 crowds in. In those moments when we are not working, such concerns as those I 
have just mentioned, bubble up into consciousness. It is as if one knows what one should 
be doing, but something holds one back. 
This is not a new phenomenon and various critics have commented on it. John 
Berger dealt with it in 1960 in 'Permanent Red'.188 He quotes Chardin on the difficulties 
of being an artist, 
" 'He who has not felt the difficulties of his art does nothing that counts; he, who like 
my son, has felt them too soon, does nothing at all; and you can be sure that most of the 
high conditions of society would be empty if one were admitted only after an examination 
as severe as the one we must pass.' 
Without any sense of the future one lacks a sense ofperspective, and without 
perspective one is constantly forced into attitudes and theories of trivial opportunism..... 
The artist sets out to improve the world - not in the way that a reformer or a 
revolutionary does - but in his own way, by extending what he believes to be the truth, and 
by expressing the range and depth of human hopes. In a climate of disillusion it becomes 
very difficult for him to desire or believe in even his kind of improvement As a result, his 
art also becomes trivial; he begins to mistake the means for the end. 
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one can define the particular difficulty which the western artist faces today: it is the 
difficulty of seeing men - including himself - whole again: the difficulty of recognizing 
what all men have in common, and of having confidence in what they wish to be."189 
I agree with Berger, but he has made here one big mistake - the same one that 
Fuller made in writing about Michelangelo and Neumann made in writing about Moore. 
They have all failed to recognise the way in which the artist thinks and works. For the 
artists the 'means' are all he can think of. The 'ends' are for others, often for those who 
have a hobby horse to grind ; some greater scheme - in Berger's case a development 
towards socialism. The artist's stance is much more humble. He makes. Matisse puts the 
artist's position very clearly; 
The model, "must not be made to agree with a preconceived theory or effect. It must 
impress you, awaken in you an emotion, which in turn you seek to express. You must forget 
all your ideas, all your theories before the subject"190 
Before I deal with my own 'sense of the future' I should like to quote one more passage 
from Berger, which says much about the role of the artist in contemporary society. 
"The tragedy of art, and indeed of many other skills and trades, under the late stages of 
capitalism is that the status of the calling has been totally destroyed, and the standards of 
superficial success, either in terms of temporary reputation or money, have been put in its 
place. This has had afar-reaching effect on the artist 
An artist 's status in society, when it has been established, is something which he feels 
behind him, supporting him, encouraging him. Success, with the meaning it has now 
acquired under capitalism, is something which may or may not happen quite arbitrarily to 
one or several of his finished works, considered merely as commodities. Thus, whether he 
seeks or despises success, whether his aim is to please or startle, the bourgeois artist's 
conscious or half-conscious concern takes the form of his having to foresee, whilst he is 
still working, the likely effect of the finished work according to quite arbitrary criteria -
arbitrary because in no way connected with the truth he may well be trying to 
communicate. The Bitch-Goddess prowls between him and his canvas, between intention 
and execution, inhibiting him, making him caricature himself or prompting unnecessary 
caution or unnecessary excess."191 
'Times change', as the saying goes, but more importantly, attitudes towards time 
change. It is easier to understand the past, than to analyse our own present conditions 
and beliefs. We are too involved in our own time. We cannot step back from it and see it 
in a rational, detached way. 
I have already mentioned that, at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the 
history of man was thought to be only six thousand years old. If one holds such a belief 
then the achievements of man seem so close and familiar. Plato seems not much older 
than Jesus Christ, and even God is not so old. If God created the world, and everything 
in it, in six days, then he did so just before the Egyptian civilisation began. 
Today, our view of time is quite different. 
"Until the nineteenth century all world cosmologies - even including that of the 
European Enlightenment - conceived of time as being in one way or another surrounded or 
infiltrated by timelessness. This timelessness constituted a realm of refuge and appeal. It 
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was prayed to. It was where the dead went. It was intimately but invisibly related to the 
living world of time through ritual, stories and ethics. 
Only during the last hundred years - since the acceptance of the Darwinian theory of 
evolution - have people lived in a time that contains everything and sweeps everything 
away, and for which there is no realm of timelessness. In the galactic perspective proposed 
by such a cosmology, a hundred years are less than an instant. Even in the perspective of 
the history of man they cannot yet be considered more than an aberration."192 
'Dust to dust, ashes to ashes'. We now, thanks to Darwin and Einstein, see that we are an 
insignificant moment in an inconceivably long process. We were once dust, we became a 
living entity for a second of time, and we return to the primordial dust from which we 
once crawled out. It is difficult to find any significance in our existence when we have 
such a small part to play in the order of things. Peter Fuller's neurotic obsession with 
trying to relate himself to the historical process, in his autobiographical 'Marches Past', 
comes to mind.193 We need to leave a mark, to say that, 'I was here', to give meaning to 
our existence in time. We try to make our age significant by stuffing everything we 
produce into museums, supposedly for posterity. 
Our view of time is tied up with our obsession with progress. It is as though 
knowledge is evolving, just as Darwin's species did. It is our mistake. So much 'new' 
knowledge is merely rediscovered old knowledge, sometimes presented in a different 
way. The builders of New Grange in Ireland new many moons before Copernicus that 
the earth revolved around the sun. Euclidean geometry was rediscovered by Euclid. 
Oppenheimer, when asked if the atom bomb exploded at Almagordo was the first, 
replied; 'Yes, it was - at least, in our times'.194 The ancient civilisations of Egypt and 
Southern and Central America showed a scientific knowledge far in advance of that of 
the Dark Ages in Europe and perhaps, in certain respects, even of ours today. One could 
go on almost endlessly. 
Because of our own transience we see time as existing in a straight line. But time is 
circular, or rather, spiral. The seasons come and go, the moon waxes and wanes, as they 
have done, and will do, for a long time. Each July 19th is not the same as the last, for I 
have grown older, but I have not moved along the straight line of time. Time has moved 
around one circle on the spiral and is now one stage away, directly above the last July 
19th, and under the next July 19th. I suspect that when we remember we move back 
through these spirals, and mentally we are able to jump freely from past to present and 
future. Living in London I had no real notion of time, in this sense. Time was something 
measured on a watch and appointments kept, or not kept. The villagers, where I live, 
understand spiral time, for each year is a repetition of the previous year's activity, 
coupled with the remembered experience of all those previous years. At some point they 
have stepped onto the wheel and they will later step off it, but the wheel will keep 
turning. This is the Medieval concept of time, and a concept which is much more holistic 
and gratifying. The spiral concept is virtually the same but with the addition from 
Buddhist thought that you can never step into the same river twice. 
I have been at pains to differentiate between the logical evaluation of sculpture 
and, what I have chosen to call, the empathetic evaluation. Logical evaluation conceives 
of time as moving in a straight line. I have been particularly cagey about getting too 
involved with psychological and symbolic readings of sculpture. It is this part of our 
make up which, you will remember, Henry Moore did not wish to read about, and I 
would go so far as to say that this is the position of sculptors generally. For the sculptor 
there is no need to try and rationally understand the symbol, the image, and its 
psychological effects. I think that logical analysis of such matters can never really help 
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us to understand them. I also think that such logical toying with them will, inevitably, 
inhibit our capacity to enjoy these aspects of our being. It is quite common to meet with 
psychologists who are unable to live their non-rational experiences, because they are 
already analysing them whilst they happen. The other notion of time, the timelessness of 
the wheel or spiral, is that of the subconscious visual realm of the right brain. 
When we lose this holistic concept of time, as our society surely has, we lose our 
sense of belonging in a significant way. I have already mentioned, in the first chapter, 
how sculpture encodes certain concepts of time. I have also, I hope, shown how sculpture 
can be timeless. Whilst it encodes its own Zeitgeist, sculpture can, at its best step out of 
time and speak to both the past and the future. It has the capacity, even today, to leave 
the straight line of time, and move through the wheel or spiral, alighting where it will. 
Modernism has tended to concentrate on the formal aspects of sculpture and it is, 
according to Clive Bell, and, differently, to Roger Fry, these aspects which make 
sculpture timeless. There is, I have proposed, some truth in this, but these formalist 
aspects, per se, are meaningless. When worked into an image which is related in some 
way to, and reliant on, the essence of our being, the sculpture may then be timeless and 
reunite the viewer with a sense of himself within the meaningful wheels of time. 
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Chapter 6 Manifesto. 
"All these figurative works so far (and probably all the other works too), have much 
more to do with a dialogue with art history than with a real relation to the real world. From 
a first nod towards classical Greece (or the modern fragmented understanding of it) in the 
'Three Graces' and 'Chatilla' there was a move back topre-classical (Cycladic) influence 
and now a hotch potch of international borrowings (Aztec, Egyptian, African etc.). Each 
'development' is sideways as new art historical discoveries are made (the influence of the 
Turkish show in Vienna on recent ceramics). Each time I start to explore an avenue which 
is more my own I get frightened and revert back to something that 'looks like' sculpture 
(Le. has a definite art historical precedent). This is because of uncertainty, lack of 
confidence too, but chiefly because of lack of engagement with the real world and real 
emotional or rational responses to it. The works do not originate from any engagement 
other than with myself and my attitudes to existing art 
So what's the way forward? The sort of art that appeals to me, the sort of three 
dimensional language is clear - a sort of animism, a belief in a fundamental force of 
objects. The problem is to use this position as a basis of an engagement with the real world 
and not with art history as an autonomous phenomena. What gives power to those works I 
so admired was a belief that came from such integrated engagement with life. It is a 
mistake to think that reproducing bits of this or that cultural language in an eclectic 
manner will give objects of the same power. A new way forward must be found. 
Of crucial importance to my view is gravity - the way things hit the ground, are rooted 
in it, or grow out of it. Secondly I like objects that express themselves through their 
presence, i.e. that are simple and direct, which have a kind of geometric simplicity, which 
express what they have to express by encapsulating the expressed through form, rather than 
by narrative means. (Say a Cycladic figure is much more expressive to me than the 
Laocoon!). This perhaps explains my leanings towards the so-called 'primitive' cultural 
artefacts in preference to the Classical Greek - Renaissance - Rodin tradition. 
To make any advances in art one must work within a tradition and innovate within it. 
For me this tradition lies somewhere between the 'primitive' cultures, but it is, of course, 
not inherited in a specific cultural sense. My cultural inheritance is that of Greece, Rome, 
Renaissance, Rodin - or is it? Does not the Celtic culture, the cultures of stone circles & 
long barrows have more to do with 'Englishness' and similarly the history of man's 
intervention in the landscape - so evident in Britain. Add to that the Romanesque. 
Now all these things have elements of what I want Ijust think that 'we' went a bit 
wrong in our direction, losing all the force of Romanesque, even the bumpkin qualities of 
local craftsmen too. We were blinded by the alien influence of Renaissance & with it the 
renewed interest in Classical Greece & Rome. (Roman art of course did colonise Britain at 
one time, but the art history that follows it suggests that it was an attitude alien to 'British' 
artists' sensibility). 
Perhaps the key to all this lies in those Romanesque cathedrals wherein the joyful 
sensibility of a mason who carved animals, nature, man in a kind of innocent natural, in-
tune way, being worked into the powerful conception of something larger - the building 
itself. There is a similar power in one small head in Lincoln Cathedral to the entire feeling 
of the building. It is I think based on a joy of empathetic observation. Somehow the 
expression on the faces is the feeling. They are not the empty sentimental masks of 19 C 
sculpture - You can't 'express' joy by 'illustrating' it, you must create it, imbue the material 
with it vis a vis Lincoln Cathedral or Southwell Minster's carvings." (From my notebook 
21.2.1991) 
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I was probably having an off-day when I wrote this. I know those times too well. 
They usually come after making a large work abroad somewhere and I have to pick up 
the threads when I return to the peace of my studio, or perhaps when I have a large 
exhibition and I work hard to finish work for it and then the studio is suddenly empty 
and I must begin again. At times like these I tend to ponder on what I have done and 
why and where to go next and it is often a period of very hard self-criticism. Then I start 
to make something and the rhythm of the physical work takes over. From my arguments 
it would seem that the left side of my brain has been dominant in these thinking periods 
and then the right side takes the upper hand as I get back into the groove. However, re-
reading this entry in an old notebook, I do think that it encapsulates, to some extent at 
least, my current position, as much as one is able to explain that in words. 
There is a danger of mistaking the position that I have taken as a formalist one. 
The materialist basis of my argument is evident. My placing the origin of beauty, and 
our emotional reaction to it, in the recognition of the very physiological patterns which 
control our senses, would suggest that I believe only in a reaction to the formal aspects of 
line, shape, etc.., with which I began. But we must remember that the right side of the 
brain is responsible for our response to holistic images, whilst the left side of the brain 
reads formalist detail. The empathetic capacity is a response to the total image of the 
sculpture, and not to its parts. Formalist evaluation of sculpture is of the intellect and, 
subsequently, of the left brain. 
There is a further difference. The formalist approach values the lines, shapes, etc., 
and there interrelationships, as an end in themselves. In a strictly formalist sculpture 
there are only these elements and thus as image which alludes, basically, to itself. The 
type of sculpture which I champion uses line, shape, etc., only as elements in the final 
image. The image is more than a sum of its parts and quite other than are they. My 
version of aesthetic reaction is a response to the holistic image and not to consideration 
of the individual formal elements, for this latter is an intellectual activity. It is this which 
differs my stance from that of Clive Bell in his book 'Art', which I read around twenty 
five years ago. I was reminded of it again by Peter Fuller 1951 do agree with Bell 
that 'we gibber' when we talk of works of art and I do agree that the Renaissance 
attitude began to destroy the idea of the 'pure aesthetic rapture' of art because in it, 
'intellect is filling the void left by emotion and supplanting it with 'science and culture'. 
But his idea of'Significant Form' is a mistake. Form in itself is not significant, except in 
the way in which it contributes to that communicative image which arouses a 
physiological reaction within us along with their corresponding psychic events. 
I do not deny that there is a formalist approach to sculpture, or that its 
achievements may be considerable. It is, though, by its nature, bound to its time and 
place and, however high its intellectual merits, will never be profound. The whole ideal 
of the formalist approach in the absolute sense, is to expurgate the work of references to 
anything other than its own self. In this it denies the possibility of meaning and of 
emotional response. I am reminded of the words of the formalist critic Roger Fry; 
"The form of a work of art has a meaning of its own and the contemplation of the form in 
and for itself gives rise in some people to a special emotion which does not depend upon 
association of the form with anything else whatever."196 
I have begged to disagree. 
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When we empathise with, and are moved by, a sculpture, it is not, firstly, because 
of a certain juxtaposition of lines or shapes alone, but because the image, the wholeness 
of the thing, arouses us. It involves us in a parallel feeling of wholeness, of 'being in 
accord with life', as Wheeler put it. 
"Modern man does not understand how much his "rationalism" (which has destroyed his 
capacity to respond to numinous symbols and ideas) has put him at the mercy of the 
psychic "underworld." He has freed himselffrom "superstition" (or so he believes), but in 
the process he has lost his spiritual values to a positively dangerous degree. His moral and 
spiritual tradition has disintegrated, and he is now paying the price for this break-up in 
world-wide disorientation and dissociation."197 
Intellectual arguments about the specific nature of the symbol and the tenets of 
psychology will never help us to understand the sculpture that we are seeing, for our 
ability to make a profound intellectual response to the symbol has become debased by a 
lack of shared beliefs. We can no longer programme our profound responses to sculpture 
through intellectual contemplation of the symbol. We can only wait and appreciate 
profound responses when they come. I am sure, though, that they will arise more 
frequently if we clear our heads of intellectual concerns and begin to 'look' at sculpture 
again. 
I made mention earlier of those Nineteenth Century marble sculptures in which the 
artist merely illustrated the emotion of, say, sorrow. They had an awful sentimentality 
about them, for they merely illustrated and made no attempt to arouse an empathy 
within the viewer through an 'embodied' image. They were based on an ethic rooted in 
the intellect, ultimately on that of Alberti, and one might, were there space here, trace 
the decline in sculptural values from his time to the late Nineteenth Century. The 
modern movement reversed this trend and showed signs of a new holistic attitude 
towards sculpture which was, in fact, very old. It is no accident that the force of much 
modern sculpture from the early part of this century has a look and feel - the conviction 
- which is normally associated with ancient, or so-called 'primitive' art. I suspect that 
this sense of wholeness was based in a belief in the harmonic future which the 
technological revolution seemed to proffer. Whilst the First World War damaged this 
sense of wholeness, the Second World War, and its aftermath, destroyed it entirely.198 
Since the Second World War our society has been transformed. Our feelings of 
security and belonging, our hopes and our fears, our ethics and morals, and, to a large 
extent, our world view, have all become based in the belief in the importance of money. 
We fear poverty, we hope for financial security, we dream of the big Football Pools, or 
Lottery win. Killing is wrong, but when a country's financial security is at stake... In 
such a climate, where genuine hope and a sense of the future is difficult, our intellect has 
become valued at the expense of our intuitions and instincts. But it is in art that there are 
signs of hope. 
Following a period of intellectualism in art which was at its strongest in the 1970's 
and carried through into the 1980's there has been a return to the old alchemist 
principle of the 'spirit in matter', which was especially strong at the beginning of this 
century. This is why we may consider the language of sculpture to have a vital 
reparative role in today's society - it has the ability to heal. Through it we may once 
again make imaginative, holistic, interpretations and to see the object as a physical 
equivalent for something spiritual. As Aniela Jaffe puts it: 
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"Psychologically interpreted, this spirit is the unconscious. It always manifests itself when 
conscious or rational knowledge has reached its limits and mystery sets in, for man tends to 
fill the inexplicable and mysterious with the contents of his unconscious."199 200 
Lacking a dynamic, systematic, intellectually-based symbolic order, we must rely on our 
ability to make subconscious associations, based in our collective instincts, with the 
image of the sculpture. Today, this is the only way in which the sculpture may speak to 
us of that which is beyond the merely personal, and relate the individual self of the 
viewer to the universal experience of existence, in the present, past and future. 
"...if the philosophical language game is going to have any value beyond mere self-
indulgence (which is sufficient for many scholars) there must be a point at which the world 
is translated into symbols and a point at which the results are translated back into the real 
world"201 
So my manifesto is this: 
1) Sculpture and, thus, our reaction to it, must be again holistic and must achieve this 
through reliance on the first response of what I have called the 'empathetic capacity', 
situated in the unconscious right side of the brain. If we are to have a sense of wholeness, 
a sense of order and of place in the world, we must begin to trust again in that 
genetically based, constant capacity that is latent within us. 
2) Sculpture must engage with the real world outside of sculpture. It must encode life, 
the world and our experience of being in it. 
If it does these two things sculpture will have a meaningful role in society once again. 
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Postscript 
The process of writing this has been, in some ways, similar to the making of a 
sculpture. I began with an idea, in this case, an argument. The rough form I knew as I 
set out to write, but I had no idea of its final shape. In the process parts have been added, 
taken away, changed, and the whole has been knocked into shape and finally polished. 
The big difference lies, of course, between the visual language of sculpture and the 
intellectual, word-language of a book. A parallel may be made between the final visual 
image of the sculpture, (and its meaning,) and the final intellectual argument of the book, 
(and its meaning). The success, or otherwise, of a sculpture, and a book, respectively, rest 
here. 
I once spoke with Fuller about the difference between writing about, and making, 
art. I asked him about his own experience of making art, for his, seeming, lack of 
understanding of the processes involved, always has, and still does bother me. He replied 
quite simple; 'I write. Isn't that enough.' It is only now that I understand what he meant 
by this reply. I should add that I am humbled by the breadth of his knowledge, and by 
that of many of the other writers whom I have referred to in the text. I have tried to 
express something of the sculptor's attitude towards sculpture. I hope that this work is 
not merely the view of one sculptor. 
Those who are familiar with Fuller's work will surely be able to see this text as a 
rather thinly disguised attempt to put down those things which I valued, and, more to 
the point, those things which I could not accept, in his thesis. I am sorry that we cannot 
continue the argument personally, for I am sure that he would have been horrified by 
what I have written, and may well have been able to put me right. 
I have always thought of science as being based on logic and on, more or less, 
proven facts. In preparing this study I realised that science is just as full of opinion and 
widely differing theories, as is philosophy, or art, and that it relies on intuition much 
more than its protagonists may willingly recognise. The reverse may also be said of 
artists, for I am aware that I have made too strong a distinction between the conscious 
and subconscious, between the intellectual and the empathetic, for in practise the two 
are complexly interwoven and not so easily separable. I have come to realise that those 
working in each of these different fields are really trying to do the same thing, in their 
different ways. It is, I suppose, a search for truth, although I prefer to think of it as a 
search for understanding. The methodologies are quite different, but perhaps we can 
proceed better through co-operation between disciplines. 
I leave the last word to Betrand Russell; 
"Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget 
how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of very great 
, „ 202 importance. 
148 
1 1 had a copy of Tucker's original, unpublished, seminar notes. 
2 William Tucker 'The Language of Sculpture', Thames & Hudson, London, 1974. 
3 William Tucker, op. cit.. pages 20-21. 
4 Rainer Maria Rilke, 'Rodin', translated by Jessie Lamont & Hans Trausil, London, 1949. 
5 Paul Klee, 'Pedagogical Sketchbook', Faber & Faber, London, 1953. (My edition 1968) 
6 Paul Klee, op. cit.. page 9. 
7 M.-L. von Franz, 'The Process of Individuation', in Carl Jung, 'Man & His Symbols', Aldus Books Ltd, 
London, 1964. My edition, Picador, 1978. Pages 221-224. 
8 For example the work of Nigel Hall, Alexander Calder's 'Circus', Picasso's wire constructions and to a 
lesser extent some of Nuam Gabo's constructions. 
9 As in the work of Anthony Caro, for example. 
10 Nuam Gabo's work, again. 
11 T.S.Eliot 'The Hollow Men', 1925, from 'Collected Poems 1909-1962', Faber & Faber, London, 1963. 
12 Alexander Calder's work is a prime example. 
13 Michael Freid, 'Anthony Caro', Arts Council of Great Britain, London, 1969. 
14 Ernst Neizvestny, 'Space, Time and Synthesis in Art', Mosaic Press, Oakville, 1990. Page 85. 
15 Other research suggests that Euclid merely rediscovered his mathematical rules and that the golden 
section, for example, was a much older measure. See Theopanis Manias, 'The Invisible Harmony of the 
Ancient Greek World and the Apocryphal Geometry of the Greeks', Athens. 1969. 
16 Robert Kudielka, 'Phillip King's Sculpture', Arts Council of Great Britain, London, 1981. 
17 Bertrand Russell, 'The History of Western Philosophy', George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1961. 
Pages 177-78. 
18 In particular the work of Dan Flavin. 
19 Rosalind E. Krauss 'Passages in Modern Sculpture', Thames & Hudson, London. 
20 John Berger, 'Painting and time', from 'The White Bird', Chatto & Windus, London, 1985. Page 205. 
21 Christos Doumas, 'Cycladic Art',Catalogue number 178 in the British Museum's catalogue of the N.P. 
Goulandris Collection, London, 1983. 
22 Patrick Heron, 'Late Matisse' in Modern Painters, Vol. 6 no. I, Spring 1993. 
23 Edward de Bono, 'I am Right, You are Wrong', Penguin Books, London, 1991. Page 152 
24 Gertrude Stein, 'What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them', from 'Look at Me Now 
and Here I Am', Penguin Books, 1967. 
25 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', Writers & Readers, London, 1980. Pages 12-13. 
26 Peter Fuller, 'Beyond the Crisis in Art'. 
27 Reuben Wheeler, 'Man, Nature & Art', Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1968. 
28 Wilson Duff, 'Images Stone B.C.', University of Washington Press, 1975. Pages 14-15. 
29 These are themes which run throughout Fuller's later writings and which are dealt with in considerable 
detail in Peter Fuller, 'Theoria', Chatto & Windus, London, 1988. 
30 Ernst Neizvestny, op. cit.. pages xxix - xxx. 
31 Bhagavad-gita, Hungarian Edition, The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1989. 
32 Fuller was killed in a car crash in 1990. 
33 Fuller's materialism, I feel sure, derives from a difficult relationship with his father who was a devout 
Christian. See Peter Fuller, 'Marches Past', Chatto & Windus, London, 1986. 
34 Ruby Ginner, 'Gateway to the Dance', Newman Heane. Quoted in Reuben Wheeler, op. cit.. Page 5, 
35 John C. Eccles, 'The Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self , Routledge, London, 1989. Page 1. 
36 John Maynard Smith, 'Evolutionary Genetics', Oxford University Press, 1989. 
37 John C. Eccles, op. cit. 
38 Richard Dawkins, 'River out of Eden', Hungarian Edition, 'Folyam az Edenkertbol', Basic Books, 1995. 
39 John C. Eccles, op. cit. 
40 Richard Dawkins, op. cit., page 29 
41 Richard Dawkins, op. cit., page 28 
42 Richard Dawkins, op. cit., page 30 
43 John Maynard Smith, op. cit. 
44 Charles Darwin, 'On the origin of species by means of natural selection or the preservation of favoured 
races in the struggle for life', Murray, London, 1859. My edition; Penguin Classics, 1985 
45 John Maynard Smith, op. cit., pages 42-44. 
46 John Maynard Smith, op. cit.., page 9. 
47 John C. Eccles, op. cit.., page 13. 
48 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 5. 
49 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 8. 
149 
s 0 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 48. 
31 W.G. Hoskins, 'The making of the English Landscape", Pelican Books, Middlesex, 1970. 
52 Richard Dawkins, op. cit., page 79. 
53 Charles Darwin, op. cit., page 20. 
s 4 Charles Darwin, op. cit., page 142. 
53 Charles Darwin, op. cit., page 319. 
56 Charles Darwin, op. cit., page 80. 
57 Charles Darwin, op. cit., page 89-90. 
58 Charles Darwin, op. cit., page 96. 
59 See 'volt-e vilaghaboru a tavoli oskorban?' in Erich von Daniken, 'Ujabb jelek a kozmoszbol', LAP-ICS 
Press, Budapest, 1995. 
60 See Mihaly Derera, 'Szarnyas istenkek, foldi balvanykak', Mora Press, Budapest, 1982. 
61 T.C. Lethbridge, 'The Legend of the Sons of God', Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1972. 
62 Erich von Daniken, 'A mult profetaja', LAP-ICS Press, Budapest, 1994. Pages 50-77. 
63 See 'Az Ediacara-fauna rejtelye', in Erich von Daniken, 'Jelek a Kozmoszbol', LAP-ICS Oress, 
Budapest, 1992. Pages 269-272. 
64 Martina Steinhardt, from Erich von Daniken, 'Ujabb jelek a kozmoszbol', LAP-ICS Press, Budapest, 
1995. Pages 66-70. 
65 Fred Hoyle and N.C. Wickramasinghe, 'Evolution from Space', London, 1981. 
66 Fred Hoyle, 'Diseases from Space', London, 1979. 
67 Fred Hoyle & Chandra Wickramasinghe, 'Our Place in the Cosmos', Phoenix, London, 1996. Page 140. 
68 Peter Fuller, 'Images of God', Chatto & Windus, London, 1985. Pages 298-311. 
69 'Darwin's Black Box' by Michael Behe, Simon & Schuster, London, to be published on November 4th 
1976. The book was previewed by Stuart Wavell in The Sunday Times on 13 th October 1996 
70 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 48. 
71 H, Margenau, 'The miracle of Existence', Woodridge, Conn., Ox Bow Press. 1984. Page 96. 
72 Richard Dawkins, op. cit., page 32. 
73 Richard Dawkins, op. cit., page 20. 
74 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 176. 
75 John Maynard Smith, op. cit., page 12. 
76 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 87. 
'7 Eccles gives an account of these in John C. Eccles, op, cit.s pages 76-80. 
78 H. Feigl, 'The "Mental" and the "physical"', Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1967. 
79 Edward de Bono argues differently - "...contrary to our traditional view, the brain may be a very simple 
mechanism acting in a highly complex way.", although the difference between these two statements may 
merely be pedantic. See Edward de Bono, op cit., page 35. 
80 John C. Eccles, op. cit., pages 207-8. 
81 Jerre Levy 'Psychological implications of bilateral asymmetry' in S.J. Dimond & J.G. Beaumont, 
editors, 'Hemisphere function in the human brain', New York, Wiley, 1974. 
82 K.R. Popper and J.C. Eccles, 'The self and its Brain', Berlin, Heidelberg, London, New York, Springer-
Verlag, 1977. 
83 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 72. 
84 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 220. 
85 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 223. 
86 R.W. Sperry, 'Lateral specialisation in the surgically separated hemispheres' in The Neurosciences, 
edited by F.O. Schmitt & F.G. Worden, 1974. 
87 See H. Margenau, op. cit. 
88 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 192. 
89 Patrick Heron, 'Solid Space in Cezanne', in Modern Painters, Vol. 9 no. 1, Spring 1966. 
90 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 137. 
91 John C. Eccles, op. cit.. page 117. 
92 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 120. 
93 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 120. 
94 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 126. 
95 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, 'Elettan Biologosoknak', Tankonyvkiado, Budapest, 1988. 
96 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit, page 818. 
97 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 822. 
98 Dr. Adami^yorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 832. 
99 Dr. Ad#m Gyorgy and feher Otto, op. cit., pages 816-7. 
150 
100 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 817. 
101 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 835. 
102 Tibor kukorelli, from Dr Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., pages 952-3. 
103 R.L. Gregory, 'Eye and Brain, The Psychology of Seeing', Oxford University Press, Fourth Edition, 
1995. 
104 R.L. Gregory, op. cit., page 10. 
105 R.L. Gregory, op. cit., pages 13-14. 
10fi Quoted by R L . Gregory, page 153. 
107 R L . Gregory, pages 161-162. 
108 R L . Gregory, op. cit.. page 177. 
109 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 967. 
110 Tibor Kukorelli in Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 950. 
111 Tibor kukorelli in Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., pages 944-5. 
112 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto. op. cit., page 919. 
113 Tibor Kukorelli in Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 958. 
114 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit., page 30. 
113 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit., pages 29-30. 
116 Garnett McCoy, 'David Smith', Allen Lane, London, 1973. Page 63. 
117 Henri Matisse, 'Notes d'un peintre' 1908, reproduced in Dominique Fourcade, 'Henri Matisse. Ecrits et 
propos sur Part', Hermann, Paris, 1972. 
118 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit., page 30. 
119 Andy Goldsworthy, 'giving natural objects their own eloquence', 23 December 1980, photo in Modern 
Painters, Vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 1995. 
120 Ernst Neizvestny, op. cit., page 1. 
121 David Smith, op. cit., pages 86-7. 
122 Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 731. 
123 Jose Silva and Philip Miele, 'Agy Kontroll', General Press, Budapest, 1989. 
124 Jose Silva and Philip Miele, op. cit., page 13. 
125 Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., page 732. 
126 Tony Cragg, interview with Demosthenes Dawetas in Art & Design, 'British Art Now' London, 1988. 
127 Garnett McCoy, op. cit., page 79. 
128 When Serota took over as director of the Tate Gallery in London, he began a series of annual rehangs 
in order to show parts of the collection which were rarely seen. Generally speaking they were widely 
acclaimed and certainly Serota's effort is laudable. In this case, he made a mistake with the Brancusi. 
129 Glyn Williams, 'Ancient Art of Mexico in London' in Modern Painters, Vol. 5 no. 4, winter 1992. 
130 Garnett McCoy, op. cit.. 
131 Tony Cragg, op. cit., 
132 One can sense the importance of the kitchen table in village life in John Berger's essay 'The eaters and 
the eaten', in 'The White Bird', Chatto & Windus, London, 1985. 
133 It makes interesting reading to compare the arguments put forward by the lawyers of the customs 
officials in the court case brought against Brancusi, when he was tried for trying to smuggle raw metals 
into America, the raw metals being his sculptures. The sort of prejudices shown by the British press over 
the Bricks Affair were very similar. But even so, I think that Andre's work is in no way comparable in 
status to Brancusi's, although I must say that even Brancusi produced some very weak works on occasion. 
I am thankful to Sean Maslin for pointing out the similarity of these two art incidents. 
134 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., Page 33. 
135 Peter Fuller, Art & Psychoanalysis, op. cit., page 30. 
136 Sigmund Freud, 'The Moses of Michelangelo', in 'Standard edition of The Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud' 24 vols. Hogarth Press, London. Page 211. 
137 For a discussion of the role of symbolism in sculpture see 'Reading the Image' in Part 4, below. 
138 John Berger, 'A Painter of our Time', Writers & Readers, London, 1976. Pages 89-90. 
139 Peter Fuller, 'Theoria', op. cit.. 
140 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit.. 
141 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit., page 66. 
142 Waldemar Januszcsak, 'The Critic as Jeff Koons Fan' in Modern Painters, Vol. 1, no. 2, Summer 1988. 
This is a witty interview between Januuszcsak and himself, as if he were being interviewed by Peter 
Fuller, the, then editor of the magazine Modern Painters. Whilst poking fun at Fuller, with whom he 
rarely saw eye to eye, much of what he has to say is quite pertinent. 
143 Peter Fuller,' Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., pages 71-129. 
151 
144 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., page 97. 
145 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., page 99. 
146 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., page 121. 
147 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., pages 118-9. 
148 William Tucker, 'The language of Sculpture', op. cit.. 
149 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., page 124. 
150 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., page 125. 
151 Carl Jung, editor, 'Man & his Symbols', Picador Books, London, 1978. Page 85. 
152 W.G. Hoskins, op. cit.. 
153 See K.R. Popper & J.C. Eccles, op. cit.. 
134 G. Baumgartner, 'Psychophysics and central processing' in A. Ashbury, etc. 'Diseases of the Nervous 
System: Clinical Neurobiology' vol. 2, Heinemann Medical books, London, 1986. Quoted by John C. 
Eccles, op. cit., page 139. 
155 Geoffrey Chaucer. 'The Canterbury Tales', c. 1387. My edition J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., Everyman's 
Library, 1958. This is an extract from 'The Nun's Priest's Tale', versus 3718-3736. 
156 Aniela Jaffe, 'Symbolism in the Visual Arts', in Carl Jung, 'Man & His Symbols', op. cit., page 310. 
l s 7 Christian Duverger, Catalogue for the exhibition 'Les arts de l'Amerique latine', Unesco, 1977. Foe a 
more serious account of the ball game see Wolf Giinter Thieme, 'Ullamaliztli, das altindianische Ballspiel' 
in 'Glanz und Untergang des Alten mexico', Verlag Philipp von Zabern, Mainz, 1986. 
158 Ernst Neizvestny, op. cit., page 25. 
159 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit.. 
160 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit., page 55. 
161 For Loki see Kevin Crossley-Holland 'The Norse Myths', Penguin Books, 1980. For Cu Chuiaind see 
'Early Irish Myths and Sagas', Penguin Books, 1981. 
162 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 4. 
163 Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Feher Otto, op. cit., pages 994-5. 
164 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 58. 
165 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 25. 
166 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 72. 
167 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 69. 
1 6 8 1 should point out here that I find that much of what Jung calls archetypal is well beyond the realms of 
the physiologically based instincts. His failure, for my part, was his inability to distinguish that which is 
truly instinctive, i.e. physiologically and genetically based, from that which is based in accrued experience. 
169 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 4. 
170 Johannes Greber, 'Der Verkehr mit der Geisterwelt Gottes', L932. My translation: 'Kapcsolat Isten 
Szellemvillagaval', Greber Kor, Pecs. 
171 Johannes Greber, op. c i t , page 72. 
172 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 176. 
173 This is a point made by, amongst others, M.-L. von Franz in 'Science and the Unconscious', in Carl 
Jung, op. cit., pages 377-387. 
174 Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pages 787-788. 
175 Bertrand Russell, op. cit., page 789. 
176 John C. Eccles, op. cit., page 189. 
177 T. C. Lethbridge, 'The Legend of the Sons of God', op. cit 
178 John Michell discusses the idea in relation to, amongst other things, the ancient Chinese Seng fui in 
'Atlantisz Oroksege', Edesviz Kiado, Budapest. 
179 Guy Underwood, 'The Pattern of the Past', Abacus paperback, 1972. 
180 Peter Fuller, 'Images of God', op. cit.. 
181 Peter Fuller, 'Images of God', op. cit., page 30. 
182 See Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis, op. cit.. 
183 Quoted in Peter Fuller, 'Images of God', op. cit., page 28 
184 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., page 41. 
185 Reuben Wheeler, op. cit., page 4. 
186 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 31. 
187 Tibor Kukorelli in Dr. Adam Gyorgy and Fehet Otto, op. cit., page 958. 
188 John Berger, 'Permanent Red', 1960. My edition, Writers & Readers, London, 1981. 
189 John Berger, 'Permanent Red', op. cit., pages 31-32. 
190 Andre Verdat, 'Entretions avec Henri Matisse' 1952. Quoted in John Elderfield, 'The Drawings of 
Henri Matisse' Thames & Hudson, London, 1984. 
152 
191 John Berger, 'Permanent Red', op. cit., pages 210-11. 
192 John Berger, 'Painting and Time' from 'The White Bird', op. cit.. 
193 Peter Fuller, 'Marches Past', op. cit.. 
194 Erich von Daniken, 'Ujabb jelek a kozmoszbol', op. cit., page 152. 
195 Peter Fuller, 'Art & Psychoanalysis', op. cit., pages 145-49. 
196 Roger Fry, 'The Artist & Psychoanalysis', Hogarth Press, London. Quoted by Peter Fuller in ' Art & 
Psychoanalysis, op. cit., page 16. 
197 Carl Jung, op. cit., page 84. 
198 One must also note the importance of the effect of the new physics on Twentieth Century art. Einstein's 
theory of relativity changed the way we see matter. Matter is no longer a concrete thing, but simply 
energy. Thus, that attitude to matter, which was always fundamental to sculpture, has become 
disintegrated. The holistic notion of an absolute matter has been replaced by the temporal notion of force 
fields which alter over time. I suspect that this is one of the main reasons for the increased use of the 
constructive mode in sculpture, and with it the disintegration of the holistic image. The current trend for 
making 'Installation' sculpture is a personification of this change of attitude. This whole question may be 
the subject of another study, which is why I only mention it in passing here. See Albert Einstein, 
'Relativity - Einstein', Routledge, London, I960. 
199 Aniela Jaffe, 'Symbolism in the Visual Arts', in Carl Jung, 'Man & His Symbols, op. cit., page 292. 
200 1 should point out here that Jaffe argues that the unconscious must be balanced by the conscious in art, 
as, otherwise, it will lead to the expression of despair. (See pages 314-316) I simply disagree, although it 
may be true of art produced by the mentally unbalanced patients, with whom Jaffe was professionally 
familiar. What I am arguing is that the subconscious may have a role, quite separate from the conscious, 
and that this is, of a holistic nature. It may recognise holistic images and beauty. It has a reparative role 
without resource to the rational. It is based on physiological elements which are common to all of us. One 
of its manifestations is the visual language of sculpture. I am aware that I am here taking a stance that is 
contrary to all psychological thinking, but I hope that I have been able to show that there is physiological 
evidence for my theory. 
201 Edward de Bono, 'I am Right, You are Wrong', Penguin Books, London, 1991. Page 153. 
202 Bertrand Russell, op. cit.. 
153 
